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ABSTRACT
NEIGHBORHOODS, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS
Sean M. Payne
October 29, 2013

This study examines the relationship between neighborhoods, social capital and
economic success. In the model developed in this research, social capital mediates the
relationship between neighborhoods and economic success. Social capital represents
social networks with their associated norms and resources and increases economic
success by facilitating cooperation and by lowering transaction costs. Neighborhoods
affect social capital through local interactions, network exclusion, social learning and
social identity processes. An understudied part of these relationships is the existence of
endogeneity among the key variables. Using data from the Project on Human
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, this study uses structural equation modeling to
test the model empirically and find that social capital and economic success are
endogenous, but while social capital increases economic success, economic success
decreases social capital, ceteris paribus. I also find that social capital is highly dependent
on neighborhood levels of social capital. These results suggest that place-based policies
may be an effective method for increasing economic success.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Americans live in a stratified landscape. Economic and racial cleavages are
replicated in housing patterns as people are sorted into separate communities and
neighborhoods. While racial segregation has been one of the most important social
institutions in shaping urban political economy, segregation by income is growing and
shaping American life in important ways. How does this neighborhood inequality, the
sorting of people of different means geographically, affect an individual’s life chances?
Put another way, how does the neighborhood in which you live affect your opportunity
for economic success? In this dissertation, I argue that social capital—social resources
rooted in social connections—is a link between neighborhoods and economic success.
Evidence in the U.S. shows that income inequality has grown over the past 40
years. A 2011 report from the Congressional Budget Office reported that between 1979
and 2007, income grew by 275 percent for the top one percent of income earners, while it
grew only 18 percent for those in the bottom quartile (CBO 2011). This growth in
income inequality has been mirrored by increasing segregation by income in the same
period (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). In 1970, only 15% of Americans lived in either
poor or affluent neighborhoods. By 2007, this has increased to 31%. These trends
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have been driven more by the segregation of the affluent rather than for the poor
(Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Overall, these trends describe growing economic cleavages
in the U.S. which are transcribed in the geography and composition of neighborhoods.
There is also growing evidence that these social cleavages are having real
economic and social consequences beyond income. Disparate authors such as libertarian
Charles Murray (2012) and communitarian Robert Putnam (Putnam et al. 2012) and
journalist Timothy Noah (2012) have observed similar trends of growing differences in
human capital, social connections, and adult investment in children along economic
cleavages. These are some of the very indicators that predict success in life, suggesting
that class cleavages are increasingly being reinforced across generations (Putnam et al.
2012: 1-2). While Murray and Putnam offer different particular explanations—Murray
prefers culture and marriage while Putnam prefers differences human capital investment
in children—both converge on the idea that social separation by income drives the
differences.
How does this separation by neighborhood affect economic success? This is the
main problem around which this dissertation is focused. In this research I propose the
hypothesis that these different socio-economic outcomes are driven in part by social
capital—resources embedded in social structures and relationships—and that in turn
social capital is in part determined by neighborhoods. The purpose of this dissertation is
to investigate the links between neighborhoods, social capital and economic success. To
do that, we weave a conceptual and empirical narrative that shows that economic success
is in part determined by social capital for individuals and then that social capital is
affected by neighborhood economic conditions and the social capital of others in your
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neighborhood. In the next section we outline some conceptual basics that underlie this
research and then describe the main research questions. Following that, I provide a brief
summary of the main empirical methodology of this study and an overview of the
arguments.

Conceptual Overview and Framework
Central Concepts
This research is built around three core concepts: economic success, social capital
and neighborhoods. Before providing an overview of the research focus and the rest of
the dissertation, we need a working understanding of these concepts and how they are
related.
Economic success as a concept is meant to relate an individual’s ability to secure
their own economic well-being. At its most basic, economic success represents an
individual’s income—either through wages earned in the labor market or other sources.
The basis of economic cleavages, and hence inequality, are differences in income and
wealth. In this study I focus on income as the primary indicator of success.
Social capital represents a qualitatively different type of resource than economic
success. Social capital is defined here as social networks with their associated norms and
resources. This definition requires a little unpacking. This concept of social capital sees
people as fundamentally embedded in social networks—social connections among
friends, family, colleagues and others. These network relationships vary based on the
informal rules and expectations by which people interact and the resources such as
information that people can access due to their network membership. Social capital is
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distinct from human capital. Human capital refers to the competencies and abilities that
make an individual brings to their activity, while social capital refers to shared norms,
knowledge and expectations that exist in the links between people (Ostrom 2000).
Although there is controversy about how social capital is precisely conceptualized, social
capital research has increased drastically since its popularization by Putnam (1993;
2000), and has become “routinized” in policy and research discourse (Woolcock 2010).
Social capital is often differentiated qualitatively between bridging and bonding social
capital. Bridging social capital refers to networks with wider reach, often across social
cleavages, while bonding refers to close-knit networks among homogenous groups. Both
are important, but different types of social capital could have different effects on
economic success.
The last central concept is that of neighborhoods. Neighborhoods are both a
geographic and social construction (Coulton 2012). Geographically, neighborhoods are
contiguous areas with shared space, but may not have well defined boundaries. More
importantly, neighborhoods are a network of relationships among people who live close
together and composed of a shared understanding of what, and who, the neighborhood is.
Because neighborhoods are social networks, access to neighborhoods or membership in
the neighborhoods is one means by which individuals have access to social capital. The
converse of access is closure, the restriction of access to resources (Burt 2000). This
means that membership in neighborhood networks can give or restrict access to social
capital.
This study focuses on two scales of interactions: the individual scale and the
neighborhood scale. We also focus on the interactions between the scales, how
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individuals affect the neighborhood and how the neighborhood affects individuals. This
is based on Gidden’s (1984) theory of structuration. In structuration theory, human
agency and structure are in a relationship with one another, and analytic primacy cannot
necessarily be given to one over the other. Instead, individuals make choices in response
to their environment and the opportunities which are available, i.e. in response to the
structure, but through the actions of many individuals that environment or structure may
change. Here we see social capital existing in the interactions between individuals and
their networks, the most important of which for this study are neighborhoods.

Social Capital and Economic Success
One of the main concerns since the popularization of social capital has been its
role in the economy (Woolcock 2011). This economic social capital literature can be
generally split into two camps: those that look at the macro-economic effects of social
capital and those that look at the micro-economic outcomes.
Studies examining aggregate levels of social capital and aggregate economic
outcomes, such as growth, have generally found a positive relationship between the two.
Putnam’s (1993) classic study of Italy kick-started research into the relationship between
economic growth and social capital. Putnam used civic engagement, measured by voter
turnout, newspaper reading, voluntary membership and trust in institutions, to explain
regional differences in economic development between north and south Italy. Similarly,
Fukuyama (1995) used “trust,” measured simply as voluntary organization membership,
to explain economic development differences between nations and among societal
groups, arguing that high trust societies will prosper. Knack and Keefer (1997) compare
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economic performance and social capital cross-nationally using factors constructed from
the World Values Survey (WVS). They find that trust and civic norms impact aggregate
economic output, but find that association memberships, contrary to Putnam, have little
impact. Other studies using the WVS have generally supported these findings (Whitely
1997; La Porta et. al. 1997).
More important for our purposes are the studies that look at the micro-economic
impact of social capital. These studies have also generally found a positive relationship
between social capital and economic success. The most convincing evidence on the
micro-economic front is how social capital functions in the labor market, where social
networks have been shown to help people find work, increase labor force participation,
and keep their jobs (Granovetter 1973; Aguilera, 2003 Zippay, 2001 Fernandez and
Castillo, 2001). Studies of both low-wage labor markets (D. Brown et al 2001) and
higher-paid mangers (Bowman et al 1991) found that the majority of workers found their
jobs through informal means. Also, a large number of studies find that social capital in
youth, often measured at the family level, is a significant predictor of upward mobility,
test scores and human capital development generally (Furstenburg and Hughes 1995;
Hagan et. al. 1996; McNeal 1999).
Research into neighborhoods has also shown a connection between neighborhood
conditions and the economic success of individuals. Though it has some precursors, the
influential work of William J. Wilson (1987; 1996) spawned the “neighborhood effects”
literature which examines how poor neighborhoods limit the opportunities of the
residents within them. Wilson’s primary thesis is that poor neighborhoods are socially
disconnected from opportunities that could better them. In effect, he argues that poor
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individual’s social capital was limited by their neighborhoods. Studies following Wilson
have found strong correlations between neighborhood poverty and individual economic
outcomes (Small and Newman 2001).
A significant methodological issue for studies of social capital and economic
outcomes is the problem of endogeneity (Portes and Vickers 2011; Durlauf 2002).
Endogeneity is where two concepts have some element of mutual causality. In the case
of social capital, we can see from the theories of Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988)
that economic status and social capital may be mutually reinforcing—that an individual
or group possess certain forms of social capital, say bridging networks, based on their
economic status which then help them maintain their income or economic position. This
is what Portes and Vickstrom (2011) call the “origins issue,” which they claim is undertheorized and studied (466). Durlauf (2002) also criticizes the empirical literature for its
lack of dealing with endogeneity. In the few studies that do use an instrumental variables
approach, an econometrics technique for dealing with endogeneity, the instruments often
fail validity tests. Durlauf argues that “researchers need to provide explicit models of the
codetermination of individual outcomes and social capital” (474). A codetermination
model would explicitly model the reciprocal relationship between social capital and
economic outcomes.

Research Questions
This dissertation is driven by the following broad conceptual and empirical
research questions:
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(1) What is the relationship between social capital and economic success at the
individual level? Previous research strongly suggests that there is a link between social
capital and economic success, but there are many unanswered questions about the
mechanisms and nature of this relationship. There are three sub-questions or tasks
involved in examining this question. The first task of this research is to examine the
causal link between social capital and to outline the mechanisms by which social capital
has an effect on economic success. The second is to examine if different forms of social
capital, i.e. bridging and bonding social capital, have different dynamics. Due to the
different nature of these social capitals, it is usually argued and assumed that they have
different dynamics with regards to income (Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000). Bridging social
capital is seen as more productive as it is outward looking and forms wider network
connections, while bonding is seen as not as productive for income because of its closeknit nature (Putnam 2000). The third aspect is to determine the nature of the relationship
between social capital and economic success. Does social capital increase success, or
does success increase income? There is good reason to believe that this relationship is
endogenous, i.e. that there is an element of mutual causality or feedback between the two
(Durlauf 2002). One objective of this research is to develop the theoretical argument for
the endogeneity of economic status with social capital and to test this endogeneity
empirically.
(2) What is the relationship between social capital and economic success at the
neighborhood level? This question mirrors the first, but looks at the relationship between
social capital and economics success at the neighborhood level. Why and how do

8

neighborhoods matter for social capital, and is this linkage endogenous? Are the same
dynamics at the individual level the same at the neighborhood?
(3) What is the relationship between neighborhoods and individual social capital? The
final research question is follows closely with the investigation of the second question.
Why do neighborhoods matter for individuals? This question is driven by research that
shows that neighborhood economic conditions can have significant effects on the life
chances and outcomes of individuals. The neighborhood effects literature offers
convincing accounts of neighborhood context that reinforce poverty through social
capital related mechanisms (Wilson 1996). Previous research has indicated contextual
effects for neighborhood ethnic or racial diversity on individual social capital (Putnam
2007), and for neighborhood economic conditions for aggregate social capital (Sampson
et al. 1999). This study does not focus on effects of poor neighborhoods exclusively.
Focusing solely on impoverished neighborhoods draws attention away from differences
and similarities between neighborhoods, and it is important to understand the range of
interactions in neighborhoods.

Summary of Methodology and Data
The main empirical methodology for the empirical portion of this dissertation is
structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM is a family of statistical techniques that
combines confirmatory factor analysis and path regression techniques. SEM is
particularly suited for research that features latent variables or complicated causal
questions. Latent variables are measures which cannot be directly observed, but must be
inferred from other outcomes which the latent variable is thought to cause. In this study,
social capital is conceived as a latent variable underlying observable indicators such as
9

trust of neighbors, participation in voluntary organizations and cooperative behavior.
SEM techniques were developed to handle and model these variables within a causal
framework. Causality is the second strength of SEM techniques, as the path regression
component allows for causal paths to be specifically defined and tested. In order to
specifically test endogeneity of social capital and income, I employ an additional
statistical method, two-stage least squares regression, to specifically test for endogeneity.
The data for the empirical portion of the dissertation comes from the Project on
Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) community survey (Earls et.
al. N.D.). The PHDCN survey was a large scale study designed to investigate the
relationship between neighborhood conditions and individual outcomes. The survey
sampled 8,782 individuals on health, socioeconomic status, community participation, and
neighborhood conditions among others and organizes responses into 343 neighborhood
clusters in Chicago. This organizing of respondents by neighborhoods allows us to
model neighborhood level effects on individuals. This survey includes quite a few
questions on social capital indicators and socio-economic status. For over a decade,
Robert Sampson and colleagues have used the PHDCN data to investigate the
relationship of social capital related concepts to violent crime (Sampson et. al. 1997;
Morenoff et. al. 2001), Childhood development and well-being (Sampson et. al. 2008a)
and the social monitoring of children’s behavior (Sampson et. al. 2002) among others.
Also the survey instrument has been replicated in other studies and contexts (Dorsey and
Forehand, 2003; Drukker et al 2003; Lochner et. al. 2003; Rankin and Quane, 2002;
Subramanian et al. 2003; Brisson and Usher 2005; Brisson and Usher 2007).
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Overview of the Argument
The thesis of this dissertation is this: Social capital increases economic success
because it provides a foundation for cooperation that is a basis for economic success.
Economic success also has an effect on social capital because it can allow for the
building of wider networks. Neighborhoods affects an individual’s access to social
capital because they are one of the primary networks that individuals have access to, and
that economic cleavages between neighborhoods are also network cleavages that shape
social capital. I develop this argument across the following chapters, leading ultimately
to an empirical test of the relationships between these elements and to some policy
recommendations
In chapter two I develop the argument for how social capital and economic
success are related at the individual level. After a review of the social capital literature, I
situate social capital and economic success as a problem of collective action and as a
social dilemma. I then outline how social capital helps overcome problems of collective
action through behavioral norms and specific resources. Social capital affects economic
success by developing norms that encourage cooperation and through resources such as
information, access, and social support. Finally in chapter two, I argue that social capital
and economic success are mutually causal, because economic success provides the
opportunity for more social resources and reinforces the norms and behavior that led to it.
In chapter three I move beyond the individual level to look at group level
dynamics, with a particular focus on the neighborhood. After reviewing the
neighborhood effects literature, I argue that social capital is best understood as a type of
social interaction, which seems obvious, but means that because social capital is a

11

relational concept it can be understood as a type of externality. Social capital is a type of
local interaction, which means that the spillover effects of social capital, the positive or
negative benefit it generates for others, is limited to those connected in the network.
Local interactions can lead to the significant differences between networks and limits
what social capital people can access. Finally I connect social capital with processes of
social learning and social identity to show how norms and resources are transmitted, even
indirectly, through neighborhood networks.
Chapter four serves as a transition between the theoretical arguments in chapters
two and three and the empirical portion of the dissertation in chapter five. In chapter four
I develop a model for the relationship between social capital, economic success and
neighborhoods and specific hypotheses that are tested in chapter five. The empirical
results show that the relationship between social capital and economic success is indeed
endogenous, and that neighborhood social capital is one of the largest predictors of social
capital. However, we also find something surprising. While social capital increases
economic success, as expected, economic success actually decreases social capital all
other things being equal. In chapter six, I look at the policy implications and argue that
the role of neighborhood social capital in creating individual social capital means that we
need place-based policies designed to build social capital. I argue that the current
policies of poverty deconcentration are counter-productive and may actually be harmful
to those they are intended to help.
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CHAPTER 2 – SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC
SUCCESS
The question of economic success is central to understanding economic
inequality. The significant macro-differences in income distributions reflect processes
that play out at smaller scales. If we can gain some understanding of economic success at
the individual level, then that understanding will help build an understanding of the
bigger picture. The frame of analysis that we introduced in the first chapter, structuration
(Giddens 1984), applies here: individual level dynamics create and pattern dynamics at
the aggregate level that in turn influences future individual level dynamics. This chapter
builds an understanding of the social aspects of economic success at the individual level.
What determines whether an individual is economically successful? The basic
idea is that individuals sell their capabilities and skills, also known as human capital, in
the labor market for a particular price determined by the supply and demand for labor.
Individuals with the same capabilities should receive the same wages. Empirically,
however, this is not the case (Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 2001). Individuals with very
similar capabilities, age schooling and experience often have very different earnings.
While race and gender are well-known predictors of income, a large difference among
people of similar demographics can still be seen. A key piece of the individual level
dynamics puzzle is what determines the non-merit determinants of income.
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In this chapter we focus on the elements of economic success that come from
social capital at the individual level. The argument that I put forth in this chapter is that
social capital has two elements that influence economic success at the individual level.
The first is that the norms associated with social capital form a basis of economically
productive behavior and cooperation. The second is that access to non-money resources
in social networks allows an individual to be more successful and productive in earnings.
To build this argument I first introduce and review the concept of social capital,
and frame the entire problem of economic success as one of collective action. Then I
develop the argument for norms and the resource view of social capital. These processes
are very closely tied to those at the aggregate level, in particular dynamics of social
learning, network differences and social identity. For the sake of analytic clarity, those
concepts will be discussed in the next chapter. The next chapter will also look at some of
the co-determinant aggregate processes.

Social Capital
Before we look at how social capital affects economic success, we need to have
some idea of what, exactly, we mean by the concept. In the broad view social capital, as
a concept, is meant to capture the networks of relationships in which human action is
embedded and the norms of behavior and resources accessible due to these relationships.
Defining social capital precisely is a problem. It is an “essentially contested concept,”
meaning that there is widespread recognition of the concept, but not widespread
agreement on its particulars (Woolcock 2010). In this study, I will view social capital as
social networks with their associated embedded resources and norms.
14

The term “social capital” was introduced as early as 1916 by education researcher
Lyda Hanifan (1916) and has even earlier precursors in the work of social theorists such
as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim (Portes 1998). However, it is the work
of Robert Putnam (1993; 2000) which has brought the concept to prominence in social
and political research and policy discourse. In perhaps his most important work, Bowling
Alone, Putnam defines social capital as:
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital
refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness
that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some
have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls attention to
the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense network of
reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is
not necessarily rich in social capital (Putnam 2000: 19).
This definition has two elements that are important to tease out when discussing the
concept of social capital. First, social capital is based on both social connections, or
social networks, and norms of reciprocity. This captures the idea that people are
connected to each other and they are willing to act on another’s behalf. In this way, social
capital can be seen as a mechanism for facilitating collective action and overcoming the
prisoners’ dilemma (Axelrod 1985). An important point is that Putnam doesn’t specify
exactly who possesses social capital—is it people in networks, the networks themselves
or some larger aggregate? Yet, in his operationalization of the concept Putnam utilizes
all the levels of analysis but primarily focuses on social capital as a collective property
generated by individual actions (Putnam 1993; 2000).
The second and more controversial element is that Putnam ties social capital to
“civic virtue.” By tying networks to civic virtue, Putnam is essentially limiting his
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conception to Tocquevillian notions of civil society—social networks that increase
participation and fluidity of public affairs. This plays out in how he focuses his research
on associational activity. For example in his study of regional economic differences in
Italy, Putnam (1993) finds that it is civic participation and associational activity that
explain why northern Italy outperformed the south. In Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000)
argued that associational activity in the US had steadily declined and that this has had
negative effects on political engagement, informal socializing, human well-being, general
tolerance and trust. Putnam, in essence, is defining social capital as a public good.
Putnam has been criticized for this normative conflation of networks with civicness
(Portes 1998; DeFilippis 2001), and it is noteworthy that in later works Putnam (2007)
dropped the explicit connection with civic virtue. He instead focused on a “lean and
mean” definition in which social capital was defined as “social networks and the
associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness” (Putnam 2007: 137).
In contrast to this focus on the collective benefits of social capital, earlier theorists
have focused on how social capital affects individuals (Coleman 1988; Bourdieu 1986;
Loury1977). Loury (1977) argued that the individualistic framework of neoclassical
economics failed to explain racial income inequality. The alternative explanation that
Loury offered was that differences in opportunity—defined as the intergenerational
transfer of wealth, knowledge and social connections—continued racial income
inequality. Loury (1977) wrote:
The social context within which individual maturation occurs strongly
conditions what otherwise equally competent individuals can achieve. This
implies that absolute equality of opportunity, where an individual’s chance to
succeed depends only on his or her innate capabilities, is an ideal that cannot be
achieved … an individual’s social origin has an obvious and important effect on
the amount of resources that is ultimately invested in his or her development. It
16

may thus be useful to employ a concept of “social capital” to represent the
consequences of social position in facilitating acquisition of the standard human
capital characteristics (176).

In a similar vein, Bourdieu (1986) defined social capital as the aggregate of actual and
potential resources linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. In other words,
social capital is linked to membership in a group (Brourdieu 1986, 248). While
somewhat vague, both of these conceptions see social capital as a social resource that
primarily benefits individuals and recognize that class and privilege are maintained
through these social networks (Field 2003). Wacquant and Wilson (1989) reiterate
Bourdieu’s conception in their analysis of the social structure of urban ghettos,
identifying social capital as resources “potentially provided by … lovers, kin and friends
and by the contacts they develop within the formal association to which they belong—in
sum, the resources they have access to by virtue of being socially integrated into solitary
groups, networks or organizations” (22).
Coleman (1988) also expands on the benefit of social capital to individuals, but
defines the concept functionally: “Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a
single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common:
They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of
individuals who are within the structure” (1988: s98). In essence, Coleman sees social
capital as any social structure which facilitates cooperation and mutual advantage (Field
2003). Portes (1998) argues that Coleman makes contradictory claims regarding the
sources of social capital and function, leading to some conceptual confusion. Yet,
Coleman’s concept is essentially relational. It is not a quality of actors, but “inheres in
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the structure of relations between actors” (s98); however, its benefits accrue for actors.
By actors, Coleman primarily means individuals, but also allows for benefits to corporate
actors. Though Coleman and Bourdieu have similar conceptions of social capital as
resources provided through networks, Field (2003) points out the stark difference
between them. “Coleman’s view is also naively optimistic; as a public good, social
capital is almost entirely benign in its functions … with little or no ‘dark side’.
Bourdieu’s usage of the concept, by contrast, virtually allows only for a dark side for the
oppressed and a bright side for the privileged” (28).
These concepts of social capital have some important similarities and differences.
They both define social capital relationally as social networks between actors and the
expectations of reciprocity among them.

Where they differ is in the functional purpose

of social capital, and to whom the benefits accrue. Bourdieu and Loury conceptualize
social capital as essentially a private good which benefits those actors in the networks,
while Putnam and Coleman conceptualize social capital as public or club good that
facilitates cooperation. This is, in part, a level of analysis argument. It is reasonable to
argue, following Glaeser (2001) and Durlauf (2002), that social capital has both elements
of private individual benefits and powerful externalities in the aggregate. Woolcock
(2011) has argued that the levels of analysis problem follows disciplinary lines and that
sociologists and economists prefer more individualistic conceptions while political
scientists have focused on the aggregate level (471).
David Halpern (2005) argues that the concepts of social capital can be boiled
down into three common broad components: networks, norms and sanctions (9-11). The
component of networks captures the relational nature of social capital as existing in the
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relationships between people. These networks could be geographically defined, such as a
neighborhood community, or feature broader and “ill-defined” connections. The second
component, norms, captures the role of informal rules and expectations that fuels
reciprocity in these networks. The last component, sanctions, captures the idea that these
networks often have means of enforcing norms among members, which may be direct,
such as exclusion, or indirect through reputation and gossip (11).
Thus defined, social capital is a very broad concept that could be applied to
almost any form of social relation, and this conceptual vagueness is a source of criticism
(Portes 1998).

Woolcock (2011) argues that social capital is an “essentially contested

concept,” meaning that its usefulness lies not in a clear conceptual consensus, but rather
“on its capacity to draw attention to salient features of the social and political world …
that are of significance in their own right and play a role in valued aspects of everyday
life” (470). In this way we can regard social capital as an umbrella concept of certain
types of social relations. However, to understand social capital, it has to be articulated
through more specific sub-concepts.

Typology of social capital – Bonding and Bridging and Others
Since the initial definitions above were articulated, more work has developed
seeking to differentiate types of social capital. The most influential of these typologies is
the distinction between bridging and bonding social capital (Putnam 2000; Briggs 1997;
Woolcock 1998; Gittell and Vidal 1998). Bonding social capital are those networks that
are “by choice or necessity inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and
homogenous groups,” while bridging social capital are networks which are “outward
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looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam 2000: 22-3).
Briggs (1998) offers the distinction between these two as social capital for “getting
ahead” versus “getting by.” Bridging capital links individuals with others outside their
immediate community, offering access to jobs and influence not contained locally. By
contrast, bonding social capital offers mechanisms to cope with the difficulties of
everyday life, such as borrowing money or emotional support (178). The concept of
bridging social capital echoes the sociological work of social network theorists who
emphasize the role of “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) or network “structural holes” (Burt
1992) in promoting economic mobility and development.
The dichotomy between bridges and bonds, or between weak and strong ties, is a
useful distinction for thinking about how different types of networks link people with
certain kinds of resources. Other authors go further, however, in specifying particular
types of social capital. For instance, Williamson (2010) looks at general social trust, trust
of neighbors, group involvement and informal socializing; all arguably aspects of social
capital. Similarly, Sampson et. al. (1997) look at collective efficacy, which measures
informal social control and how willing neighbors are to intervene. In a related study,
they form specific concepts of social cohesion (how much people trust their neighbors),
organization participation (which reflects the traditional measures of social capital) and
social ties (based on the number of friends) (Morenoff et. al. 2001). Durlauf (2002)
argues that these more specific conceptualizations of aspects of social capital offer a
more compelling vision of how social capital is operating. Though these more specific
conceptions of social capital are attractive, they add further terminological confusion.
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This analysis uses bridging and bonding as the basic typology of social capital in order to
stay consistent with the majority of the literature.

Social Dilemmas and Problems of Collective action
Economic Success as a collective action problem
The great thrust of contemporary social capital theorizing is that it is a tool for
overcoming collective action problems1. Collective action problems are generally
situations where the actors involved would benefit from working together and
coordinating their actions, but private incentives work to discourage this cooperation.
Mancur Olson (1956) first formulated the idea of a “problem” of collective action in
examining why small groups are more effective than broad-based interests. In effect,
well organized minorities can be more effective than majorities. Many political and
economic problems, if not most, can be categorized as collective action problems. The
key point of the concept of the collective action problem is that it is a relational concept;
whenever an individual’s outcome or benefit depends on both her own and others’
behavior, there is the potential for a collective action problem. The nature of these
problems is that an individual cannot solve the problem on their own; there must be
coordination between individuals (Ostrom 2003). Ostrom and Ahn (2003) summarize
collective action this way: “Collective-action problems arise whenever individuals face
alternative courses of actions between short-term self-regarding choices and one that, if
followed by a large enough number of individuals in a group, benefits all. The problem
is one of overcoming selfish incentives and achieving mutually beneficial cooperative

1

For examples, see Ostrom and Ahn (2003) and Woolcock (2010).
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ways of getting things done” (4). Cooperation is hard, because in the short run an
individual is better off by not cooperating.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game represents the problem well, and it has even been
called the central problem of political science (Ostrom 1998). The narrative version of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) goes something like this: Susan and Katie are arrested after
robbing a store and are taken separate holding cells at jail. The prosecutor goes to Susan
and offers her a deal. If she confesses and betrays Katie, then Susan will get a minor
charge and a slap on the wrist: 3 months in jail. If both Susan and Katie confess, then the
prosecutor cannot let Susan off so lightly, but will pursue the lowest amount of time
possible: 2 years in jail. If Susan doesn’t confess, however, the prosecutor will throw the
book at Susan: the maximum sentence of 5 years in jail. The prosecutor then leaves and
offers the exact same deal to Katie, but makes sure that the two cannot communicate.
What the prosecutor doesn’t tell the women is that there is not enough evidence to
convict them of anything other than a minor crime. Essentially if both women stay quiet,
they will only be sentenced to one year of jail time each.
Table 2.1 shows the payoff matrix of the game and the dilemma. Collectively, the
best outcome for both women is to cooperate with each other and not confess, since this
minimizes both of their jail times. If Susan confesses and Katie does not, then Susan gets
the best possible outcome for herself, even though this means more total jail time
between her and Katie. On the other hand, if Susan does not confess, and Katie does, then
she will get her worst possible outcome. By confessing, Susan will avoid her worst
outcome while also potentially obtaining the best. This payoff structure means that the
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dominant strategy is to confess and avoid the worst-case scenario, because there is
uncertainty about what the other will do.

Table 2.1 Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

-1,-1

-5,0

Defect

0,-5

-3,-3

In this very basic version, there are some curious qualities about the PD game.
First, it is what Elinor Ostrom calls a “first generation” collective action problem,
meaning that it relies on a fundamental assumption that humans are selfish, rational and
atomized individuals (Ostrom and Ahn 2007: 6). People, however, are embedded in
relationships and networks with other people. Field research and experiments have
repeatedly rejected the assumption of universal selfishness (Ostrom 1998). If Susan and
Katie knew each other well before their arrest, would it change their behavior or
calculations? The second curious thing is that the basic PD game is played only one
time, and the actors don’t consider the future beyond the immediate payoff. In reality,
through embedded relationships, people interact and face collective choices over and over
again. This repetition fundamentally changes the nature and payoff structure of the game
(Axelrod 2006), as the players know the other players' previous strategies and have to
think about how their decision in this game might affect future situations. Thirdly,
outside of the rather artificial metaphor for the PD game above, cooperation is rarely an
all or nothing affair. People can cooperate in degrees, taking small risks until a
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relationship is established with the other party. In light of these problems, perhaps the
best way to regard the simple PD game is as an ideal type or metaphor that reveals an
underlying structure of a situation where cooperation is advantageous, but difficult.2
Before moving on to discuss the role of social capital in the prisoner’s dilemma
game, it is useful to show how the simple PD game can determine economic success.
The easiest way to show this is through a simple exchange. Take David Hume’s classic
example of neighbors digging a drainage ditch to clear a swampy area (1739). Two
neighbors would both profit from digging a drainage ditch. If the ditch is dug, they both
will be able to grow more crops and profit, no matter who does the work. Inherent in this
is the incentive for one-neighbor to free-ride on the work of the other. If they work
together, the total profit is greater than if just one neighbor had done the work.
Cooperation enhances the overall economic efficiency. Of course, Hume’s argument was
that there would be no free-riding in this situation because of the neighbor's ability to
monitor each other’s action and know the reputation of the other. However, the more
people you add to the project, the harder it is to know them and monitor; therefore, the
opportunity for them to free-ride increases. Hume’s argument also shows how,
sometimes, a PD game isn’t really a prisoner’s dilemma.
There are two inter-dependent ways of changing the payoff structure of the PD
game so that it is fundamentally different. The first is repeating the game for an
unknown length of time. In repeated games, benefits of defecting quickly disappear, and
cooperation generally has much higher benefits in the long run. If a player values the
future, that is has a low discount rate, then indefinitely repeated games create an incentive

2

My categorization of PD games as ideal types is controversial, but generally follows Koppl and Whitman
(2004).
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to cooperate.3 But, repetition also allows the players to observe each other’s behavior
and react to it. In a computer simulation run among many competing strategies in a
repeated PD game, Robert Axelrod (2006) found that the most successful strategy in the
long run was a tit-for-tat strategy—one which began by cooperating but then mirrored the
other player’s behavior. What this strategy demonstrates is the ability of players to 1)
adjust their strategy in relation to others' behavior and, significantly, to 2) monitor and
punish defections. The second way is to not assume that the players are necessarily
selfish, but to allow for altruistic and cooperative behavior. As mentioned earlier, field
research and experiments have generally rejected a hardline view of economic rationality
and have found that people cooperate in all sorts of situations that, from the outside,
could be constructed as social dilemmas (Ostrom 1998). One central finding from field
and experimental research on social dilemma is that “the world contains multiple types of
individuals.” Some are willing to act cooperatively and trustingly from the start and with
more emphasis on reciprocity (Ostrom 2000: 138). This is to say that individuals vary in
their balance between norms of trust and reciprocity and non-cooperation.
These two elements, norms of trust and reciprocity and repeated interactions, are
at the core of most social capital theories (Halpern 2005; Woolcock 2010). The theory
assumes that people are embedded in networks formed through repeated interactions,
whether they are very frequent interactions with family and friends, as in the case of
bonding social capital, or less frequent but with more diverse people in bridging social
capital. The concept is incomplete, however, without norms governing behavior. The
most important norm in the literature is that of trust. Trust and reciprocity may be
generalized, meaning that someone is generally trusting of most people, or it could be
3

Discount rate is explained below.
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particularized, meaning that trust is limited to a select group. The most important point is
that it exists and creates a foundation for overcoming collective action problems with the
trusted parties. In the next section we will examine more closely the role of norms in
creating a basis for economic success.

Social Capital and Norms
There are two primary means for overcoming challenges to collective action. The
first is through formal institutions, which regularize transactions through formal rules
(North 1990). Many institutions are designed purely to facilitate economic cooperation:
contract law, organized markets, insurance and so on. Social capital functions both
alongside and in lieu of these institutions. For instance, when formal labor market
matching institutions, such as trade unions that match skilled laborers with jobs, are
absent, personal connections can act a substitute by matching laborers with employers. If
there is no insurance system for protecting a business deal, then trust, reputation and
reciprocity can substitute for the formal institution in reducing the uncertainty in the
transaction. Norms are central in overcoming collective action problems. Trust,
cooperation and reciprocity offer a means of reducing free-riding. They reduce
transaction costs and provide a means of monitoring behavior. Other more internalized
norms, such as self-efficacy and time preference, interact with these to enhance and
subvert economic success. Here we look at four inter-related norms associated with
social capital, trust, cooperation, self-efficacy and time preference, and the closely related
issues of reciprocity and reputation.

Norms
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Norms are unwritten rules of behavior and codes of conduct (North 1990). In
effect, norms form a logic of appropriate action (March and Olsen 2004). Preferences, on
the other hand, are the result of an actor’s internal ordering between preferred choices or
outcomes. Some preferences may be wholly determined by an individual’s personal
qualities, but often they are influenced by the social environment and relations (Bowles
and Gintis 1993). That is, they can be socially endogenous. Norms and socially
endogenous preferences are very closely related both conceptually and analytically and
can be used interchangeably. The distinction is minor: Social norms can lead to
internalized motives or constraints on action (preferences), but norms can also be
enforced through social sanctions where a defector from the norm will be punished for
breaking the rules. For the sake of further simplicity, the terms will be used
interchangeably.
Norms and social preferences represent one type of “non-skill determinant of
economic success” (Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 2002). In their review of the behavioral
economics literature, Bowles et. al. found four particularly salient behavioral preferences,
or norms, that were important in predicting economic success in individuals: trust,
cooperation, self-efficacy, and time preference (discount rate). Trust and cooperation
refer to how much an actor is willing to work with others in situations of uncertainty,
where there is the possibility to defect, and their anticipation of how others will act. Selfefficacy is the belief or attitude that an actor can effect change in the world and achieve
what they want, while time preference is an individual’s willingness to trade current
income for benefits at a later time.
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Trust and cooperation have been the traditional norms of focus in social capital
research, and many scholars conceptualize social capital as equivalent with generalized
trust (Fukuyama 1995). Trust is most often used as an aggregate concept of social capital
and to predict various behaviors and economic development (Fukuyama 1995; Halpern
2005). Ostrom and Ahn (2007) draw a distinction between trust and trustworthiness that
is important. They define trust as the subjective belief about the unobservable or yet-tobe observed actions of other agents. Trustworthiness, on the other hand, is a probability
assessment regarding the motivation of a trustee and their likelihood of behaving
cooperatively and is based on the trustor’s perception of the population, in particular on
observable characteristics based on identity (12). Actors tend to see people with similar
characteristics as more trustworthy (Usulaner 2011). More importantly, individual trust
and perceptions of trustworthiness are based on the observation of trusting and
cooperative behaviors in others and learning them through social interaction (Ostrom and
Ahn 2007: 14-15). Agents who act in trusting networks will be more likely to trust, and
vice versa, so the aggregate level of trust is one important determinant of individual trust.
Trust and cooperation are important to economic success, because they are precursors to
accessing the social leverage and support resources embedded in networks. A person
who is perceived as trustworthy will have a greater capability of accessing diverse
networks either directly or through intermediaries who vouch for them (Coleman 1994).
Self-efficacy and time preference are more internalized norms than trust and
cooperation. These norms are what Bowles et. al. (2002) call “earnings-enhancing
behaviors,” in that individuals who display these norms empirically earn more, all else
equal (40). The intuition behind this observation is that individuals who are able to delay
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current benefit and who see themselves as capable of affecting the world will have more
economic success.
A ubiquitous feature of life is the existence of inter-temporal choices, which are
“decisions involving tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at different times”
(Frederick Lowenenstein and O’Donoghue 2002: 351). These choices can have
important consequences for future economic success in basic and fundamental ways.
Choosing to go to college, for example, is in part a choice4 between earning wages right
after secondary school or delaying wages for the promise of greater future benefit. Time
preference, also known as discount rate5, is how much a person is willing to sacrifice
current value for future gains. Or, put more simply, how much value someone puts on
the future. A high discount rate means that they value future value much less than
current value; future value is heavily discounted in comparison with current value.
Conversely, low discount rates means that the future is valued closer to current values.
Discount rates are important for understanding investment, schooling, saving, health
decisions and acceptance of risk (Frederick, Lowenstein and O’Donoghue 2002).
These inter-temporal choices feature heavily in cooperative behavior alongside
trust. Axelrod (2006) calls the discount rate the “shadow of the future,” meaning the
probability that agents will have to interact again in the future (13). This is a slight
permutation of the preference, but it captures the same logic: An actor can face a trade-

4

This is not to minimize the fact that not everyone has an equal opportunity or ability to attend college,
no matter what their time preference may be.
5
The terminology for time preference can be somewhat confusing. Time preference refers to actual
internalized preference, while discount rate is a measure of how much someone values the future
compared to the present. A high discount rate means that future value is heavily discounted, or reduced
in value, compared to current value. Some authors use the term discount factor instead, which is
essentially the same as discount rate but with an inverse interpretation; i.e. a low discount factor means a
discounting of future value.
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off between profits now and those of the future. Axelrod’s case is made in reference to
the PD game. If there is a low chance of future interaction, or if the actor cares about
those interactions very little, then they most likely will not cooperate because they do not
stand to gain anything. If there is a high likelihood of future interaction, or they place a
high value on the future, then cooperation is much more likely, barring other factors.
Social networks of relatively stable interactions mean, by definition, that actors have a
very high probability of interacting with those in their network again in the future, mostly
likely many times. Time preference, then, is not only an internalized preference for the
self, but also relative to the social structure of the situation.
Self-efficacy, the last norm that is important for economic success discussed here,
is the perhaps the most internalized. Efficacy is the psychological concept that connotes
an agent’s sense that they have control over their own lives and can “produce and
regulate” the meaningful events in their lives (Bandura 1982: 122). Self-efficacy is not
merely about possessing the capability to handle your environment, but the selfperception and self-judgments of those capabilities. It is trust in oneself. In a seminal
article of the central role self-efficacy plays in human agency, Bandura (1982) outlined
the functional and central role efficacy plays in decision making: Self-efficacy
judgments, whether accurate or faulty, influence choice of activities and environmental
settings. People avoid activities that they believe exceed their coping capabilities, but
they undertake and perform assuredly those that they judge themselves capable of
managing. Judgments of self-efficacy also determine how much effort people will
expend and how long they will persist in the face of obstacles or aversive experiences.
When beset with difficulties, people who entertain serious doubts about their capabilities
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slacken their efforts or give up altogether, whereas those who have a strong sense of
efficacy exert greater effort to master the challenges (123).
Econometric studies of self-efficacy, usually measured by the Rotter scale6 have
shown that it has a significant influence on earnings and wages and was comparable in
effect to schooling, intelligence and parent’s earnings (Jencks 1979, Osborne 2000,
Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 2001). Self-efficacy is also a strong predictor of educational
attainment, occupational choice and career advancement (Duncan and Morgan 1981;
Duncan and Dunifon 1998). But as Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001) point out, studies
on the relationship between efficacy and economic success is still underdeveloped (158).
At first blush, self-efficacy seems more a personality trait or behavioral
characteristic than a social norm and, therefore, not really relevant to a social capitalbased understanding of economic success. This is, at least in part, true. Self-efficacy is
an internalized personality characteristic derived, in part, from developmental
experiences from birth onward. However, self-efficacy is also profoundly influenced by
the social environment, in particular the family and peer interactions (Bandura 1986: 166177). Bandura (1986) emphasizes the role of social learning in the development of selfefficacy. Through observational learning processes, seeing what others do and how they
are rewarded, agents learn a sense of their own capabilities. Self-efficacy can be modeled
in the family or in the extended social network. Bandura (1986) argues self-efficacy is
most powerfully transferred through persistent, repeated social interactions (thus through
social networks) with other persons who have similar attributes to the agent. Exposure to
multiple and diverse models of efficacy have the most profound impact on self-efficacy
(98-99). It is perhaps easier to understand the social nature of self-efficacy by thinking of
66

The scale is based on Rotter’s (1954; 1966) work on locus of control and social learning.
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it as creating an expectation of the future. If Susan observes others in her social network
who are similar as being successful, then it enhances her expectations of her own ability
to achieve success. Conversely, observations of failure may diminish Susan’s perception
of self-efficacy. Because these processes model behavior where an individual updates
their probability of success based on observing the success of those around them, I refer
to it Bayesian social learning.7 Self-efficacy is important in a social capital context,
because through Bayesian social learning, it is embedded in the same social network that
is the basis for social capital.
All the norms above are learned socially as much as they are particular to the
individual (Bowles and Gintis 2002). Bowles and Gintis call these “environmental
inheritances” (13-4), but what they really mean is that they are learned from social
interactions with family, peers and people in their social environment. Norms are
transmitted through the social network. The mechanisms by which these norms are
learned and transmitted are the focus of chapter 3.

Reciprocity
The concept of reciprocity is central to theories of social capital and functions
hand-in-hand with trust. Putnam (2000) puts it directly, stating reciprocity “is the
touchstone of social capital … I’ll do this for you now, without expecting anything
immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident that down the
road you or someone else will return the favor” (134). Putnam’s definition is what we
may call generalized reciprocity. Like generalized trust, generalized reciprocity is a norm

7

Bayes' theorem shows how someone updates their beliefs, modeled as probabilities, based on acquiring
evidence.

32

and associated behavior that is extended to people at large. But Putnam’s definition is
misleading on two accounts: Reciprocity is not just general good will, but is often
particularized; and he is overly positive and shows only the cooperative aspect of
reciprocity. Importantly, reciprocity may also involve a retaliatory aspect. Fehr and
Gachter (2000) quote the 13th century Poetic Edda that marks a more general view and
captures the retaliatory aspect: “A man ought to be a friend to his friend and repay gift
with gift. People should meet smiles with smiles and lies with treachery” (158). This
quote is remarkable as it shows both specific reciprocity, be good to your friends; general
reciprocity, meet like with like; and both cooperative and retaliatory aspects. This is the
quintessential golden rule—the do unto others clause of most religions, but also the eye
for an eye. Reciprocity, it seems, is a near universal norm (Ostrom 1998).
Reciprocity is different from mere cooperation and retaliation. As Fehr and
Gachter (2000) point out, cooperation and retaliation are built on expectations of future
benefits. It is also different from altruism, which is “unconditional” kindness to others,
and is independent of others' actions. Reciprocity is a specific response to other actions,
even if there is no material benefit (160-1). All the norms detailed here have behaviors
and strategies associated with them, but the association is strongest for reciprocity. In
addition to the attitudinal component, reciprocity is strongly associated with particular
behaviors (i.e. repaying like with like and expecting the same).
Behavioral research on reciprocity shows a remarkable trend. “People repay gifts
and take revenge even in interactions with complete strangers and even if it is costly for
them and yields neither present nor future material rewards” (Fehr and Gachter 2000:
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159).8 This goes against some of the maxims of strong rationality and shows the strength
of the norm. A significant number people, maybe most, prefer to repay or punish people,
even if it gives them no material benefit and at cost to themselves. This means that when
moral interests and self-interest are in conflict, moral interest will often win.
Stating the strength and prevalence of reciprocal norms does not mean that they
are accepted universally. They are a social construction, a rule, and adherence to the
social rules will vary in any population. The prevalence of reciprocal norms depends
very much on the environment an actor finds herself in. The role of the environment in
affecting norms will be taken up in Chapter 3. There may also be a great deal of
individual variation. Some individuals may use reciprocity strategically; they may
behave reciprocally in situations where there is a strong likelihood of retribution or may
sucker individuals with strong reciprocity norms into providing resources at small
personal cost (Ostrom 1998: 11).

Reputation
There is one instrumental resource so closely related to norms that it is almost
impossible to discuss it separately. That is the role of reputation. Put simply, reputation
is how much others perceive an actor to follow social norms as well as their capability to
do so. Reputation is based, in part, on past behavior. So an actor who acts in a
trustworthy manner will gain a reputation for trustworthiness. An actor who behaves
reciprocally, either positively or negatively, will gain a reputation as such. Someone who
shirks, cheats, lies, defects and so on will gain a reputation of being untrustworthy, while

8
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someone who refuses to retaliate may gain a reputation as either a sucker or a saint
depending on the observer.
One important facet of reputation is that it can be communicated and, therefore,
learned by actors who have not necessarily interacted before. This is where social
networks become important. If Mary and Bob both know Sue, then Mary can learn about
Bob’s reputation from Sue and vice versa. If Mary and Bob act in a trustworthy manner
toward one another, then both of their reputations are enhanced. In this manner
reputation is built little by little, through many and repeated interactions. This gives us
two important methods for understanding social capital. First, it shows the diffusion of
information about actors through the social network in a Bayesian model of social
learning. The second method leads to the idea of indirect reciprocity (Doebeli and Hauert
2005).
In the Bayesian model, each actor’s actions reveal something about themselves
(most important, for this study, their adherence with norms of trust and reciprocity). Each
other actor can, thereby, make better decisions by observing behavior and choosing their
own actions in accordance (Gale and Kariv 2003). This social learning mechanism is
important for much of the resource view of social capital discussed below.
Indirect reciprocity is the idea illustrated in the simple Mary, Bob and Sue
example above: an actor can choose a strategy based on what they learn about their
behavior from other actors. If Bob is trustworthy with Sue, then Mary can cooperate with
Bob at a lower risk. If Bob cheated Sue, then Mary can learn not to cooperate with Bob.
The effect is reciprocal action, retaliation and cooperation, in response to an individual’s
behavior with other actors. Indirect reciprocity goes beyond the simple “I help you and
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you help me” to the more diffuse “I help you and someone else helps me” (Doebeli and
Hauert 2005: 756).
Indirect reciprocity is somewhat different from the generalized concept of
reciprocity. Generalized reciprocity is where the system is so indirect and so diffuse that
actors behave reciprocally without the expectation of specific benefits. These three facets
of reciprocity (direct, indirect and generalized) are really about the scale of the norm, or
norm acceptance, rather than separate concepts. Norms operate at the inter-personal,
network and aggregate/macro scale levels. Studies that focus on macro-economic
performance or larger geographic units have most often focused on the role of
generalized reciprocity (Putnam 1998; 2000; Fukuyama 1995). However, the macro
scale plays less of a role in this analysis than direct and indirect reciprocity within
networks.

Bridging Social Capital
The first form of social capital linked to economic success is bridging social
capital. Bridging social capital, to echo the earlier general definition, refers to social
networks that connect people or groups previously unknown to one another (Gittell and
Vidal 1998: 15). Or to put it another way, it represents trust and cohesion between
individuals from different communities. Aggregate bridging social capital has been the
traditional focus of much of the previous social capital research, following the lead set by
Robert Putnam and others, who primarily focused on the role of bridging social capital as
a driver of civic engagement and generalized trust that provides wide benefits (Putnam
1993; 2000; Woolcock 2010).
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As important as the aggregate is, different dynamics are observed at the individual
level for bridging social capital. Rather than providing general public goods, bridging
social capital provides particular access to valuable resources. These are resources that
are used to “get ahead” or to better oneself and provide “social leverage” (Briggs
2007:153). The most important of these resources are access to private information,
particularly about the labor market and individuals’ reputations, knowledge spillovers
and access. Private information refers to gaining knowledge about individuals or
opportunities that is not widely available, known as information asymmetries; knowledge
spillovers refers to learning due to proximity; and access refers to the ability to gain
access to institutions that can enhance success.

Information Asymmetries and the Labor Market
The first, and arguably the most important, channel in which social capital affects
economic success is through providing a means of overcoming information asymmetries.
Information asymmetries refer to situations of imperfect information, typically where one
party has more relevant information about a transaction than other parties; or where
individuals who could conduct a transaction cannot find each other; or when they do,
they do not trust each other enough to trade (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005). In contrast
to standard neoclassical analysis, these sorts of information failures are the norm in
human transactions rather than the exception (Hayek 1945).
Two specific types of information asymmetries are important for social capital:
search and quality. Search refers to the available processes by which economic agents
seek a trading partner before transacting. In markets, buyers rarely have perfect
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information about the lowest priced goods and face the problem of how to acquire such
information. Another variation of this is the search for jobs, where prospective workers
have to acquire information about available jobs and their quality (Stigler 1962). This
problem introduces a transaction cost known as a “search cost” (Dahlman 1979: 148).
The second information asymmetry is private information and quality. There is a
specific information asymmetry that concerns the quality of a product in a transaction,
whether that good is a used car (Akerlof 1970) or the skills of a potential worker. The
problem is that the seller has more complete information about the quality of the good
than the buyer. A used car seller knows more about the reliability of the car, and whether
it is a “lemon,” than the buyer. A job applicant knows more about her skills and abilities
than the potential employer. The problem becomes one where potential buyers or
employers have to try to protect themselves from making “adverse selections”—costly or
bad market decisions—due to information asymmetries (Akerlof 1970). This introduces
information costs, another source of market inefficiency, into transactions. Both trust and
reputation can reduce these costs, as they lessen the need for direct monitoring, provide
information on reliability and provide a means of sanctioning non-cooperative agents
through negatively affecting their reputation. Search and information costs therefore
represent two significant sources of market inefficiency.
There are two methods for overcoming information asymmetries: formal
institutions and interpersonal relationships (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005). Formal
institutions can take many forms to provide information or guarantee the exchange, such
as a stock exchange or guarantees on used cars. Interpersonal relationships overcome
asymmetrical information at a small scale through word-of-mouth or through repeated
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interactions. Though they are not mutually exclusive, that is some formal institutions
may facilitate or hinder beneficial interpersonal relationships, the concept of social
capital brings the role of these interpersonal relationships into stark view. The chief
insight is that an individual with a large network of contacts has access to more
information at a lower cost than other agents. This gives her a potential competitive
advantage in the marketplace. Below we will consider some specific examples of the
way that social capital facilitates this type of advantage.
Flows of information in the labor market are perhaps the easiest to understand
aspect of how social capital can affect economic success through overcoming information
symmetries. It is relatively easy to find anecdotal evidence of job searches being filled
through personal connections or personal references and recommendations allowing
someone to obtain a new position or advance their career. It is the embodiment of the
cliché “it’s not what you know, it’s who you know”. Beyond the anecdotes and clichés,
though, is a substantial body of research to support this claim. In the labor market we
find that two types of information asymmetries are important: the search for jobs,
including the quality of the job, and information about the job candidate.
Access to and information on the labor market is one of the main ways that social
capital directly affects socioeconomic status. In a seminal article, Granovetter (1973)
demonstrated the “strength of weak ties” in the job search. By weak ties, Granovetter
was pointing to the type of connections that are referred to in the social capital literature
as bridging connections—that is diverse and disperse connections with a wide range of
people—and even refers to them as “bridge” connections between more tightly connected
networks. These diverse ties channel information about jobs and applicants to jobs
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through the loosely connected network. A fairly robust finding is that 40-50% of people
find their jobs through information from family or friends (Granovetter 1995), meaning
that a large proportion of people find their job through word-of-mouth and informal,
interpersonal channels. Another finding is that people with diverse networks are able to
obtain jobs with higher wages (Lin 2000; 2001; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004). In
Granovetter’s (1973) analysis, having a diversity of weak contacts increases the
probability of access to benefits. The implication is that individuals with more contacts,
and contacts of higher quality, will be able to obtain jobs easier, will have fewer periods
of unemployment, or will land jobs with higher wages. In practice, bridging social
capital can be seen as reducing the search cost for job candidates by disseminating
information about jobs to candidates through these interpersonal channels.
Another way that this bridging social capital operates is by providing information
about a job seeker to a potential employer through personal recommendations and the
reputation of the candidate. The issue for the firm looking to hire is to gain accurate
information on the candidate. Reputation is the extent with which someone is believed to
be trustworthy. The diverse ties in a bridging network can bring employers greater
information about a candidate, for a lower cost, and reduce the likelihood of adverse
selection in the hiring process. Personal recommendations deserve a specific mention in
this process, as they represent the transfer of reputation from one person to the next.
Here’s an example: A new job candidate has little work experience and therefore very
little reputation. Perhaps she knows someone who has ties to the hiring firm and is
known to be trustworthy. This contact will vouch for her trustworthiness. Through this
process of vouching, a portion of the trustworthy agent’s reputation is tied to the new
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candidate. If she turns out to be trustworthy, both of their reputations will be enhanced.
If things do not work out, both reputations will be reduced. There is, therefore, some
element of risk in personal recommendations, and it is unlikely that an agent will offer
such a recommendation unless they have private information on the candidate’s actual
trustworthiness.
There is an element of mutual causality in the link between social capital and
labor market success. People with high quality contacts are able to obtain higher quality
positions and status, which reinforces and strengthens the quality of their social network.
Conversely, poorer people are less likely to be able to advance their status or obtain
higher quality jobs through their contacts and are less likely to form more diverse
contacts through work channels. Social capital in this form has the effect of reinforcing
relative income and status positions.
If we assume that a networked agent’s employment and status is probabilistically
related to that of their contacts, then the distributional effects of this form of social capital
become more obvious. For example, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) develop a
model that follows this assumption and shows that the duration of unemployment is
dependent on the employment status of the network. If agents in the network become
detached, drop-out of the labor market, it worsens the future prospects for other agents,
causing the probability that they drop-out to increase. The reason for this, CalvóArmengol and Jackson explain, is that searching for employment is costly; this cost may
lead to the decision to drop if the expectation of the future is low. Likewise, employed
agents in the network increase the likelihood of others to be employed in the future. In
the aggregate, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson show that this employment externality “can
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generate persistent differences among two social groups with identical economic
characteristics except that they differ in their starting state” (438). Given different
starting employment histories, these networks can result in sustained employment
inequality.
One way to think of the type of economic success that can be facilitated by
information sharing aspects of social capital is to think of them as a type of
disequilibrium rent (Bowles Gintis and Osborne 2000). Disequilibrium rent simply
means that an economic agent is able to gain economic benefit from asymmetries in the
market—they are able to use their private information or access to private information to
accumulate rents. This obviously takes place in the labor market, where individuals are
able to advance their careers either through acquiring new jobs or advancing in their
current ones due to access to private information. Entrepreneurship is another type of
avenue. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is one who searches for economic opportunities
and takes advantage of private information (Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 2000: 6). Much
like a job seeker, wide ranging and loosely connected networks provide a channel for the
dissemination of this type of information.
Closely related to the capturing of disequilibrium rents is brokerage. The idea of
brokerage is that some people are better positioned to take advantage of information
asymmetries than others and can benefit by linking—by being the bridge—between
disconnected networks (Burt 2000). Burt describes network structures known as
“structural holes,” which exist when two more densely connected networks are very
loosely connected to each other, perhaps through only a single agent. The agent that
connects the two networks is a position, due to her bridging connections, to broker the
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flow of information between the groups and can gain an economic advantage. As Burt
(2000) puts it, her bridging connections give her “broad, early access to, and
entrepreneurial control over, information” (355). The main idea is that an agent can use
their network to profit by brokering between disconnected groups. This is similar to
Granovetter’s weak ties argument, where looser connections provide greater access to
private information. While the concepts of disequilibrium rents and brokerage can be
applied directly to the labor market, which would mirror the discussion above in how it
would operate through lowering search and information costs, they also point to other
ways that social capital can lead to economic success. Social capital in these cases can
fuel entrepreneurship by providing information on opportunities and markets or for career
or social advancement through brokerage.

Knowledge Spillovers and Diffusion
Another information channel through which social capital can affect economic
success is through knowledge spillovers. The concept of knowledge spillovers comes
mainly from the field of industrial organization. In the most common definition,
knowledge spillovers “include all the information exchange taking place informally
between people working in the same or in unrelated industries” (Forni and Paba 2001:2).
In this literature, knowledge spillovers are typically applied to the diffusion of technology
and innovation and are modeled as efficiency-enhancing positive externalities.
Importantly, these exchanges of knowledge are not regulated by formal market
exchanges.
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The typical conceptual narrative is that agents working to develop innovations or
new knowledge facilitate other agents' innovation. This can happen either through active
sharing or through pure imitation, but it is always facilitated through some form of social
contact, typically geographic closeness (Breschi and Lissoni 2001). Studies of patent
citations, such as the classic paper by Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), show a
geographic concentration of various activities and that patents (as a measure of
innovation) are most likely to cite other patents from the same state and even the same
metropolitan area. This geographic concentration shows that this behavior is based, at
least in part, on social processes (Jackson and Yariv 2010).
Several studies have shown the spread of knowledge through social contact at the
individual level. Some studies have looked at the spread of technological use by
individuals, such as the use of hybrid corn among U.S. farmers (Griliches 1960) or the
diffusion of microfinance participation in rural India (Banerjee et. al. 2012). Frank, Zhao
and Borman (2004) show that the adoption of new technologies and productivity
enhancing behaviors are facilitated within organizations through the social connections in
those organizations. Their study shows that innovations spread more rapidly within an
organization that has more social capital.
The basic concept of agglomeration can be related to social capital at the
individual scale, as at its core agglomeration is based on the transfer of knowledge
between individuals. Here is a simple example to show how productivity spillovers can
work at the individual level. Consider two colleagues employed by the same firm
working independently. The first, Sharon, figures out how to increase her productivity
through a change in workflow. Her colleague, Michelle, learns of this innovation, either
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through Sharon telling her about it or through observation of Sharon, and adopts the same
behavior enhancing her productivity. If Sharon goes to a party, maybe she tells someone
about her process and they try it, too. In this way, productivity is spread through normal
social interactions and each person has potentially enhanced their economic position.
This knowledge externality doesn’t necessarily have to be an innovation to have
an economic impact. For instance, Greif (1993) shows how Maghribi traders in the 11th
and 12th centuries exchanged information while conducting normal business in their
complex trade and social network. In addition to market opportunities, the traders were
able to monitor their own agents and the behavior of other merchants through the
knowledge spillovers in the networks, could punish those who acted in bad faith and
maintain a system of trust that enhanced their profits. The knowledge spillovers could
also have a negative externality on productivity. For example, if employees learn that
they can shirk some work from other employees, they may learn productivity reducing
behavior. An example of this comes from Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul’s (2008) study
of fruit pickers. They found that without a strong individual motivation for productivity,
in this case piece-work pay, the workers were likely to adopt the less productive methods
of workers they were friends with.
The implication of these knowledge spillovers is that individuals who have more
social capital—who are better connected socially—will have increased chances of
benefiting from these types of externalities. Bridging connections increase contact
between diverse groups and therefore also increase, probabilistically, the likelihood of
learning productivity-enhancing knowledge or behaviors through these networks.
Bonding networks can also provide knowledge spillovers, for example people may
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acquire important work skills through their tight-knit networks (Edwards and Rothbard
2000), but the closed off nature of these networks generally do not allow for circulating
new knowledge and behavior from outside the network unless it also features wellconnected individuals. In a probabilistic fashion, better connected individuals with more
bridging social capital will then be more likely to have greater work productivity and thus
greater economic success.

Access and Influence - Institutional Resources
Better connected individuals have a further tool for enhancing their economic
status: the potential for greater access and influence in a variety of settings and
institutions. Probably the most important mechanism of this kind is access to institutional
resources. The main intuition here is that individuals with a greater number of diverse
ties and with social networks of higher social standing will be better able to leverage
institutions and organizations to their benefit. According to social resource theory,
individuals with high social capital are able to acquire greater ties to those who control
access to institutional resources (Lin 1990). In this aspect, social capital not only
provides information, but also opens doors.
Again, the labor market provides salient examples of how this access can
influence economic success. While these institutional connections can provide greater
success in the labor market by providing more avenues for the flow of information, as
discussed above, they can also provide for success through access and influence in a
firm’s work hierarchy. The classic example of this is the “Old Boy Network,” wherein
people, usually men, with social ties are given preferential treatment in hiring and
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promotion within firms. Ahn et al. (2012) found that CEOs were more likely to appoint a
former school-mate or someone from their region, while Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy
(2008) found that financial portfolio managers invested much more heavily in firms that
had former school-mates in leadership; likewise Inci and Parker (2012) show that
entrepreneurs are more likely to get financing if they are socially connected to lenders
This crowds out less connected entrepreneurs, who are less likely to find financing no
matter the worth of their project. Lalanne and Seabright (2011) offer some damning
evidence of the Old Boy Network—they find that executive pay has an increasing
function for the number of ties they have to other people in high positions, but only for
men. When they control for men’s networks, the large pay gap between male and female
executives largely disappears.
Access to promotion is important, but social capital can open other doors that can
have distributional effects. A strong example of this is high status parents leveraging
their social connections to gain admission for their children in selective, high-quality
private schools. One documented aspect of this the “shadow process” of admissions at
colleges. In 2009, an Illinois commission found that the University of Illinois College of
Law and College of Business both routinely admitted less qualified applicants “at the
intervention of well-placed family members or friends.”9 Similarly, an anecdotal report
from Law Professor Aaron Taylor (2013) claims that this shadow process is a regular part
of law school admissions and that it almost always works to advantage privileged, wellconnected and typically wealthy applicants. These interventions were based almost
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entirely on the social capital of the family.10 Perhaps most telling is that this shadow
process typically benefited least capable, but well-connected applicants over applicants
from poorer backgrounds. As the discussion of the old boy network above shows, these
college admissions will build connections that will serve to benefit the applicant later in
life.
Another example is access to political institutions and resources through social
connections. One of the most persistent themes in the analysis of social capital is its role
in fostering “civic engagement” (Putnam 2000). While civic engagement is generally a
public good, the concept of access goes beyond engagement to inter-personal
relationships that grant privileged access to, and presumably influence over, these
political institutions. The most nefarious example of this is pure cronyism, the granting
of positions or contracts to friends and personal contacts (Mauro 1995). Beyond simple
personal benefits, better connected individuals may be able to mobilize political support
for public actions that provide economic benefit, such as the mobilization of public funds
for neighborhood improvements that increase property values. Fischel (2005) shows how
connected homeowners mobilize politically, typically in a NIMBY manner, to protect
their property values.11 Similarly, individuals with greater institutional access may have
influence over the quality of policing or access to school officials.
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In each of these examples, social capital serves to open the door for individuals to
gain economic success through non-merit processes of inter-personal relationships. In
some cases, such as that of political influence, the factors are subtle, but in others, such as
the old boy network, they are not. What they all have in common, with each other and
also the benefits of information above, is that they leverage social connections as a nonmerit source of economic advancement. They offer a means of overcoming collective
action problems and fostering cooperation among diverse agents.

Bonding Social Capital
So far we have focused on the role of diverse connections in fostering economic
success. Now we turn to the role of close interpersonal connections, bonding social
capital, in fostering success. Whereas bridging social capital is associated with diverse,
dispersed and weakly connected social networks, bonding social capital is created in
think, dense and strongly connected networks. Bonding social capital refers to networks
that connect similar people to one another—people of similar experience or
characteristics. It represents close connections among people who know one another
(Gittell and Vidal 1998: 15). It is the type of social capital associated with strong group
connections and, to a certain degree, with exclusivity (Putnam 2000: 22-24). As Putnam
(2000) states, bonding social capital undergirds “specific reciprocity,” mobilizes
“solidarity” and serves as “a kind of sociological superglue” (22). It binds people
together while also defining boundaries among and between people.
Like bridging social capital, bonding social capital is linked to specific
types of resources and mechanisms which may have an effect on individual economic
success. The most important is what Briggs (2007) calls “social support,” resources that
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“help us get by or cope with particular challenges” (152). These social supports provide a
base-line that enable economic success. By this I mean that they build a social
scaffolding upon which economic success outside the home and neighborhood can be
built. In some cases they act as substitute for bridging social capital and in some cases
act as complement to it. Bonding resources are also more closely related to group
dynamics of social learning and social identity, which are covered in the next chapter.
Finally, bonding social capital can, in some cases, impede economic success when close
network connections become a drag on personal resources.

Social Support: Bonds as a resource.
While bridging social capital grants social leverage to facilitate advancement and
help individuals to “get ahead,” social support resources help individuals “get by” and
cope with specific situations (Briggs 1998). At its most basic, bonding social capital
represents a network structure for the exchange of favors and resources, usually based on
affect or social obligations. Survey research has shown that people rely on their friends
often and substantially with 55 percent of Americans reportedly going to friends and
family first when needing to borrow money and 48 percent of British respondents
reportedly lending an average of $1,800 to friends and relatives in the span of a year
(Leider et. al. 2009: 2).
The key is that these resources are accessed due to interpersonal relationships.
These resources can take a variety of forms, from various types of material support
accessed due to personal relationships, such as small loans, child care, shared car rides, to
immaterial support such emotive care and personal advice. These are only examples.
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The key is not the particular resource, but that it is gained through close interpersonal
connections.
Social supports are perhaps most important for poor and working class families
where they can function as a substitute for savings and income. This is demonstrated
most clearly in Carol Stack’s 1974 ethnography of a poor black community, All Our Kin.
In those communities, Stack observed “extensive networks of kin and friends supporting,
reinforcing each other—devising schemes for self-help, strategies for survival in a
community of severe economic deprivation” (28). Stack’s argument is that the poor
families she studied were based in kinship networks. These networks were based on the
exchange of services, gifts and emotional support. These support networks developed as
survival strategies, “adaptations” for the residents who had very little to no income.
These networks were governed by strong norms of exchange, based on both strong
sentiments of solidarity and the material realities, where “not to repay on an exchange
meant that someone else’s child would not eat” (28).
Stack’s work is just an example of a bonding network providing social support
resources. Similar networks of exchange have been observed and studied in different
communities and contexts, for example by Edin and Lien (1997) in their study of low
income white and Hispanic mothers in Chicago, Boston, San Antonio and Charleston and
by Newman’s (1999) ethnography of the working poor in Harlem. Ethnic and immigrant
communities often have similar strong social support networks, where the inherent
closure (or exclusionary nature) of the networks allows for greater monitoring and the
exchange of obligations (Coleman 1988: S106). The observation of these networks is
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widespread, but it is not universal; the strength of ties varies based on the particular
community and an individual’s tenure and ties to it (Desmond 2012).
One of the most important services that is provided through bonding networks is
child care. Upper and middle income families sometimes rely upon family or friends for
child care but also have the resources to pay for child care, whereas poorer women more
frequently use unpaid child care provided through family and friends. When poorer
women do pay for care, it is both of lower cost and quality than better off families and
represents a larger fraction of family income (Anderson and Levine 1999). Anderson and
Levine’s econometric analysis show some strong differences between skilled and
unskilled mothers: 37% of mothers with less than a high school education rely on a
relative for child care, the majority of it unpaid, compared to about 17 % of educated
mothers. For those who do pay for child care, less educated mothers on average pay
10.4% percent of their income, while educated mothers only 6.5%, though education
mothers pay much more in absolute amounts (7-9). The employment context can effect
child care decisions, as low wage earners often have to work nontraditional hours, deal
with shift work and can have changing work schedules (Presser 2003). Low-income jobs
are also unstable, which combined with varied hours, can make finding child care,
especially paid child care, much more difficult for low income families (Henly and
Lambert 2005). Without an institutional response to increase the supply of child care,
such as subsidized programs like Head Start, poor families can be pushed to rely upon
relatives and friends for child support or may have to withdraw from the labor market to
provide care themselves.
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Middle-class and affluent families also benefit from social support networks, but
for them it is less a means of survival and more a means for maintaining current income
level. By its nature, bonding social capital ties together people of similar backgrounds
and status, so members of the working-class will be most strongly bonded with other
working class individuals, middle-class with middle-class and affluent with affluent, in
addition to kinship and ethnic ties. Also of more affluent families, supportive and
bonding networks can act as sources of social leverage (McNamee and Miller 2009). The
bonding network could provide resources directly, for example through nepotistic hiring,
or indirectly by providing a link to high quality bridging networks. As we saw earlier,
one of the simplest examples of the latter is a close family member who uses their social
bridges to find employment opportunities or job references for another family member.
In these examples, bonding social capital acts as a substitute for two types of
resources: savings dimension and bridging social capital. The first, savings dimension, is
the dynamic that was highlighted above for poor families. Access to a thickly connected
network of personal ties allows families to provision resources through these
interpersonal connections and is based on exchange of, or is discounted by, affect, favors
and social bonds rather than through the exchange of money. The other type of
substitution is with bridging social capital, allowing less connected individuals to access
resources through their thick networks. For example, bonding ties can also serve as a
link to the labor market, as job opportunities are often shared within close networks first
and occupational skills can be transferred through close relationships (Portes 1998). This
substitution is imperfect, however, as the information and resources in these networks are
used over and over within the tight group with limited inputs. Outside connections,
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bridging links, present opportunity for access to new resource systems (Granovetter
1973).
Bonding social capital also plays a large role in identity selection and norm
formation. This is the socialization mechanism of social capital, which was one of the
focuses of early social capital researchers like Coleman (1988). The processes of social
identity and social learning are examined in the next chapter, but the main idea is that
people’s norms are influenced by those with whom they interact. Individuals learn from
and tend to adopt identities similar to those of their peers. This means that bonding
networks can play a major role in shaping the norms outlined above.
Beyond the resource enhancing and substitution functions of bonding social
capital, it can in some cases be an impediment to economic success. The same social
obligations that can serve to enhance or enable economic success can also work to
impede it, if there are excessive social demands. Social obligations could potentially
drain away resources from an individual who could otherwise use them for greater
economic success. To draw upon Stack (1974) again, the networks of child care and
sharing of earnings among poor single mothers often meant that individuals were not able
to save for themselves. Another way bonding social capital can have negative economic
consequences, and this can apply to bridging social capital as well, is when the collective
action mechanisms of social capital enable coordination of anti-social behavior, such as
with youth gangs; or when close-knit networks prevent the access of others to markets,
such as with ethnic communities tightly controlling entry into certain markets as seen
with Produce markets in the eastern U.S. (Carroll and Stanfield 2003: 402). Perhaps the
greatest impediment to economic success, however, is that bonding social capital may
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lead individuals to select “oppositional identities” (Ogbu 1978), which reject mainstream
norms and values and may inhibit economic success.
One way to conceptualize the distributive effect, which is the effect on economic
success, of bonding networks is to picture different networks of different resource levels.
By membership in a particular group, say an extended family or closely bonded
neighborhood, an individual can access the resources in that network at a lower cost. If
these resources are of high quality—such as access to bridging networks of high status
individuals or institutional resources—then an actor has a greater opportunity for
economic success. Conversely, if a close bonding network lacks high quality resources
or extensive bonding networks, then access to networks beyond the immediate group has
a higher cost, reducing the ability, and possibly willingness, to obtain these resources. Of
course individuals will vary greatly in their ability and willingness to capture these
resources, but the distributional effects on average mean that actors in close and resource
rich environments and networks will obtain greater economic success than those in
resource poor networks. I will examine this claim more in the chapter on neighborhoods.

Endogeny in Social Capital
What causes social capital? If social capital has a direct effect on economic
success, is the opposite also true? Does economic success create social capital? Is it
even important? In this section I discuss the role of endogeny in social capital. There is
a subtle difference between the theoretical question of endogeny, which occurs when
causation is internal to the system, and endogeneity, which is a methodological issue
discussed in chapter 5. Here we focus on the endogenous relationship between social
capital and economic success.
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Putnam (2000) states, in the study of social capital, “the causal arrows . . . are as
tangled as well-tossed spaghetti” (137). One of these tangled spaghetti strands is the
relationship between income and social capital. While the majority of this chapter has
been spent showing how social capital affects economic success, it could also be argued
that economic success has a direct effect on social capital. We can see this in the theories
of Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988), which show that economic status and social
capital are mutually reinforcing—that individuals or groups possess certain forms of
social capital based on their economic status, which then help them maintain their income
or economic position. This is what Portes and Vickstrom (2011) call the “origins issue,”
and it is important from both a theoretical and policy standpoint to understand how these
can be mutually causal.
The argument is relatively straightforward and has been suggested through much
of this chapter so far. If the various forms of social capital can be hypothesized to have
an effect on economic success, economic success can also be hypothesized to have a
reciprocal effect on social capital. Economic success can affect social capital both
through the resource and normative dimensions. For resources, economic success in
itself may provide the opportunity for building or strengthening bridging or bonding
connections. For example, a successful career or higher status position provides
opportunities for an individual to build connection with individuals of similar or higher
status because of their own success. These connections could then open up new
opportunities. Economic success creates opportunities for agents to access networks with
high levels of resources. Those high resource networks then provide opportunity for an
agent to either maintain or enhance their economic success in a positive feedback loop.
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The argument for bonding social capital is similar but less direct. If a close
bonding network is made of economically successful members, members will have
access to greater resources at lower cost. This is what provides the opportunity to
enhance individual economic success. Achieving economic success further enhances the
resources available to members of the network, again creating a positive feedback loop.
Bonding networks without higher levels of economic success can help sustain members
at their current level of success, but the enhancement effect may be small. Bonding
social capital may also be enhanced by economic success, because economically
successful individuals will not strain the resources in bonding networks as much as less
economically successful individuals.
Economic success can also affect norms. If an individual is rewarded
economically by adopting a particular norm, such as trust or a low discount rate, then that
success will have a positive feedback and strengthen the norm. Similarly, if an individual
is in a network with economically successful individuals, then they may adopt the
attitudes and behaviors of those around them. This could also work the other way.
Individuals who are not successful when they behave in accordance with social norms
could find that those norms are weakened by the lack of success.
It is also possible to show how economic success may have a negative effect on
social capital. First, there is an opportunity cost to social capital. It takes time to build
and maintain extensive networks or even circles of friends. Economically successful
individuals may have a higher opportunity cost of time and be less likely to build or
maintain their networks if they are already successful. Likewise, individuals who have to
devote much of their time working, such as the working poor, may not have time to build
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networks. In this case we could say that lack of success reinforces a lack of social
capital. Second, there is an issue of motivation. If an individual is already economically
successful, they may not feel the need to maintain or build social capital. Also,
economically successful individuals may not build extensive bonding networks because
they do not have a need for the resources that these networks provide, because resources
such as child care and small loans can be provisioned in the market.
There is one more important aspect to treating social capital as endogenous from
both a theory and policy perspective. Setting aside the issue of mutual causality for the
moment, the subtle consequence of treating social capital as endogenous is that it implies
that it can be affected and potentially manipulated. This is best illustrated by posing the
counter-argument, which is that social capital is exogenous. If social capital were
exogenous, then it would be set in the short-run and therefor unexplained. When we treat
social capital as endogenous, we instead treat the causes of social capital as internal to the
system. If we can understand the causes of social capital, then it can be changed by
changing its causes. To bring the mutual causality of social capital and economic success
back in, policies which affect one, such as policies to build social capital, has spillover
effects on the other.

Conclusion
Social capital primarily affects economic success by enabling collective action.
The norms associated with social capital provide a motivational and incentive basis for
cooperation, and the networked resources help enable collective action by reducing
different transaction costs and enhancing productivity. Collective action enables people
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to find work, be more productive at their jobs, explore new opportunities and maintain
their quality of life at lower cost. In short, collective action can make people better off.
In this chapter, we have focused primarily on the individual side of the social
capital and the collective action question. But social capital is an inherently relational
concept, meaning that our understanding is incomplete without looking at group
processes, which are different from the individual ones. In the next chapter we do that by
focusing on social capital at the neighborhood level.
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CHAPTER 3 - NEIGHBORHOODS AND NETWORKS
Americans live in neighborhoods largely segregated by income, and the patterns
of segregation have grown with time (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Economic
segregation has grown even as racial segregation has declined in many U.S. cities
(Glaeser and Vigdor 2012). The patterns of economic segregation have followed closely
the patterns of economic inequality, which raises the question: What role do
communities have in economic success? In this Chapter we move from looking at the
social dynamics of economic success at the individual level to how neighborhoods can
affect economic success through social capital.
Neighborhoods are clearly segregated by income. The question is does the
resource level of a neighborhood have a causal effect on individual success? The
argument I put forth in this chapter is that neighborhoods do matter for individual
success, because they are social networks and can determine who has access to resources,
norms and other cooperative individuals. While there is an element of choice in
neighborhoods—people are free to choose where to live—previous research on poor
communities shows that neighborhoods do have an independent causal effect on
individual success.
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In this chapter, we will first examine some of the previous thinking about the role
of neighborhoods in economic success. Most of this previous work has focused on the
issue of concentrated poverty. After the review, we develop our theory by looking at the
nature of social interactions and draw out the implications of those in segregated
networks by looking at local interactions and processes of network differentiation. We
will then look more closely at social capital transmission through processes of social
learning and social identity theories. The chapter concludes by drawing explicit
connections with chapter two.

Neighborhoods Effects: A Review
In chapter 2, we focused on developing a theory of how social capital affected
economic success by focusing on the “stuff” of social capital: the normative and resource
dimensions. In this chapter, we instead look at the aggregate side of social capital, the
idea of networks and network dynamics. So why focus on neighborhoods? There are
two answers. First, neighborhoods represent a particularly salient network to which most
people have membership simply through their place of residence; and two, because
previous research has shown the importance of neighborhoods for economic success.
Neighborhoods are both a geographical and social construction (Coulton 2012).
Geographically, neighborhoods are contiguous areas of residence with some form of
shared public space. The geographic boundaries of neighborhoods are often arbitrarily
defined by public officials, but in practice they are often amorphous and shaped more by
social interaction (or social isolation) than by static lines (Gotham 2003). The physical
form of neighborhoods can be seen as forming an ecological environment for humans.
The idea of a neighborhood as a physical space or a physical container for human action
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can be contrasted with the equally important social definition of a neighborhood. The
social definition is that a neighborhood is a social network of people who live in close
proximity to each other. Neighborhoods are defined through social interactions and
social understandings. So while neighborhoods can be thought of as places, even more
importantly they are networks of people. Neighborhood effects refer to a class or group
of theories and propositions, mostly stemming from sociology and political science, that
the neighborhood one grows up or lives in has a causal effect on life outcomes.
Neighborhood effects have mostly been studied in the context of urban poverty
(for example Wilson 1987, 1996) and the neighborhood's role in sustaining poverty in
U.S. cities. Concentrated urban poverty is a highly visible, complex and intractable social
problem that is tied in with a history of official and unofficial racial discrimination. But
why should spatially concentrated poverty matter? Does it have, in itself, a causal effect?
Does living near poor people make one poor? In other words: Is poverty contagious?
It’s worth considering some previous thinking on the causes of urban poverty before
trying to make the connection to social capital.
The contemporary literature on the role of the neighborhood in shaping life
chances and outcomes was sparked by the work of William Julius Wilson (1987; 1996).
Wilson’s work was in part a response to conservative thinkers of the 1980’s and 1990’s
who, following Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s controversial Moynihan Report, proposed that
the cause of urban black poverty was a ghetto culture, or a culture of poverty. Wilson
presented a pervasive counter-argument that took cultural differences and family
structure (the pillars of conservative theorizing on poverty) seriously, but contextualized
them by linking them to both unemployment and the changing social structure of urban
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neighborhoods. Wilson argues that changes within the wider political economy led to the
concentration of poverty in urban neighborhoods.

Deindustrialization led to growing

unemployment among working class African-Americans, while middle-class black
families left urban neighborhoods as social changes granted greater mobility. Among
other important causes of poverty the flight of the black middle class lowered the social
capital in their former neighborhoods. One effect of this was the removal of a network
for finding employment, while the second was transmission of “mainstream” behavior
norms (Wilson 1996: 67–70). There are many important nuances in Wilson’s argument,
but social capital plays a major role in sustaining concentrated poverty as a vicious circle.
In other more empirical work, Wacquant and Wilson (1989; 1993) found that residents in
poor neighborhoods had fewer overall social contacts, lower involvement in organization,
more instances of single parents and that the social contacts they did have “tend to have
ties of lesser social worth, as measured by the social position of their partners, parents,
siblings and best friends” (1989:23).
Tietz and Chapple (1998) present eight hypotheses on the causes of urban
poverty: macro-economic shifts and globalization that undercut employment for the
urban poor; inadequate human capital; racial and gender discrimination in employment;
the interaction of culture and behavior which isolates the poor from the mainstream labor
market; a spatial mismatch hypothesis wherein new employment opportunities for less
educated workers are spatially located on the urban fringe away from where most poor
people live; migration processes that removed middle class residents from
neighborhoods; what they call an “endogenous growth deficit,” which means low access
to capital and entrepreneurship for community development; and finally that urban
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poverty is the result of misguided public policy (36-7). These hypotheses are not
mutually exclusive, and some are tied very closely. for instance, macro-industrial shifts
are closely tied to the spatial mismatch hypotheses. The 1960s -1980s saw a radical
deindustrialization of U.S. central cities, as globalization and deregulation allowed firms
to move their manufacturing overseas or away from the urban core to take advantage of
lower land and labor prices or were undermined by international competition. The jobs
that replaced these were typically lower wage service industry jobs located mostly in the
booming suburban sprawl, spatially distant from where most poor and less educated
people lived. These structural economic shifts are important for understanding the
historical rise in inequality, but by themselves don’t explain the persistent role of
community—it’s easy to imagine, under the structural view, that neighborhoods are
really just containers of people with no real causal processes themselves, and therefore,
spatial poverty processes are just spurious to the macro-economy.
The neighborhood literature, however, has shown neighborhoods to have
independent effects on outcomes. In the quantitative literature, concentrated poverty has
been linked to a wide range of negative adolescent outcomes including physical and
mental health, low school achievement, drop-outs and teenage pregnancy (Brooks-Gunn
et al. 1997). Jencks and Mayer (1990) find in a fine grained meta-review of empirical
studies that the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood independently affects a
teenager’s educational attainment and sexual behavior and reduces the chance to find
well-paying jobs. Another in-depth review of the neighborhood effects literature
(Sampson et al. 2002) found that a number of social problems—crime, delinquency,
social disorder, infant mortality, child maltreatment—were “bundled together at the
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neighborhood level” and related to neighborhood-level factors of disadvantage including
“concentration of poverty, racial segregation, single parent families and rates of home
ownership and length of tenure” (446).
Most of these are correlational studies that link structural factors of the
neighborhood to outcomes, without considering the role of social capital in mediating the
connections. An exception to this is the ongoing work of Robert Sampson and colleagues.
Through an ongoing series of publications (Sampson et al. 1997, Sampson et al 1999;
Morenoff et al 2001; Sampson and Graif 2009; Sampson 2011) that utilizes data from the
Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, the researchers examine
neighborhood social processes related to social capital. They show that their concept of
collective efficacy—basically a measure of informal social control—independently
affects rates of violent crime using a hierarchical linear model to control for individual
characteristics (Sampson et al. 1997, Morenoff et al. 2001). Importantly, they also found
that neighborhood structural characteristics—such as concentrated disadvantage,
affluence, stability, population density and immigration—are direct predictors of
outcomes themselves and predictors of neighborhood social processes (Sampson et al.
1999). In a more recent study (Samson and Graif 2009), they have shown that
neighborhood disadvantage and residential stability are differentially related to four
different measures of neighborhood social capital: collective efficacy, organizational
involvement, local networks and conduct norms.
Sampson et. al. (2002) identify three common neighborhood mechanisms: social
ties and interactions, norms and collective efficacy, and institutional resources (457-8)12.

12

They also suggest land-use patterns as a fourth mechanism, but this falls outside of the scope of this
dissertation.
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Social ties and interactions refer to the direct social relationship between neighbors, while
norms and collective efficacy refer to conditions of mutual trust and cooperation between
neighbors. The last, institutional resources, refers to the “quality, quantity and diversity
of institutions in the community that address the needs of [residents]” (458). Quality
schooling is an obvious member of this last category, but it can also include parks,
quality policing, family support like day care and others. Despite these social
mechanisms, structural characteristics of the neighborhood, such as poverty and stability,
remain strong predictors of neighborhood outcomes (Sampson et. al. 2002: 465). The
mechanisms that Sampson et. al. (2002) outlined are somewhat indistinct as concepts. It
is hard to imagine, for example, strong trust among neighbors (a norm) without a density
of social relations. It is more fruitful, perhaps, to abstract these specific neighborhood
mechanisms into more general categories of socialization effects and resource pools,
while understanding that in reality the mechanisms will always overlap.
Small and Newman (2001) propose socialization and instrumental mechanisms as
two models of how neighborhoods affect economic success (32). Socialization
mechanisms are processes that seek to describe how neighborhoods mold people, while
instrumental mechanisms are ones in which the environment limits individual agency.
These mechanisms are closely related to what I develop below in that they are concerned
with how the social environment shapes individuals and conditions their access to
resources. Where I differ is that I propose socialization and instrumental mechanisms as
general aggregate processes of social capital and not just as processes in poor
communities. The biggest change is that instrumental processes can limit or enable
individual agency; it is not just the neighborhood, but the neighborhood as a social
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network which molds people. As will be explained below, however, social networks and
neighborhoods are related. The most important instrumental process in my account is
that of network differentiation. The most important socialization processes in my
account are social identity, membership processes and social learning.

Social Interactions
Neighborhood effects, peer interactions and even social capital generally can all
be understood as primarily social interactions. Since the goal of this chapter is to outline
the mechanisms by which social capital works in aggregate, it is worth taking a bit of an
elementary view to consider the nature of social interactive processes before moving to
the specific mechanisms of social capital. Scheinkman (2008) defines social interactions
as “particular forms of externalities, in which the actions of a reference group affect an
individual’s preferences”. In this general formulation, the reference group depends on
context. These are sometimes referred to as “non-market” interactions, because they
usually don’t rely on prices (Scheinkman 2008: 1).
Some forms of social interactions are purely strategic. This type forms the basis
for non-cooperative game theory. For instance, the prisoner’s dilemma game can be
viewed as a social interaction between the players, where each player selects a strategy
based on her expectations of what the other player will do. Another interaction of this
type is that of strategic complementaries, where an actor’s utility increases with how
much peers take the same action (Scheinkman 2008). The prototypical version of this
type of social interaction is the fairly well-known Thomas Schelling’s (1971, 1978)
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critical mass, or tipping, model which initially sought to explain racial segregation.13 In
the model, agents made choices about which neighborhoods they lived in and had a
preference (increasing utility) for the race of her neighbors. If agents were unhappy, they
would move to a neighborhood that matched their preferences. Strong racial preferences
unsurprisingly lead to total segregation, but the surprising result was that even very mild
racial preferences, say three out of eight neighbors of the same race, could also lead an
initially integrated city to become totally segregated.
Social interactions can be thought of as being of several types (Manski 2000).
First there are constraint interactions. These are interactions where the decisions of one
agent constrain the choices of others. These are perhaps the easiest models to understand,
as they range from the choice of agent buying a good affecting the availability or price of
that good to models of street congestion, where each agent’s use of roadways has an
impact on others. This type of interaction forms the heart of the “tragedy of the
commons” problem, where each agent’s use of a resource limits its use by others (see
Ostrom 1990). Second there are expectations interactions, which are a form of social
learning, where an agent changes their expectations from observing the outcomes of the
actions of others. Third there are preference interactions, where an agent’s preferences
depend or change with the actions or preferences of other agents. This is the type of
interaction captured in the critical mass model, above, or in the social identity model.
This list is not exhaustive, as Manski (2000) says, there is a more general class of
interactions where “preferences, expectations and constraints of one agent ... affect the
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The name critical mass model wasn’t used until Schelling 1978, and was also published by Granovetter
(1978) in a separate paper in the same year. The model was later expanded to explain other
phenomenon.
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preferences, expectations and constraints of another agent in ways that are not mediated
through actions” (11).
Neighborhood effects can be generalized as a specific class of social interactions
that influence outcomes. Manski (2000) outlines three general types of social
interactions (23-25). First there are endogenous interactions, which occur when an
individual’s behavior varies with the behavior of the group. This model implies that an
individual bases her behavior on the expected or observed behaviors of others--the mean
behavior of the group. The second type Manski outlines are contextual interactions,
where behavior varies with exogenous characteristics of group members. This class
includes things such as the socio-economic or racial composition of the group and is
based on average attributes rather than behaviors. Most studies of neighborhood effects
fall in this category, where researchers operationalize neighborhood measures as level of
poverty, racial composition of the neighborhood and so forth.14 Manski’s final category
of interaction is correlated effects, in which people in a group have similar outcomes
because they have similar individual characteristics. Ascribed group membership, such
as race, is an example of this effect, where individuals are assumed to co-vary in part
because of facing the similar challenges or opportunities due to their race. Most of the
social interactions I am concerned with here, however, are endogenous effects.
One near universal property of social interactions is that they produce
externalities (Akerlof 1997: 1005). An externality is cost or benefit that falls on
individuals not directly involved in a transaction (Buchanan 1967). In any type of social
interaction, the behavior or characteristics of someone in a group has an effect on others
in that group. These externalities are central to social capital (Durlauf and Fafchamps
14

See Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley (2002).
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2005). The behavior and resources of individuals in a network have effects on others
within that network. In the analysis that follows, I focus on three inter-related types of
social interactions: local interactions, social learning and social identity.

Local Interactions and Social Distance
To begin to understand to how social capital operates in a neighborhood, and in
other network formations generally, it helps to conceptualize the neighborhood as a social
space created through local interactions. The idea of local interactions is fundamental to
social capital theory, but is rarely expressed explicitly. Local interactions are a type of
social interaction concerned with the structure of relationships. The idea of local
interactions refers to “environments where individuals interact with a group of agents
close to them in an otherwise large economy” (Özgür 2010: 588). The idea comes from
the observation that agents who are “close” either spatially or socially tend to have
similar characteristics or outcomes. This is to capture the embeddedness of social and
economic interactions, where “each agent’s ability to interact with others depends on the
position of the agent in a predetermined network of relationships, e.g., a family, a peer
group, or more generally any socio-economic group” (Özgür 2010: 592). This idea is at
the heart of social capital theory: that people interact with people to whom they are
connected and that these connections have individual and aggregate outcomes. So the
idea of local interactions captures the network structure of social capital. People are
simply more likely to interact with people to whom they are connected socially. For this
analysis the important social connection is the neighborhood, but any social space could
form the field for local interactions.
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Local interactions become important when combined with the externalities of
social interactions. If, as stated above, all social interactions involve some form of
externality, negative or positive, then localizing those externalities can have important
consequences in creating differences between networks. The social externalities are
strongest felt with a social sub-set, the local environment. In an economy with multiple
local interactive environments, the nature of the externalities can produce marked
differences between social groups. An environment rich with positive externalities will
generally benefit those connected with it, while an environment with strong negative
externalities will hinder. An important point to distinguish is that the strongest effects of
these externalities are contained within the locality and are not necessarily shared across
larger geographic or social space. Schelling’s (1974) tipping model represents precisely
this type of interaction: agents make decisions based upon interactions with their
neighbors rather than the larger economy. In Schelling’s model the decision of other
agents to move in or out of a neighborhood creates an externality for their local neighbors
and influences those agents’ decisions to stay or go. The interesting part is not just the
local decisions, but how they create larger patterns of difference based on the local
interactions, such as the production of segregation.
An empirical example will help make the importance of local interactions clear.
Investigating the spatial dynamics of employment, Giorgio Topa (2001) looked at how
unemployment clustered geographically in Chicago in the 1980’s and 1990’s.
Empirically, unemployment was clustered into geographically contiguous census tracts,
there were positive spatial covariances between locations, and unemployment rates over
time were also correlated. As Topa states, “This geographic ‘lumping’ is consistent with
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the presence of local interactions and information spillovers” (263). Topa found that
having employed neighbors significantly increased the likelihood of an individual having
a job and that this effect was independent of observed tract characteristics. The local
effect was stronger in more socially homogenous census tracts, and the presence of
neighboring tracts with similar demographic characteristics increased the effect. What
Topa shows is that employment has a spillover effect and that this effect is localized and
contained, not only in geographic areas, but in social spaces of neighborhoods. This
evidence supports the ideas of information sharing in chapter two, where information
exchange on jobs or references to peoples’ character are primarily local occurrences.
A closely related idea to local interactions is that of proximity and distance,
particularly social distance. The idea of distance is the definition of who is local; who is
interacting in these local interactions. Distance can be spatial, meaning physical distance
between actors, or it can be social, meaning how much separation or social overlap there
are between social groups. Proximity and distance are, on one hand, ways to represent
the connectedness of the social network. On the other hand, they are somewhat
analogous to the strength of ties in a network. A bonding social capital network would be
characterized by more proximity, while bridging connections are access to more distant
connections. Social distance, though, is also related to the perception an agent has about
how similar a group is to themselves and not just a probability function of their likelihood
of interactions, though the two are closely related (Akerlof 1997).
The concept of distance helps to define who is local in interactions and in
understanding who people interact with in their networks. Individuals are less likely to
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have network connections with those who are distant to them, which is important for
understanding self-sustaining differences between networks.

Local Interactions, Network Differences and Exclusion
Now that we have an outline of how local interactions work, and how they can
serve to create more limited economies through spillovers within larger economies, we
can now begin to outline some of the ways these local interactions can create differences
in resource distribution. Some of this analysis may be obvious, but it is worth drawing
out some the implications before moving onto other collective level social capital
mechanisms of learning and socialization.
Perhaps the most important dynamics that arise out of local interactions are ones
of network differentiation and exclusion. I use network differentiation to connote how
social networks differentiate themselves from one another and how these are sustained
through the feedbacks of local interactions. Exclusion is the opposite side of the coin
from membership in networks. The analysis has so far focused on what resources and
socialization effects that membership in social networks provides to members, but
membership in networks necessarily implies that some are excluded by definition;
otherwise the network structure wouldn’t exist. But just as memberships provide the
network members with resources, other individuals excluded can be harmed by their
exclusion from those networks. But first, let us examine network difference.
The historical formation of differences in networks is important, but beyond the
scope of this dissertation. Take for instance the social structure of American urban
neighborhoods, which are the result of a long historical process driven by inter-regional
migration, capital investment patterns, government policy and racial discrimination
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among other factor. To avoid confusing the myriad of forces operating in neighborhoods,
it is perhaps better to step into abstract analysis, just to draw a picture of how differences
in networks can develop and sustain. For now, assume that we have two groups of agents,
connected to each other within the group but not across groups. For simplicity we can
assume that the groups are similar in composition and preferences and start with the same
endowments. By luck, fortune or enterprise, an agent in group A has an efficiency
enhancing break-through, say an innovative business design, but it doesn’t really matter.
If this breakthrough has a large enough spillover, then other members of group A benefit
from that agent’s break-through, and everyone in group A profits. In the presence of
local interactions, the benefits of these spillovers will be mostly contained within group
A; group B may see some advancement as well, but will be mostly excluded from the
benefits. Group A will have enhanced success creating a level of inequality between the
two. Let us make the example a little more concrete. Assume two adjacent
neighborhoods, A and B, which face some common social dilemma such as maintaining a
public space. Let the difference between them now, though, be the general level of
cooperation. Neighborhood A has a few gregarious individuals who have worked to
establish a base level of trust, while neighborhood B does not. As we can recall from the
previous chapter, trust is one manner of overcoming social dilemmas. Trust also has the
property of reinforcing and propagating itself when it is upheld (Ostrom 2005). So if in
neighborhood A people work together to maintain public space through cooperation, that
cooperation will have the externality of raising the general level of trust and furthering
greater cooperation. The public space will be maintained at lower cost. If neighborhood
B doesn’t have the same level of trust, then it will not be able to maintain the space, or
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will have to resort to less efficient and coercive mechanisms. Even if both neighborhoods
start with similar endowments, difference can develop through the mechanism of local
interactions. If we drop the a-historical pretense, most neighborhood networks have very
different endowments, such as wealth and access to investment finances, which would
make the difference enhancing effects even more important.
This differentiation due to local interactions suggests two interrelated dynamics:
path dependency and multiple equilibria. At its simplest, path dependence is the idea that
history matters; but more specifically that self-reinforcement and positive feedbacks can
lead to large differences in outcome at a later point in time (Page 2005)15. The idea of
multiple equilibria is that there can be multiple different stable states that can emerge
through local interactions. Another way to state this is that there can be more than one
stable decision structure within a local population (Durlauf 2007). Because of path
dependence and multiple equilibria, even similar neighborhoods can have different
outcomes in the presence of local interactions.
What does this mean in practice? Let us return to the example of local
interactions on employment. If having employed neighbors makes you more likely to
have a job (independent of other factors), then the local interaction effect can cause the
development of different neighborhood systems. In neighborhoods with high levels of
employment, the positive feedback would work to sustain and enhance the general level
of employment in the neighborhood. In contrast, a low employment neighborhood would
be excluded from this effect and would have a stable lower level of employment. In this
case there is an information asymmetry between the local networks, with the
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Page 2006 makes much more fine grained distinctions among different types of path dependence which
are interesting, but not useful here.
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neighborhood with greater employment having greater access to information about jobs
and this information is mostly contained within that network. Without bridges from the
low to high information networks, the cost of acquiring jobs is higher in the low
information network and over time can create different stable levels of employment
between them. Because of the differences in the networks, the social capital externalities
of high resource or information rich networks will be constrained to members of those
networks.
In general, we can highlight the importance of neighborhood membership by
thinking of a neighborhood as providing access to a resource pool. Neighborhoods can
limit the availability of resources for the development of individual social capital. The
neighborhood can be thought of as ascribing a pool of resources available at a discount,
and individual social capital will vary with the size of this pool of available social capital.
Because of this resource pool effect, we can expect that individuals who are members of
more resource rich neighborhoods will have more leveraging social capital due to the
lower cost of obtaining high quality connections. The converse is also expected for
poorer neighborhoods, which are expected to have fewer leveraging resources available,
thus increasing the cost for individuals. The quality and usefulness of a social
connection between actor A and actor B is dependent not only on the individual resources
each possess, but also on the quality of the network to which they have access. So if B
has access to C, the A has a lower cost to access C through her relationship with B. So in
effect, the level of social capital, and its leverage, is dependent on the quality and amount
of social capital over others in the group.
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The idea of network members implies the inverse: network exclusion. The idea of
exclusion is that individuals can be harmed from not having membership to these
networks (Durlauf 2007). People can be denied access to resources, such as information
or institutional access, because they are not members. The most basic idea of this is
through preferential access. Members of a network can gain preferential access to some
rationed resources, say private information or simply trust, which works to the benefit of
the members of that network, but not to wider community. A crass example of this is
insider trading, where some investors use private information to profit at the cost of those
not in their networks. But the employment example serves as well: access to the private
information on job availability obviously benefits the members of the network but may
result in less efficient allocation of jobs or the exclusion of qualified persons from jobs.
Taylor (2000) shows this in the context of the Old Boy Network.
In Taylor’s (2000) model, members of the network rarely work with those outside
to shield themselves from potentially unqualified trading or business partners. This
exclusion from the resources greatly limits what outside, but capable, partners are able to
achieve, in effect injuring their economic capability. And Fafchamps (2002) found a
similar harm in market institutions in Africa, where newcomers were often excluded from
trading networks since their reputations could not be verified.16 What these example
have in common is the rationing of both private information and trust in areas of
asymmetric information, and their effect is to create bifurcated systems; one system of
dense relations and trust and one of exclusion. Bowles and Gintis (2004) call this type of
preferential access and attendant exclusion parochialism in the context of ethnic
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In many ways this is the inverse of Greif 1993 which detailed how traders used reputation to police
members of their network.
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networks, but the dynamics are similar whether the networks are ethnically based or not.
Network members tend to be protective of the gains in their network and resistant to
sharing or access.
One of the most visible, and important, dynamics of exclusion in neighborhood
networks is segregation. Segregation can be the result of self-organized choice—people
choosing to live near people similar to themselves—and through institutions that sort
people along racial and socio-economic lines, such as the housing market (Hoff and Sen
2005). Both processes mean that the social externalities are contained within the set apart
group, and other groups are excluded through geographic isolation. Indeed some of the
reasons that motivate individuals to move to economically segregated communities is to
capture some of the externalities available in those neighborhoods, and they may
construct barriers to entry to protect those externalities. For example, a wealthy
community of homeowners may seek to protect their land values and character of their
neighborhood by opposing the construction of affordable housing nearby (Fischel 2009).
But this protective attempt to capture externalities has itself a spillover effect on other
communities. First it denies members of other communities access to the resources of the
well-to-do neighborhood and the social externalities. Second, the exclusion of
membership may push less sociable individuals and behaviors into other communities,
which could weaken positive social externalities, like cooperation, and increase behavior
with high negative externalities, like crime, within the excluded communities. Third, this
exclusion could lead to stable and entrenched inequality between the neighborhoods, as
they reach different equilibriums within their networks.
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Segregation of networks has effects on the access to resources and to the benefits
of social externalities. These processes of membership and exclusion become
compounded when we consider how they interact with social capital. The next two
processes look at how network composition affects access to information and to norms
through social learning and through social identity.

Social Learning
In chapter 2 we examine the role of social capital in the exchange of information
between agents. People exchange information both about each other, sharing reputation,
and about opportunities. This exchange generates knowledge spillovers and helps
overcome problems of information asymmetries and incomplete information. The
information exchange presented in chapter 2 focused on exchange between agents. But
another form of information exchange also takes place through individual’s interactions
with their environment. This indirect process is known as social learning, where one
where agents learn through observation of the actions of others. Through this process,
individuals update their own expectations and actions based on what they observe from
those to whom they are connected. I refer to the process of social observational learning
as Bayesian social learning.17 Social learning processes, in general, refer to the sharing
of private information or private beliefs among actors through interactions. Sometimes
this is through observing the actions of others; sometimes it is through observing the
outcomes or expressed knowledge of others (Chamly 2004: 4-5).
Social learning theory has its roots in clinical psychology, and was first developed
by Rotter (1954) and was more fully developed later by Bandura (1978). Bandura’s main
17

Again “Bayesian” is used in a non-technical sense to capture how individuals update their beliefs based
on what they are able to learn and observe in the social environment.
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assertion in his development of social learning theory is that behavior is best understood
as arising from complex interactions between the environment, cognition, and behavior.
A person’s behavior depends on how an individual’s expectations are shaped by both the
environment and by reinforcement of previous behavior. In many ways, social learning
is fully compatible with expected utility theory and rational choice, but it does not
necessarily imply those approaches (Akers 1990). The key to social learning is that
individuals draw inferences and abstract from observing the behavior and actions of
others.
Social learning can lead to strongly conformist or herding behavior (Bannerjee
1992). Individuals copy the behavior of those who act before them. This can sometimes
lead to cascading effects if the copying is widespread enough, as in the tipping model.
There are two logics that can drive this behavior in rational actors that we call the
evolutionary and cascading dynamics. The evolutionary dynamic is the copying of
successful behavior. If an individual is perceived to have adopted a successful strategy,
then others who observe that strategy will be more likely to adopt it. The opposite is also
true. If an individual adopts a particular strategy which is not successful, then others may
avoid the strategy. This is the evolutionary dynamic of herding behavior. The other
dynamic is cascading. If observers see an individual acting in a particular fashion, it may
signal that they have private information and prompt others to behave the same way, even
to the point of ignoring their own private information. Both of these social learning
dynamics interact with reputation. Individuals will most likely copy those with favorable
reputations (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003).
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Hirshleifer and Teoh’s (2003) review of the empirical research on social learning
in financial markets shows how social learning can produce both herding and cascading
behavior even in “fully rational” settings (26). They found that analysts and investors
often herd in their discussions and forecasts of securities, firms often herd in investment
and financing decisions and cascading behavior is common. These behaviors are often
clustered around the behavior of those with strong reputations. Similarly, evidence
shows that individuals are less likely to herd when they are experienced. For example,
Hong, Kubik and Soloman (2000) found that less experienced stock analysts are less
likely to deviate from consensus forecasts. Although social learning has been explicitly
excluded from modeling in standard transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985), in
situations with high transaction costs to acquire private information, or where reputation
is at stake, herding and cascading behavior is a way to reduce these costs and act
strategically with only partial information (Lee 1998; Romano 2007).
We can find the root of this behavior in the logic of information asymmetries. In a
situation where actors may possess private information, such as with the stock market,
then observing a particular behavior may signal that private information and lead others
to adopt the same behavior. As individuals observe the behavior and outcomes of those
around them, they update their own expectations. For example, observing an individual
who works hard at school being rewarded by their ability to find a good job would lead
others to take the same approach. Conversely, if individuals are observed not being
rewarded for hard work, observers may lower their expectations of reward for their own
work and decide not to put forth the effort. In both situations, aggregate behavior can
converge within the observational set.
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If people learn and change their behavior based on their observations, then it
follows that individual’s behavior be most strongly influenced by those they are mostly
strongly connected. In a networked environment, both theory and empirical studies show
that people learn from neighbors (Jackson 2008; Lamberson 2010). For example, a
classic study on the adoption of a new drug by doctors, Coleman, Katz and Menzel
(1956) found that adoption rates for new drugs was much higher for doctors who were
“friends” of other adopters than for those who were not. With local differences in
neighborhood networks, then individuals would be most likely to learn from others they
are connected to in their neighborhood. This localized externality creates an endogenous
peer effect. This can create a pattern of behavioral convergence within the network, but
divergence between networks because of the localization of network differences.
For example, consider a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game played among
members of a neighborhood. Individual players in the game will quickly learn the
strategy that their neighbor’s adopt by observing their behavior. In a community with a
high proportion of cooperators, then players will quickly learn that cooperation is a fairly
safe strategy, and defectors can be punished by exclusion. In a neighborhood with a high
proportion of defectors, then players will learn not to cooperate. The cost of cooperating
will be much higher and will discourage those inclined to cooperate otherwise. Because
social learning is not just from the behavior of other’s but also based on past experiences,
a player who switches neighborhoods may be resistant to swap strategies based on the
strength of their expectations (Nowak 2006; Fu, Nowak and Hauert 2010). This can lead
to dynamic systems of cooperation and defection, where strategy changes depending on
the proportion of cooperators and defectors and how they are connected in the system.
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The decision to cooperate or defect by an individual is based on their expectations of
other players actions and awareness of other players past behavior.
In a less abstract sense, we can consider neighborhoods of different resource
levels. In a neighborhood with a larger proportion of successful or trustworthy
individuals, other members of the neighborhood would be more likely to adopt the
successful individual’s strategies. The density of successful people will increase the
expectation of success in other’s they are in contact with, reinforcing productivity
enhancing norms such as discount rate, self-efficacy, and trust. Conversely, a
neighborhood with a high proportion of less economically successful individuals could
lower individual expectation of success and disincentivize cooperative behavior and
norms. Because of the externalities, this system could be self-reinforcing with positive
and negative feedback loops based on peers in the network. This social process of norm
transmission and adoptance is taken up next when we consider social identity.

Social Identity
Social identity theory from behavioral economics shows how preferences and
behaviors, and, even more fundamentally, identity, are transmitted socially. Akerlof and
Kranton (2000; 2010) present identity as the sense of self—who you are and your sense
of competence. But identity, in their view, is a social construct. It is formed, and changes,
through social interaction and in response to social context. It is a thoroughly relational
and process oriented idea of identity—not static or fixed, but constantly evolving through
social interactions. The primary process is that of identification, where “a person learns a
set of values (prescriptions) such that her actions should conform with some people and
contrast with that of others” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000: 728). Social differentiation, the
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difference between “Us” and “Them”, can be thought to be one basis for the boundedness
or inclusivity of social networks.
Identity is not just a matter of tastes; it is fundamentally about how norms provide
motivation for behavior. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) outline four key points in the
operation of identity: “(1) people have identity-based payoffs derived from their own
actions; (2) people have identity-based payoffs derived from others’ actions; (3) third
parties can generate persistent changes in these payoffs; and (4) some people may choose
their identity, but choice may be proscribed for others” (717). Because payoffs are based
on identity rather than simple utility maximization, this conception allows for behavior
that defies normal rational actor expectations, such as altruism and detrimental selfbehavior. Also, because of point two, the existence of social identities creates
externalities by creating meaning for and responses in others. This is because identities
contain by definition what Akerlof and Kranton call “prescriptions”, which are
understandings of appropriate behavior in different situations—in other words, norms.
What this means is that people do things, in part, because they believe they are supposed
to. It is part of who they think they are. It is about opinions on how they should or should
not behave and views on how others should or should not behave (Akerlof and Kranton
2010). People gain satisfaction from conforming to their concept of self, but this
satisfaction can be limited by others perceptions of their identity.
Individuals gain or lose utility based on how they behave in accordance with their
ideal of self. So if I my view of myself is that “I am a person who cooperates with
others”, then I will be more likely to behave cooperatively. The actual utility I derive
from my behavior will vary depending how well my behavior matches the ideal. If my
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identity is that I am a cooperative person, then I will gain more utility from cooperating
than someone who does not have the same identity. My behavior also creates an
externality on others if I violate their expectations for my behavior. In this example, if
others perceive my identity as that of a cooperator, then my violation of that expected
behavior can cause a loss of utility, apart from the any actual loss in transactions, and
may lead to reciprocity based on that utility loss.
Perception of identity is important for trust and trustworthiness. Recall that trust
and trustworthiness are precursors to access to resources in networks. Economic
experiments have shown that agents behave more cooperatively with people they
perceive as belonging to their group, even if the exact members are unknown or unseen
(Fershtman and Gneezy 2001).

Perceptions of trustworthiness can depend on an agents

subjective beliefs and perceptions of another’s identity and how well they conform to
expected norms in their behavior. The role that other’s perception of an agent’s identity
in accessing networks and the social transmission of identities, and thus norms, in
networks means that these are at least partially dependent on the agents social
environment and peers.
On the one hand, social identities provide a source for the norms at the heart of
social capital. We can see trust, cooperation, discount rate and self-efficacy as being
determined by identity. On the other hand, social identities show how other’s perception
of identities can influence access to network resources. Social identities are based on
difference—on creating distinctions among categories of people—and this means that
other’s expectations of an individual’s behavior is based on their perception of that
person’s identity. The consequence of the identity externality is that people will most
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often associate with people they perceive as similar to themselves (Akerlof and Kranton
2010), a phenomenon known in sociology and social networking literature as homophily
(Jackson 2008). This lowers the cost to individuals of identity expectations, but can
create dynamics of network exclusion where individuals can be excluded based on
perceived identity membership. Identities then can be a source of network differences
and network segregation.
Neighborhoods are important for two reasons. First, neighborhoods are one
source of identity. If identities are social and learned from the environment, then much
like the dynamics of social learning, the neighborhood network becomes a source for
individuals to learn about existing social identities. This is not to say that neighborhoods
limit identities, but that neighborhoods create a pool of easily accessible identities
through the network. These identities are more readily available and may be more salient
to members of a neighborhood due to social proximity. Second, because of the
externalities of identity, neighborhoods can be one network of identity enforcement.
Individuals who do not comply with widely accepted identity norms may be excluded or
punished for not-complying with identity based norms. Conversely, individuals could
have their identities reinforced through the social dynamics of the neighborhood. This
endogenous supply and reinforcement of identity could create relatively stable
neighborhood based identities within homogenous neighborhoods (Shayo 2009).
Because of this endogenous feedback of identity within the social network of the
neighborhood, the localized effects could cause different packages of identities to be in
force in different neighborhoods. Even identities that would seem to undermine
economic success could be relatively stable as long as they are consistent with the social
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environment (Shayo 2009). An example of this is the literature on oppositional identities
in poor African-American communities. These identities are rooted in historical
processes, experiences, and narratives of slavery and discrimination. These processes are
also for working class and poor whites, whose very identity and perception of whiteness
is rooted in its contrasting with African Americans (Roediger 1991). In poor, urban
African American communities, identities are formed which specifically reject and
oppose its perception of mainstream (white) culture, which is perceived as a continuing
source of exclusion and oppression (Anderson 1990; Wilson 1987, 1996) The adoption of
oppositional identities is driven by social difference, but Wilson (1996) also points to the
lack of meaningful employment for working class blacks in cities and the exodus of the
black middle class to creation of identities that support survival in deprived
environments. The out-migration of the middle class from urban areas influences identity
through a loss of role-models, but also reduces difference among blacks in neighborhoods
thereby increasing the costs of being different (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).

Conclusion: Neighborhoods as Institutions
In the analysis above, I have examined neighborhoods through the lens of social
interactions and as networks. Because social interactions by definition involve
externalities, and these externalities are localized, that produces networks with stable, but
different, resources and norms. Because of social learning and social identity, behaviors
and norms can be transmitted within the neighborhood network as well as expectations
for future success. Because of the externalities, these dynamics can be self-reinforcing
and lead to multiple equilibria between neighborhoods and stable differences. In short,
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neighborhoods are one source of social capital and membership in neighborhood
networks conditions the social capital that an individual has access to.
The processes of localization, difference, learning and identity are interactive and
dynamic. One way to think of neighborhoods is as institutions with different
configurations of networks, rules, and identities. “Institutions are the humanly devised
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991: 97).
Institutions also enable action through by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs.
Institutions generate expectations for the behavior of others that influence how an actor
will behave (Greif and Laitin 2004). Through learning, identity and network access
dynamics, these institutions reproduce and reinforce themselves.
We can illustrate this by again returning to the prisoner’s dilemma game, this time
repeated among neighbors. As Axelrod (2006) has shown, the expected number of
iterations and the expected behavior of other players modify the payoff structure for the
players. If the players are expected to only be in the game short term, as say a short term
renter in a neighborhood would be, or if other players are expected not to cooperate, as in
a fractured and disorganized neighborhood, then noncooperation has the highest long
term payoff. If, however, the length of the game is not known or is expected to repeat for
a long time and other agents are expected to cooperate, then cooperation is by far the
most profitable strategy. This cooperative effect could be further enhanced by
organizations in the neighborhood, such as community development corporations, that
provide an organizational basis for cooperation. The existence of these types of
organizations can be dependent on the social capital of residents, as some residents may
be able to leverage their networks to create local political alliances and to attract public
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resources to support neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993). But neighborhoods with
greater cooperation and trust will be more likely to secure these types of resources, even
without strong individual networks. Community cooperation is also enhanced if
cooperation is a norm in the neighborhood, where cooperation or defection reinforces
itself.
But more important than just cooperation is the distributional effect membership
in different networks can have. Neighborhoods affect economic success indirectly
through social capital. The types of connections people can form and the quality of those
connections, as well as productivity-enhancing norms, are all influenced by
neighborhoods. If everyone had access to networks of comparable size and quality, then
there would be little distributional effect. But because of existing differences in status and
income, and the tendency people of similar means and status to cluster together produces
a differential access to social capital (Lin 2000). In effect, social stratification is
replicated and reflected in social capital. This effect is compounded by the tendency of
resource rich networks to have wider and more diverse contacts. As Lin (2000) states
“Members of such networks enjoy access to information from and influence in diverse
socioeconomic strata and positions. In contrast, members in resource-poor networks share
a relatively restricted variety of information and influence” (787). Members of resourcerich networks may also have more access to identities, norms and behaviors that enhance
success than members of resource-poor neighborhoods. Neighborhoods primarily affect
economic success by setting the conditions for collective action to occur. These
conditions are the social capital of the neighborhood.

89

CHAPTER 4 – MODELS
In chapters two and three, we developed a theory of how social capital and
economic success are related and why neighborhoods matter for this relationship.
Chapter two examined the relationship between economic success and social capital at
the individual level through resources and norms and chapter three examined how
neighborhood influences social capital through social interactions and network
differences. In this chapter, we take the insights from those sections to model the
relationships of economic success, social capital, and neighborhoods. This chapter is a
link between the theory sections and chapter five on empirical tests of the models.
First I discuss the sticky issue of measuring social capital, and define my
measures. Measurement has been a source of contention in social capital research, and to
build validity into my measures, I take a multi-dimensional approach using latent
variables. Next, I briefly describe the data set for the study, as the measures are informed
and shaped by the available data. After measurement and data, we move to the actual
models. The empirical portion of this dissertation looks at several models that have a very
similar structure. Each model has several relationships of interest, and to explain the
relationships I break the model into parts. First I outline the full model to provide
context for the specific hypotheses and to explain the unifying structure and elements.
Then I explain the main hypotheses in the model between economic success and social
capital at the individual
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level and then between the neighborhood and the individual. Finally, we come full circle
and put all the pieces back together in the full model.

Measurement – Capturing multiple dimensions
In chapter 2, we made the distinction between bridging and bonding social capital
and looked at the theoretical effects of each. Social capital is a multi-dimensional
concept, particularly along the lines of network composition and which norms are
associated with them. This is the theoretical dividing line between bridging and bonding
social capital. But this begs the question, in an empirical study, how do we measure
social capital in a way that captures this multidimensionality? The approach I take here
is one of latent variables. But before we get to the latent variable approach, it is helpful
to compare it to the way social capital has been measured by others.
Social capital is an abstract concept that requires some interpretation. This allows
for a great deal of variability and subjectivity in measurement, which is inevitably
contested. The operationalization is dependent on how one conceptualizes social capital.
As Fukuyama (2001) states, “one of the greatest weaknesses of the social capital concept
is the absence of consensus on how to measure it” (12). There has been a great deal of
variability and inconsistency between studies in how to measure it (Durlauf 2002; Liu
and Besser 2003). In a fairly comprehensive review of operationalizations of social
capital, Durlauf (2002) shows that measures have often blended functional and causal
concepts. However, if we accept that social capital is an “essentially contested concept”
(Woolcock 2010: 470), then variability and contention in how it is measured should be
expected. Woolcock (2010) argues that though social capital measurement has undergone
improvement and refinement, there will probably never be true consensus.
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Social capital has typically been measured using one of three broad approaches,
each with their own advantages and drawbacks. First there are the single variable
approaches, which identify social capital primarily with one outcome of dimension, such
as trust or group membership, and use a single variable to measure it. The two most
common single variables have been trust, typically based on survey questions about how
much the respondent trusts others (Glaeser et al. 2000; Kolankiewicz 1996; Fukuyama
1995; Fukuyama 1997) and organizational membership (Baum and Ziersch 2003;
O'Connell 2003; Price 2002; Warde et al. 2003; Wollebaek and Selle 2003). The
advantage of this approach is that it is relatively simple, easy to understand, and clear.
Single variable approaches assume that there is an empirical correlation among different
possible measures of social capital and use that single variable as proxy. These
approaches fulfill what Halpern (1999) says is the need for a “quick and dirty” approach
to social capital. Single indicators are appealing because they are intuitive, and I measure
economic success using a single indicator variable in this study. Single indicators have a
drawback that is inherent in their simplicity. As a proxy, they assume a consistent
correlation with the various dimensions of social capital. Due to the multidimensional
nature of social capital, single variable approaches may not capture its complexity or the
different possible configurations (Adam and Roncevic 2003).
A second approach to measuring social capital is the use of composite measures.
Frequently referred to as either indexes or factors, these measures share the feature of
creating a single indicator from multiple observed data points. The idea is to simplify the
complexity to be able to make general statements. Composite measures are common in
the social capital literature. The idea behind this is that social capital is a theoretical
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construct—it is abstract—that underlies the observable outcomes of any single indicator.
It is not directly observable in the traditional sense. Instead, composite variables are
measured by indicators, which are observable outcomes which are thought to point to the
underlying concept. For example, since we can’t measure bonding social capital directly,
we may measure instead the number of close personal friendships, time spent with
friends, or an individual’s level of trust toward their own identity group (Kim et. al
2006); which are theoretical observable indicators of the underlying concept.
Composite variables are constructed using a variety of methods. The simplest of
these methods use pre-defined additive formula rules for combining multiple indicators.
This approach in the social capital literature is exemplified by Putnam’s (2000) social
capital index based on 14 indicators of social capital in the U.S. such as number of club
members, voter turnout, number of public meetings, fraction of people in state who
served on committees and more. At the high end of the complexity spectrum, Narayan
and Cassidy (1997) use a 26-item survey instrument to measure social capital at the
individual level along seven conceptual dimensions in Ghana and Uganda. The
advantages of the formula-based indexes are that they are information rich and clearly
define the relationships among the indicators, making them more transparent. They have
the disadvantage of relying on strong assumptions of the structure of the correlations in
the data and the interpretability of the final measure.
A different method to construct composite measures uses regression techniques to
construct latent variables. The main statistical technique employed in this study,
structural equation modeling, is used because of the way it handles latent variables (see
chapter 5). Like the formulaic approach, the latent variable approaches construct an
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index from the observable outcomes. Instead of predefining the relationship among
indicators, however, they use regression techniques such as factor analysis. The
assumption of these approaches is that correlations among observed variables are the
result of some other unobserved variable, and that these relationships can be defined
empirically, using regression. It has fewer assumptions than the rule-based approach and
uses the most information of all the approaches. Specific relationships among the
indicators are not as transparent as the additive approach and it shares the interpretive
complexity of all composite approaches. The distinction between these practices of
measurement is not as clear in reality, as most indexing approaches use some form of
empirical technique either for index construction or validation.
This study uses the measurement instrument from the Project on Human
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) Community Survey (Earls et. al
2005). The PHDCN is an interdisciplinary survey intended to study the role of families
and neighborhoods on adolescent development (Sampson 2012). The community survey
portion of the study looks at social conditions in neighborhoods and includes a large
number of social capital related questions among other indicators and demographic
questions. PHDCN features many variables related to social capital and the
socioeconomic status of the respondent, as well as detailed neighborhood variables. For
over a decade, Robert Sampson and colleagues have used the PHDCN data to investigate
the relationship of social capital related concepts to violent crime (Sampson et. al. 1997;
Morenoff et. al. 2001), childhood development and well-being (Sampson et. al. 2008a ),
the social monitoring of children’s behavior (Sampson et. al. 2002), among others. The
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variables in this dataset reflect a more specific conceptualization of social capital than
other studies that just rely on trust or organizational membership.
The PHDCN instrument has been used in a number of studies that use it in new
contexts (Dorsey and Forehand, 2003; Drukker et al 2003; Lochner et. al. 2003; Rankin
and Quane, 2002; Subramanian et al. 2003; Brisson and Usher 2005; Brisson and Usher
2007). For example Drukker et al. (2003) use it to study the social capital effect on
neighborhoods. Dorsey and Forehand (2003) conduct a SEM analysis using the PHDCN
instrument to study how social capital relates to child psychological adjustment. Brisson
and Usher (2004; 2007) use the instrument to test social capital relationship with
homeownership and other neighborhood variables. The largest study to replicate
PHDCN is the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Study (Pebley 2011). The
replication of PHDCN in these studies shows that there is a level of consensus around the
validity and acceptability of the measurement instrument used here.

The Measures
To capture the multiple dimensions of social capital, I use three factors to capture
the bridging and bonding nature of social capital: bridges, cooperation, and cohesion.18
These measures are drawn directly from measures developed in the PHDCN (Sampson
et.al. 1999: 639). I have changed the names slightly from the ones used in the original
study to represent more clearly their relationships to the overall concept of social capital.
The neighborhood level of social capital is measured using the same instrument, but uses
the mean level of each response.

18

The questions used to construct these measures are reported in table 5.1 in chapter 5.
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Bridges is used to engage two dimensions of bridging social capital. This concept
follows most closely with traditional measures of social capital and captures both
voluntary group memberships and political and civic engagement. The overall latent
variable of bridges has two sub-dimensions of membership and engagement.
Membership is simply a count of the number of different civic and social groups an
individual is a member of, while engagement is a measure of active civic participation in
and outside of groups. Bridges tries to capture the nature of bridging social capital as
wide networks and contacts external to the neighborhood and immediate relationships.
The idea is that people who are civically engaged and actively participating in voluntary
organizations have a greater amount of bridging social capital and access to the resources
that come with bridging networks. Also implied is that these voluntary associations
indicate cooperative norms, though those norms are not directly measured. Overall,
bridges measures an individual’s engagement with wider, bridging networks.
Bonding social capital is measured along two separate dimensions. The first is
cooperation which measures the reciprocated exchange of favors between an individual
and their neighbors. This represents the active cooperation of an individual neighbor, and
measures explicitly cooperative and reciprocal behavior, and implicitly the norms that
underlie this behavior. The second is cohesion, which measures an individual’s trust in
their neighbors and the general view of social cohesion in the neighborhood. Both
cooperation and cohesion measure bonding social capital because they look at
particularized trust and cooperation. Overall, the measures’ different dimensions of
social capital affect economic success.
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Measuring Economic Success
Unlike social capital, I use a single indicator to measure economic success:
income. Economic success is a multi-dimensional concept. Unlike social capital,
however, economic success can be easily measured by its outcomes. The assumption
here is that income is an outcome indicator of economic success. While related concepts,
such as poverty, have complex non-income dimensions (Klasen 2008), I avoid looking at
poverty directly and instead opt to look at the simpler dimension of income. Income is
widely used to measure economic deprivation and economic “well-being” in the United
States because it is widely reported in larger samples and is easy to interpret and
understand (Meyer and Sullivan 2003). Unlike social capital, income is directly
measurable. Income in this study is household income, but this is due to the limitations
of the PHDCN rather than design choices. Household income works as a proxy for
individual income, though, because the two are closely correlated. At the neighborhood
level, we use median household income for aggregate economic success.

Model
Overall Model
The overall argument of the dissertation is that living in a poor or affluent
neighborhood affects individual economic success through social capital. The
neighborhood level of economic success conditions the social resources available for an
individual to achieve economic success. I detail the mechanisms in more detail below,
but logic is this: Neighborhoods form a pool of available resources, such as information
access and available identities, to which individuals in the community have differential
access. Access to these communal resources has a probabilistic effect on the resources
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that an individual has direct access to—living in a social capital rich neighborhood
increases the likelihood that an individual will have access to more social resources of
higher quality. Access to these resources increases the likelihood that an individual will
be economically successful. The relationship also has an element of mutual causality, or
endogeneity. Economic success increases an individual’s access to social capital
resources while higher collective levels of social capital create more aggregate success.

Figure 4.1 Full Model

The basic outlines of these relationships can be seen in Figure 4.1. The basic
structure is the same for all three concepts of social capital. While each of these concepts
is meant to capture a different aspect of social capital, the logic of the relationships is the
same. Bridging is hypothesized to have a similar relationship with economic success as
bonding, though they operate through slightly different mechanisms. Bridges, cohesion,
and cooperation are modeled to have the same structural relationship with economic
success and the aggregate variables, though, as detailed below, the magnitude of the
relationship may be different. In what follows below, I break the model down and
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explain the reasoning behind the specific interactions. First I will look at the individual
level relationship between economic success and social capital, then the aggregate
relationship between these variables, and finally the relationship between individual and
community.

Individual Economic Success
Figure 4.2 Individual Model

The core element of the model is the bi-directional relationship between
individual economic success and social capital. In chapter two, I examined the
theoretical relationship between social capital and economic success; here, I apply that
theory to develop and explain hypotheses which can be tested empirically in the next
chapter. As an organizing method, I present each of the key relationships as a
hypothesis, and then explain the reasoning that underlies it.

Social Capital to Income
H1. Social Capital has a direct positive relationship to economic success.

As we saw in chapter two, social capital is believed to influence economic
success. Social capital helps individuals overcome social dilemmas of cooperation that
lead to economic success. This operates through incentive-enhancing norms (Bowles,
Gintis, and Osborne 2002) and through providing instrumental resources that directly
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economic success. Though they operate in similar ways, I will discuss bridging and
bonding differences separately.
Bridging social capital is the resource that is usually connected with economic
success, because it represents wider connections with the world. Bridges are most
closely associated with overcoming information asymmetries with the labor market.
Through these diverse connections, individuals have access to information on a wider
range of opportunities at a lower cost. These diverse connections also provide a degree
of information about the individual to potential economic partners (like employers)
through the network. This provides economic partners access to the individuals reputation
through lower cost mechanisms, thus increasing the chance that the individual will have
access to profitable economic partnerships and through access to institutional structures.
Also, bridges create greater opportunity for access to knowledge externalities which
enhance individual productivity and innovation.
Bridging social capital also influences economic success through norms. Implied
in measuring bridges as group membership and political engagement are the norms which
underlie these behaviors. Diverse group membership and engagement imply norms of
generalized trust and cooperation that enhance economic success through the willingness
to work with others. Also implied is a norm of self-efficacy, because they have an active
engagement with the external environment and self-directed agency. These norms and
the instrumental resources both serve to enhance economic success directly. Because of
this, the hypothesized relationship is positive.
The bridging social capital concepts of cooperation and cohesions both measure,
in different way, the willingness and activity of working with ones close neighbors, a
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much more circumscribed conception of social capital. Higher levels of these concepts
are also believed to positively affect economic success, and these mechanisms are very
similar to those above. Cohesion taps directly the norm of trust in one’s neighbors and
the norm of cooperation. This is different from the more generalized trust embedded in
bridging social capital19. Particularized trust is also economically enhancing, because it
creates, albeit more limited, basis for cooperative behavior.
The concept of cooperation captures more directly the behavioral element of
neighborhood trust, and looks at how closely connected the individual is in their
neighborhood and their active cooperation with others. This taps, implicitly, the same
norms of trust and cooperation as cohesion, but also the thickness of connections and the
resources available in the local network. There are two dimensions of these connections
that affect economic success. First is the resource dimension. Neighborhood cooperation
captures the element of social support resources. These resources act as compliments to
achieving economic success through providing social supports that enable people to be
more productive in other parts of their lives. These close connections also overcome
some of the same information asymmetries as bridging resources, proving information
about jobs and about the individual’s reputation, but in a more limited capacity. The
second dimension is norms. We have already mentioned how the cooperation concept
taps particularized cooperation and trust, but it also the norm of reciprocity through
general neighborhood cooperation. Just as these norms are economic-enhancing when
generalized, they also increase economic success within more limited circles. Both
cooperation and cohesion are believed to enhance economic success positively, though

19

Generalized trust is the norm most often associated with economic success (Fukuyama 1995; Halpern
2005).
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the relationship may have a smaller magnitude that with bridges because of the more
limited nature of the connections.

H2 The relationship between economic success and social capital is endogenous.

Just as social capital increases economic success, economic success is believed to
have a reciprocal, i.e. endogenous, relationship to social capital. The hypothesis is that
the endogenous relationship is mutually positive. What this means is that social capital
increases economic success and that economic success increases social capital in a
positive feedback loop. Higher levels of all forms of social capital increase income
levels, and those income levels increase or sustain social capital. Endogeneity is both a
theoretical and methodological issue. The theoretical problem of endogeny was
discussed in chapter two. The methodological issue of endogeneity, which can bias
coefficient estimation, is discussed in the methodology section of chapter five.
Underlying all three forms of social capital is a feedback loop with economic
success that endogenously reinforces success. What I mean by this is that when
individuals are rewarded economically for adopting particular norms or behaviors, they
are more likely to continue or enhance those behaviors. For example, when an individual
is able to obtain a job or profit through their bridging networks, they are given an
incentive to build and maintain those networks. Profitable cooperative behavior increases
the likelihood that an individual will engage in similar behavior in the future. Positive
economic reinforcement strengthens the norms and behaviors that helped generate that
success in the first place. Along these lines, economic success is hypothesized to have a
particular enhancing effect on bridges. Greater economic success provides new
opportunities to build social capital as it increases the number of potential new
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connections to which an individual has access and the probability that they will build and
engage in wider networks, and also the availability of information about the individual in
the network.
The bonding social capital concepts may have a more particular relationship with
economic success. Because bonding social capital can substitute for bridges in
overcoming information asymmetries, and because bonding networks tend be composed
of people of similar income levels and backgrounds—they exhibit homophily—economic
success is hypothesized to increase the amount of resources available in close-knit
networks and for the bonds to provide easier access to higher quality resources when they
are available. Economic success also decreases the need for instrumental material
support through the bonding network. There are two possible effects of this. First, this
may mean that these relationships are less strained by need and therefore can grow
stronger. The second, and counter to the first, is that since the need for these
relationships is less, economically successful individuals will be less likely to cultivate
close bonds with their neighbors. The overall relationship, however, is hypothesized to
be positive for all social capital variables.

The Neighborhood
H3 Aggregate neighborhood social capital positively affects aggregate economic success.
H4 Aggregate neighborhood economic success has a reciprocal and endogenous relationship with
aggregate neighborhood social capital.
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Figure 4.3 Neighborhood Level Model

The relationship between aggregate measures of economic success and aggregate
social capital is hypothesized to be similar in both direction and magnitude as for the
individual level. The mechanisms by which this works is very similar to what was
described above. Aggregate pools of resources increase the probability of economic
success of neighborhood residents and neighborhoods with more general levels of trust
and cooperation will benefit in aggregate. Social capital operates the same way, in
aggregate, as it does at the individual level. The interesting point is not that these
dynamics are mirrored, but comes when we consider the relationship between the levels,
but it needs to be explicitly modeled.

H5 Aggregate social capital directly affects individual social capital.

This assertion forms the second key point of the dissertation, and is important for
understanding the relationship between neighborhood economic conditions and
individual success. The dynamics were explored more closely in chapter three, but will
briefly be reiterated here. Figure 4.4 shows the link between neighborhood and
individual social capital.
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Figure 4.4 – Neighborhood and Individual Model

There are two primary dynamics by which neighborhood income operate on
individual income as mediated by social capital: creating pools of resources and social
learning. The first is relatively easy. Neighborhood social capital represents a pool of
socially embedded resources that individuals have potential access to as members of that
neighborhood. Because the aggregate level of economic success helps define what
resources are available in aggregate, i.e. the “pool”, it indirectly affects the cost at which
an individual can obtain access to these resources. For example, it is much easier for an
individual to obtain information about jobs through their network if that network is rich
in job information. It is not as important for the individual to have direct access to a
person with the information that can benefit then, as social capital allows them to access
it through indirect connections. Therefore the resource density of the network raises,
probabilistically, the likelihood that individuals will have access to those resources that
benefit them.
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The second dynamic is through social learning. Individuals learn through
watching others in their environment, and neighborhoods are an important environment
for this. First, neighborhoods provide a pool of easily available identities for individuals
to adopt. These identities are essentially formed by the aggregate norms of others in the
neighborhood. Second, individuals watch the strategies and outcomes adopted by others
in their neighborhood. An individual is more likely to adopt behaviors that they bring
success to others. The converse of this is observing lack of success may reduce their
willingness to adopt those norms or attitudes that could be economically-enhancing. So
the observation of poverty may reduce the willingness to adopt cooperative norms and
behaviors. Finally, the existence of cooperative behaviors through social networks in the
environment reduces the risk of free-riding. The trust and cooperation of others reduces
the cost on individuals for cooperation and reduces the risk of free-riding. People will
still free-ride on their behaviors, but the individual burden will be much less. In this way,
aggregate social capital breeds more of the same behavior in individuals. Finally, in high
social capital networks, individuals might face sanctions if they don’t adhere to the norms
in those networks, creating an incentive to build their social capital.
The flipside of the neighborhoods’ social capital on the individual is the
individual’s social capital on the neighborhood, which is the endogenous group effect.
Just as the aggregate affects the individual, the individual’s social capital affects the
overall. What this means is that individual’s cultivation of their social capital, by
building networks and acting cooperatively, will likely influence other’s to do the same.
Because of these dynamics, both aggregate to individual and individual to aggregate, I
hypothesize that the relationship between these levels of social capital is both positive
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and reciprocal. This means that increased aggregate levels of social capital will increase
individual social capital and vice versa.
This reciprocal relationship should exist for all types of social capital, but it may
be of different magnitude depending on type. Because cohesion and cooperation are
closely tied with behavior and norms directed at and generated by the neighborhood,
there should be a greater endogenous effect for these concepts. This means that the
magnitude of the effect should be greater for these than for bridging social capital.
Bonding may be more directly connected with the behavior and attitudes of others in the
neighborhood. Since bridges are less directly tied to the neighborhood, by definition, the
social endogenous effect should be of less magnitude, but still present and positive.

Figure 4.5 – Income Covariance Model

One final connection is needed between the individual and neighborhood levels of
the model, and that is a connection between median neighborhood income and individual
income. Empirically, neighborhood and individual income levels covary strongly, as the
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segregation literature shows (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). The curved line in Figure 4.5
represents this covariance. The implication is that part of the correlation between
personal and neighborhood income is not represented within the model. This means that
there are other factors which could cause the correlation between the income measures,
including filtering by the housing market, discriminatory housing practices, or selfselection by individuals into economically segregated communities. The self-selection
problem is often posed as a foil to neighborhood research (Jencks and Meyer 1990). The
problem that self-selection introduces is that if enough similar individuals choose to live
near people similar to themselves, neighborhood effects are really just the correlation of
individual effects among people in the neighborhood. To use Manksi’s (2000), typology,
self-selection means that neighborhood effects are correlational instead of endogenous or
contextual. Enough observational and experimental research now exists, however, that
we can be comfortable assuming that neighborhoods have a causal effect independent of
self-selection bias.20 The correlation between these levels represents that there may be
unobserved self-selection or other unobserved factors which cause correlation between
neighborhood and individual income.
The overall model, if valid, presents a narrative on the role of social connections
in economic success. The degree to which individuals are able to obtain economic
success is partially dependent on their social connections and social resources. These
social connections give individuals different access to the tools (resources), attitudes and
behaviors (norms) increase their chance of success. Because these are social based
though, they are embedded in communities. The neighborhood is one of the more
important communities for providing these resources because they provide and
20

See Sampson (2012) for a review.
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immediate and close (proximal) pool for individuals to draw resources from and
opportunities to learn. Because rich and poor communities differ in what is available,
individual economic success can be profoundly affected by the economic conditions of
the neighborhood.

Individual Level Controls
In addition to the main variables of interest, a number of variables are believed to
affect both social capital and economic success. These are education, age, marital status,
and race. Education is very closely associated with economic success and is usually used
as a measure of human capital, making individuals more productive and able to obtain
higher quality jobs. Education also directly influences social capital variables, because it
provides one arena for building stable relationships and influences the economic
enhancing-norms through educational experiences. Age is a factor because young people
often have not had the time and experience to build economic success and have had fewer
opportunities to build their social networks. The elderly cannot work as much as those,
and therefore have decreased incomes, but may have a lower opportunity cost for
participating in organizations and cooperating with their neighbors. Employment has an
obvious relationship with income, but is also thought to affect social capital by giving
individuals another pool to draw from. Race is a significant factor in both. Because of
discrimination and de facto social segregation, race has to be accounted for in both
income and social capital, as African Americans consistently earn less than whites, and
social separation may mean more circumscribed networks for African Americans. In
addition to African Americans, I include a variable for Hispanic. Gender and marital
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status are the last major controls. Empirically, women consistently earn less than men.
Also, gender may play a role in social capital dynamics, since women and men have
different everyday life dynamics and networks (Sapiro 2006: 153). Marital status is
included to capture the idea that marriage allows for a division of labor in the household
and support structure that allows individual to be more economically successful and
lowers the opportunity cost of social capital.
Social capital is instrumented with church and housing tenure. The instrumental
variables approach is described more in the next chapter, but instrumental variables are
needed to separate endogenous effects. Church attendance is not correlated with income
level and is thought to relate to social capital because it shows social engagement, social
networking, and some adherence to important norms. Housing tenure is measured by the
number a years living in the neighborhood and influences social capital by providing a
stable basis for building relationships through repeated interactions with neighbors. In
our sample, tenure has a minimal correlation with income. Income is instrumented with
occupational prestige.

Neighborhood level controls
In the neighborhood model, we also have a number of controls. A few of these
mirror the controls at the individual level and have the same reasoning, including the
proportion of people with college degrees, the proportion of female-headed households,
proportion employed, and the proportion African American. Female-headed households
are important because, in the aggregate, this is a predictor of neighborhood poverty. We
also use housing tenure as an instrument for neighborhood social capital. Housing tenure
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is measured at the neighborhood level as the proportion of people living the
neighborhood for five years or more, and is thought to instrument social capital by
providing a stable basis for building networks and relationships.

Conclusion
The models in this chapter represent the main hypotheses of the dissertation.
Higher social capital is hypothesized to increase income, and income to increase social
capital. The same relationship is hypothesized to exist at the aggregate neighborhood
level. Neighborhood social capital is hypothesized to link aggregate neighborhood
income to individual income through social capital. In the next chapter, we test this
model empirically.
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CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS
This chapter presents the empirical results for this dissertation. Whereas chapter
four developed models that linked neighborhoods, social capital and economic success,
here we test those models empirically. The chapter proceeds by first describing the data
set for the analysis, which comes from the Project on Human Development in Chicago
Neighborhoods. Next, I give describe the statistical methods for the analysis, and follow
with the results of the models. I present six different models, each to test a different
portion of the bigger picture and different type of social capital. This leads to a final
model, which I refer to as the unitary model, which uses a single latent measure of social
capital and is used as the basis for discussing and interpreting the results in the final
section.

Data
The data set for this dissertation is the Project on Human Development in Chicago
Neighborhoods (PHDCN) community survey (Earls et al.). The PHDCN is a large scale,
cross-sectional survey focusing on Chicago and was directed by the Harvard School for
Public Health. The survey sampled 8,782 individuals on health, socioeconomic status,
community participation, and neighborhood conditions among others. Responses were
household interviews of adult residents aged 18 or older. Key survey questions assessed
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respondents’ community involvement, their normative beliefs about their own and other’s
behavior, and neighborhood characteristics and conditions.
The sampling design of the PHCDN Community Survey was designed to generate
a cross-section of Chicago’s neighborhoods, and then of people within those
neighborhoods. The directors of the study defined neighborhoods ecologically, and
reduced Chicago’s 847 census tracts to 343 neighborhood clusters (Sampson et. al 1997).
These neighborhood units were constructed by combining census tracts through local
knowledge and geographic layout of the city. Each neighborhood cluster has about 8,000
people, is geographically contiguous and approximates local neighborhoods. By defining
Chicago neighborhoods in this manner, the data has more validity in its definition of
neighborhoods than by simply using census tracts, as it conforms closer to local
understandings of neighborhoods. In the data set, all 343 clusters are sampled. The
sampling method followed a three step process, where city blocks were sampled within
the clusters, dwellings were sampled within the blocks and finally one adult was sampled
for each dwelling (Earls et al. N.D.).21 The geographic focus on Chicago limits some of
the generalizability of the empirical findings, but also provides a control on potential
confounding variables such as regional variation in social capital, regional variation in
industrial mix and unemployment, and metropolitan institutional structures.
PHDCN features many variables related to social capital and the socioeconomic
status of the respondent, as well as detailed neighborhood variables. For over a decade,
Robert Sampson and colleagues have used the PHDCN data to investigate the
21

The non-independence of the sampling method potentially introduces the problem of heterosedasticy
into the analysis. The main issue with heteroscedasticity is that it reduces the validity of the standard
errors and therefor makes inference from significance tests suspect. To correct for this, estimates in this
analysis were corrected by using clustered robust standard errors. See the technical appendix for more
information.

113

relationship of social capital related concepts to violent crime (Sampson et. al. 1997;
Morenoff et. al. 2001), Childhood development and well-being (Sampson et. al. 2008a ),
the social monitoring of children’s behavior (Sampson et. al. 2002), among others. The
variables in this dataset reflect a more specific conceptualization of social capital than
other studies which just rely on trust or organizational membership. Of particular interest
are the latent social capital variables identified in Sampson et. al. (1999: 639). These
variables include reciprocated exchange, measured by five items of social exchange such
as favors, voluntary association, a measurement of involvement in a number of civic and
voluntary groups and social cohesion, a measure of trust in neighbors measured by
survey items of the helpfulness of neighborhoods and trustworthiness. I use these three
latent variables as my primary social capital variables but have renamed reciprocated
exchange to cooperation, voluntary association to engagement and social cohesion as
simply cohesion and added used a forth, memberships as explained in chapter four. Table
5.1 shows a summary of the questions for each social capital measure. These questions
are measured on a five point likert scale, except for the membership questions, which are
measured dichotomously. In addition to social capital responses, the data set includes
socio-economic and demographic variables. For our success variable, we use household
income, which was measured on a 15 category scale. In this analysis I will refer to
success and its variable incvalue interchangeably. Table 5.2 presents a summary of the
variables used in this study. The neighborhood variables were aggregated from the
individual responses by neighborhood cluster.
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Table 5.1 Social Capital Variables
Cohesion

Cooperation



Q11b – This is a close-knit neighborhood





Q11e – People are willing to help
neighbors

Q18 – How often do people in
neighborhood do favors for each other



Q19 – When a neighbor is not home, how
often do you and other neighbors watch
over their property



Q20 – How often do you and other people
in neighborhood ask advice about personal
things



Q21 – How often do you and other people
in the neighborhood have get-togethers
where other people in neighborhood are
invited



Q22 – How often do you and people in the
neighborhood visit in each other’s homes
or on the street



Q11f – People in the neighborhood get
along



Q11k – People in the neighborhood share
the same values



Q11m – People in the neighborhood can be
trusted

Engagement






Q13a – Have you, or any household
member, spoken with a local politician or
elected local official about a neighborhood
problem.

Membership
Do you or other household members belong to:

Q13b – Have you, or any household
member, talked to a person or group
causing a problem in the neighborhood
Q13c – Have you, or any household
member, attended a meeting of a block or
neighborhood group about a neighborhood
problem or improvement



Q13d – Have you, or any household
member, talked to a local religious leader
or minister to help with a neighborhood
problem or with neighborhood
improvement



Q13e – Have you, or any household
member, gotten together with neighbors to
do something about a neighborhood
problem or to organize neighborhood
improvement.
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Q24 Any kind of neighborhood watch
program



Q25 A block group, tenant association, or
community council



Q26 – a business or civic group such as
Masons, Elks, or Rotary Club



Q27 – Ethnic or nationality club



Q28 – neighborhood ward group or other
local political organizations

Table 5.2 Summary Statistics

Variable

Description

Individual Variables
Categorical measure of income in real
incvalue
dollars
old
Dummy for age 65 or older

Mean

SD

Min

Max

27694.55

28451.31

0

150000

0.252

0.434

0

1

young

Dummy for age 25 or younger

0.227

0.419

0

1

edu

Education in years

12.0307

3.12

0

17

hispanic

Dummy for race = Hispanic

0.25

0.433

0

1

black

Dummy for race = African American

0.396

0.489

0

1

sepdiv

Dummy for separated or divorced

0.165

0.371

0

1

female

Dummy for Gender = Female

0.590

0.492

0

1

married

Dummy for married
Dummy variable for if respondent
currently has a job
Years lived in neighborhood
Dummy for belongs to a religious
organization
respondents occupational prestige

0.373

0.484

0

1

0.579

0.494

0

1

10.389

11.966

0

81.5

0.57

0.495

0

1

40.57

13.324

17

86

28088.19

12883.42

0

95500

0.286

0.189

0

1

0.391

0.402

0

1

0.278

0.138

0

1

0.58

0.161

0

1

0.545

0.173

0

1

employed
tenure
church
prestige

Neighborhood Variables
median income in neighborhood
n_income
cluster
proportion of respondents with a
nbagrad
bachelor's degree
proportion of respondents who are
n_black
African American
proportion of single, separated or
n_femalehouse
divorced women respondents
proportion of employed
n_employed
respondents
proportion of respondents living 5
n_tenure5
years or more in neighborhood

The PHDCN measurement instrument and indicators have been used in a number
of studies, which support its validity and reliability (Dorsey and Forehand, 2003; Drukker
et al 2003; Lochner et. al. 2003; Rankin and Quane, 2002; Subramanian et al. 2003;
Brisson and Usher 2005; Brisson and Usher 2007). For example Drukker et al. (2003) use
it to study the social capital effect on neighborhoods. Dorsey and Forehand (2003)
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conduct and SEM analysis using the PHDCN instrument study how social capital relates
to child psychological adjustment. Brisson and Usher (2004; 2007) use the instrument to
test social capital relationship with homeownership and other neighborhood variables.

Methodology
The main methodological tool for this study is Structural equation modeling
(SEM). SEM is a family of related statistical techniques that primarily combines
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) path modeling and regression techniques. SEM uses
various models to depict theoretical relationships among observed variables and provides
a quantitative test of the theoretical model (Shumaker and Lomax 2004: 2). The greatest
advantage of these techniques is that they allow statistical modeling and testing of
complex relationships and phenomena. I also supplement the base SEM techniques of
CFA and structural modeling with an instrumental variables approach, using a secondstage least squares regression (2SLS) to test the endogeneity hypothesis. This intent of
using multiple methods, as well as multiple models of social capital, is to increase the
robustness of the findings. In the rest of this section I describe the statistical methods in
more detail and provide an overview of the models.

CFA
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a theory driven confirmatory technique. It
is related to other forms of factor analysis, but differs in that most other factor techniques
are exploratory, in that they seek to find inductively covariate relationships in the data.
In contrast, CFA starts with the theoretical construct and hypothesized relationships. It
then constructs a model of these relationships, called the measurement model, and tests
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how well the hypothesized covariances of the population fits the observed covariances
(Schreiber et. al. 2010).
The main theoretical constructs for this study are bridges, cohesion, and
cooperation. As I outlined in chapter four, these constructs were derived the literature.
Because these measures have been developed and tested by prior studies (see Sampson et
al 1999 and Sampson 2012), CFA is used primarily to confirm the validity of these
measures. The CFA technique is used here to provide validity to overall model and show
that the constructs hold up empirically. Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show the measurement
models graphically. The ovals represent the latent, unobserved social capital constructs.
The boxes show the actual observed variables, which are hypothesized to indicate the
latent variables. The straight arrows indicate causality to show the latent variable causes
the indicator (or alternatively is measure by those indicators), while curved lines indicate
covariance between variables.

Figure 5.1 Bridge Measurement Model
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Figure 5.2 Cooperation Measurement Model

Figure 5.3 Cohesion Measurement Model
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2SLS
In order to test the endogeneity hypothesis, I use a two-stage least squares
regression (2SLS). Social capital and economic success are modeled as endogenous—
they have some degree of mutual causality. Endogeneity can cause biased statistical
estimates, which can cause trouble for understanding relationships (Timpone 2003). The
main statistical technique employed in this dissertation, SEM, is justified in part because
it can model endogeneity and latent variables at the same time. 2SLS, or instrumental
variable regression, is a separate but related technique for modeling endogeneity which I
use to supplement the SEM process. The advantage of 2SLS is that it allows the testing
of endogeneity specifically through the Durbin-White-Hausman test (DWH).22 With this
test, we can specifically test the hypothesis that social capital and economic success are
endogenous, which lends greater validity to the structural model. The disadvantage to
2SLS regression is that it doesn’t allow us to model latent measurement variables within
the model. To perform it, we first generate predicted factor scores from the CFA model
and then use them as instrumented predictors in the 2SLS regression.

SEM
CFA and 2SLS are used to test specific assumption in this analysis, namely the
empirical validity of the social capital constructs and the assumption of endogeneity.
Structural equation modeling is used, however, to test the main theoretical relationships

22

See Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) for an overview of this technique. The technique was originally
developed through Durbin (1954), Hausman (1978) and Wu (1973).
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of interest. SEM combines the measurement technique of the CFA with a structural
model. In a structural model, causal relationships among variables is specified in
advance and are tested using to see how closely the relationships match the available data
(Shor 2004: 152). These causal relationships are specified before analysis and are most
often depicted diagrammatically. Figures 5.4 through 5.9 show the structural model of the
hypothesized relationships for each of the social capital constructs. These diagrams
represent relationships in the same way as the CFA models: ovals represent unobserved,
latent variables, rectangles observed variables, and the arrows causal relationships.
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Figure 5.4 Individual Bridges SEM Model
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Figure 5.5 Individual Cooperation SEM Model
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Figure 5.6 Individual Cohesion SEM Model
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Figure 5.7 Neighborhood Bridges SEM Model
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Figure 5.8 Neighborhood Cooperation SEM Model
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Figure 5.9 Neighborhood Cohesion SEM Model
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SEM is most useful for addressing questions about causality, measurement, and
causality when variables are not well measured (Hoyle 1994). The major strengths of the
method are the explicit modeling of causal relationships; tests that allow models to be
rejected and competing models can be compared. In the structural model, a regression
coefficient is estimated for each relationship. The advantage in this technique is that
specific and more complex causal relationships between variables can be modeled and
estimated in ways not normally available in more common multiple regression
techniques. As Hoyle and Smith (1994) state, “Unlike the goal of analysis of variance
(ANOVA) or multiple regression, which is to model individual observation, the primary
aim of structural equation modeling is to model covariances, which entails proposing a
set of relations(i.e. a model) and evaluating their consistency with the relationship
manifest in an observed covariance matrix”(429). For example, it allows us to model
endogeneity specifically within the model, through reciprocal causal paths.
One of the primary advantages that the structural model gives us is that it can test
hypotheses about mediation. Mediation is when the “causal effect of some variable X on
an outcome Y is explained by some intervening variable M"(Shrout and Bolger 2002:
422). SEM allows us to model, analyze, and estimate both the direct and indirect effect
of one variable on another. For example, we can estimate the indirect effect of
neighborhood level of bridging social capital on individual incvalue even though there
isn’t a direct path.
While SEM models causal relationships specifically, it cannot be said to test that
causality specifically (Kline 2011). SEM, like most statistical techniques, is rather a
disconfirmatory technique to tell how well the model fits the data. As Bollen (1989)
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states, “If a model is consistent with reality, then the data should be consistent with the
model. But, if the data are consistent with the model, this does not imply that the model
corresponds to reality” (68).

Measurement Results
Table 5.3 presents results from the CFA analysis. I performed the CFA analysis
separately for each of the social capital variables.
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Table 5.3 – CFA Results

Log
pseudolikelihood
Alpha
Observations

Cooperation

Cohesion

Bridge

-45281.027
0.802
7128

-51357.804
0.732
7949

-22757.996
0.777
7776

130

Observed

Coefficient

q18
q19
q20
q21
q22

0.769
0.652
0.659
0.590
0.687

0.039
SRMR
0.814
CD
Note: All coefficients significant at the 0.01 level.

Robust
SE
0.009
0.011
0.010
0.013
0.011

Observed

Coefficient

q11b
q11e
q11f
q11k
q11m

0.650
0.757
0.674
0.479
0.432

0.026
0.775

Robust
SE
0.011
0.009
0.011
0.017
0.016

Observed

Coefficient

Engage
0.540
Memberships
0.960
(Engage Variables)
q13a
0.634
q13b
0.506
q13c
0.793
q13d
0.480
q13e
0.777
0.017
0.925

Robust
SE
0.011
0.013
0.012
0.015
0.008
0.014
0.010

All of the coefficients were significant, and both the alpha for interscale reliability and fit
statistics are acceptable, so all of the models will be used without modification for the
rest of the analysis. Because the 2SLS method doesn’t compute measurement models
internally, The CFA results were used to predict factor scores for each social capital
variable.

2SLS Results
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the results from the 2SLS regressions. In models 1, 2
and 3, each of the main social capital variables are regressed on income. Social capital is
instrumented with church and tenure. Table 5.4 shows the individual level results. Each
of the social capital variables were run in separate models in order to test the endogeneity
of each with incvalue. “Endogeneity test” reports the results from DWH test, which has
the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous. Since the p-value for each of these
tests is very small, we can reject the null, which means that social capital and income are
indeed endogenous. Table 5.5 shows the 2sls results at the neighborhood level. Models
4, 5 and 6 regress neighborhood social capital, calculated as the mean of individual social
capital in the neighborhood cluster, on the median neighborhood income, n_income.
Neighborhood social capital is instrumented with n_tenure5. Because these models are
at the neighborhood level, they are regressed with non-clustered robust errors. The
endogeneity tests mirror those at the individual level, creating stronger support that the
endogeneity finding is robust.
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Table 5.4 2SLS Regression of Social Capital on Income
Dependent = incvalue

Observation
2

R

bridge
cohesion
cooperation
edu

Model (1)
bridge

Model (2)
cohesion

Model (3)
cooperation

7527

7527

7527

0.2041

0.0848

0.1465

36168.65***

n/a

(5417.464)
n/a

25096.00***
(4098.993)

n/a

n/a
25096.00***

n/a

n/a

1858.789 ***
(165.4733)

1984.705***

2071.101***

(162.460)

(154.0133)
-1182.779
(875.7165)

(2725.596)

-179.716

1187.188

(917.985)

(1127.652)

-1370.931
(927.785)

1181.764***
(1117.341)

-313.9709
(948.9779)

927.7856***

-5019.398***

-6028.067***

(1044.172)

(1181.764)

(1108.226)

-8840.698***
(1001.205)

-4286.435***
(1269.436)

-7187.444***
(1055.621)

-3176.333***

-2792.582***

-2423.248 ***

(604.116)

(649.377)

(614.6922)

-1381.033*

816.2681

-361.3895

(729.688)

(849.379)

(774.698)

9456.832***

10148.15***

9944.134***

(798.254)

(787.668)

(785.717)

11158.30***

9909.94***

11950.86***

(642.197)

(773.1136)

(662.391)

2636.22
(2200.983)

-1350.019
(2083.839)

-1807.64
(2036.475)

25.3652***

30.5266***

31.4118***

First-Stage Adjusted R2

0.1270

0.083

0.062

First-Stage Partial R2

0.0612

0.022

0.0357

young
old
Hispanic
black
female
sepdiv
married
employed
Constant

Endogeneity Test F(1, 342)

*p <.10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Bridge, Cooperation, and
Cohesion instrumented with church and tenure. 1st stage regressions are in the technical appendix.
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Table 5.5 2SLS Regression of Neighborhood Social Capital on Neighborhood Income
Dependent – n_income

Observation
2

R

n_bridges
n_cooperation
n_cohesion
nbagrad
n_employed

Model (4)
n_bridges

Model (5)
n_cohesion

Model (6)
n_cooperation

8782

8782

8782

.

0.4667

0.2601

159376.10***

n/a

(8093.789)
n/a

26464.48***
(835.268)

n/a

n/a
52216.16***

n/a

n/a

26114.75***
(1213.334)

21206.54***

21101.02***

(900.656)

(1012.609)

18186.85***
(1441.726)

17174.20***

27959.90***

(811.443)

(962.729)

-344.281

(1928.422)

-7866.809***
(679.413)

(291.845)

848.077**
(362.232)

2460.335
(1528.608)

3526.429***
(1275.09)

-4332.897***
(1285.364)

12456.77***

11216.50***

(1023.443)

(532.475)

6713.541**
(639.893)

1021.35***

662.812***

959.523***

First-Stage Adjusted R2

0.0861

0.3491

0.2096

First-Stage Partial R2

0.0429

0.1537

0.1188

n_black
n_femalehouse
Constant
Endogeneity Test; F(1, 8774)

*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01, robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Bridge, Cooperation, and Cohesion
instrumented with n_tenure5. First stage regressions are in the Technical Appendix.

SEM Results
Individual Level Results
The main individual level hypothesis is that social capital increases economic
success and that there is a reciprocal relationship. To examine this, I have run 6 models,
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two for each of the social capital variables. Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and table 5.6 report
the SEM results for the model at the individual level only, while figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15
and table 5.7 report the results for the full model. The diagrammatic figures report
standardized direct regression coefficients. The tables report both the standardized and
unstandardized effects for the structural model.23 In this section I will discuss the results
of the individual level models. The next section will examine the full models.
The first set of three models look at individual level dynamics, with one model for
each for bridges (model 1), cooperation (model 2) and cohesion (model 3). In each of
these models, the relationship between the social capital and incvalue is modeled as
reciprocal, with church and tenure as instrumental variables for social capital. Prestige
instruments incvalue. Also included in the model are socio-demographic variables which
are believed to affect both. All three of the individual models have an acceptable degree
of fit.24 Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and table 5.6 report the model results.

23

I omit the measurement model results for clarity.

24

Fit statistics, stability indices and equation level fit statistics are in the technical appendix.
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Figure 5.10 Individual Level Bridges SEM Results
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Figure 5.11 Individual Level Cooperation Results
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Figure 5.12 Individual Level Cohesion SEM Results

137

Table 5.6 Individual Level SEM Results
Observations
Log
pseudolikelihood

Model (1) Bridge
7256

Model (2) Cooperation
6644

Model (3) Cohesion
7349

-214512.72

-219269.63

-243411.23

incvalue

bridge
(SC)

incvalue

cooperation
(SC)

incvalue

cohesion
(SC)

11846.15***
0.181
(2436.732)

N/A

6964.826***
0.184
(1847.845)

N/A

9130.528***
0.221
(2238.06)

N/A

N/A

-0.001
-0.049
(0.001)

N/A

-0.001**
-0.129
(0.001)

N/A

-0.001***
-0.117
(0.001)

edu

1411.475***
0.156
(140.188)

0.034***
0.245
(0.003)

1644.096***
0.179
(140.581)

0.027***
0.113
(0.005)

1646.837***
0.180
(132.633)

0.027***
0.120
(0.005)

old

-1696.574*
-0.023
(898.352)

-0.042*
-0.037
(0.022)

-731.617
-0. 009
(957.416)

-0.138***
-0.070
(0.036)

-2402.158**
-0.033
(939.667)

0.068**
0.038
(0.028)

young

-187.925
-0.003
(889.692)

-0.102***
-0.102
(0.015)

-1215.136
-0.018
(878.488)

-0.065**
-0.037
(0.025)

-261.346
-0.004
(960.676)

-0.169***
-0.106
(0.025)

female

-3391.788***
-0.059
(599.208)

-0.025*
-0.029
(0.013)

-2637.518***
-0. 045
(600.251)

-0.080***
-0.052
(0.023)

-3274.466***
-0.056
(589.774)

-0.048**
-0.034
(0.020)

-7971.859***
-0.138
(940.265)
-6828.459***
-0.104
(977.130)
9863.003***
0.168
(753.521)
-1824.496***
-0.024
(697.363)
10753.62***
0.186
(633.260)
356.600***
0.168
(27.443)

-0.003
-0.004
(0.019)
-0.048**
-0.048
(0.021)
0.126***
0.141
(0.019)
0.035**
0.030
(0.017)
0.051***
0.058
(0.015)

-7754.538***
-0.131
(1006.300)
-6854.999***
0.104
(1046.589)
10344.23***
0.175
(792.5191)
-1567.914**
-0.020
(725.400)
11840.14***
0.203
(662.632)
349.744***
0.162
(29.128)

-0.149***
-0.096
(0.036)
-0.180***
-0.103
(0.041)
0.134***
0.086
(0.030)
-0.047***
-0.022
(0.031)
0.025
0.016
(0.032)

-5879.185***
-0.101
(1045.417)
-5575.006***
-0.085
(981.118)
10739.45***
0.182
(723.582)
-491.930
-0.006
(739.937)
10364.04***
0.179
(668.649)
361.945
0.169
(26.976)

-0.250***
-0.178
(0.036)
-0.169***
-0.106
(0.037)
0.092***
0.065
(0.029)
-0.100***
-0.054
(0.027)
0.128***
0.092
(0.030)

SC*

incvaue

black

hispanic

married

sepdiv

employed

prestige

tenure

N/A

church

N/A

N/A
0.009***
0.254
(0.001)
0.164***
0.187
(0.014)

N/A

N/A

N/A
0.011***
0.168
(0.001)
0.234***
0.153
(0.024)

N/A

N/A

N/A
0.007***
0.125
(0.001)
0.182***
0.131
(0.021)

-13572.67***
-12438.110***
-13700.24 ***
-0.478
N/A
-0.434
N/A
-0.481
N/A
(1943.764)
(2200.491)
(2283.856)
*p <.10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. SC is for the social capital variable used in each model. Each table entry in the table
reports the un-standardized coefficient with the significance level and the standardized coefficient. Clustered robust
standard errors shown in parentheses.
Constant
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In all three models, the statistically significant socio-demographic variables have
the expected signs for both incvalue and the social capital variables. Years of education
increases both success and social capital. Young people have lower social capital
compared to middle aged individuals. On success, young people also have lower
incomes, but this is not significant in models 1 and 3. Older people have lower incomes
than middle aged, but on average have slightly higher levels of bridging social capital and
cohesion, but not a significant level of difference on cooperation. African Americans
have lower incomes and lower social capital than other racial categories, as do female
headed households. Religious organization membership increases all three types of
social capital.
The main hypothesized relationship is that social capital increases economic
success, and the results are consistent with this hypothesis. All three types of social
capital increase economic success and are significant. Interpreting the magnitude of the
effect is tricky because of the nature of the factor scales. A one unit increase in bridges
increases success by 11846.15; cooperation increases it 6964.826, and cohesion
9130.528. The magnitude of this effect is surprisingly large, and is higher than for any of
the socio-demographic variables and larger than education. The standardized coefficients
also show a large magnitude of the effect. One standard deviation change in bridging
social capital changes income by 0.181 standard deviations, cooperation changes it 0.184
and cohesion by 0.221. The magnitude of this effect is higher than for any of the sociodemographic variables except for employment, though education is close in magnitude.
In models 1 and 2, employment is the only variable with a larger magnitude.
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The second key relationship is the reciprocal effect of the success on social
capital. In the 2SLS section, we tested the endogeneity of success and social capital and
found that it was endogenous. Drawing on the literature, the hypothesized relationship
was that income would increase social capital. But the surprising result is that the
relationship was in fact negative. This relationship is true for all three types of social
capital and is significant. Because of the difference in the scales, the unstandardized
coefficients for success on social capital are very small, but the standardized coefficients
are not. For each standard deviation change in success, bridges decreases -0.049,
cooperation decreases -0.129, and cohesion -0.117. This effect is relatively small for
bridges, especially when compared to the effect size of education and tenure. For
cooperation and cohesion, the effect size is on par, in absolute magnitude, with education,
tenure and church attendance.

Full Model
The second set of models looks at how the neighborhood level affects the
individual. In these models, the individual model was retained for each of the social
capital variables and expanded to include the neighborhood level variables. The
hypothesized connection between the individual and neighborhood level is social capital,
and this relationship is modeled as endogenous. Also endogenous is the relationship
between aggregate neighborhood level social capital and the median income level of the
neighborhood. Also included in the model are neighborhood variables that affect both.
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The structure of the model is the same for each of the neighborhood level social capital
variables. All of the models had an acceptable level of fit, and were stable.25
Figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and table 5.7 show the results from the full models. In all
three neighborhood models the statistically significant socio-demographic variables have
the expected sign. Most of the individual level coefficients are similar in magnitude,
direction, and significance as in the individual models. The significant neighborhood
contextual variables have the expected sign. One surprise was that the proportion of
female headed households was not significant with regards to neighborhood income.
Also, proportion African American was weakly significant only in the bridges model,
where it decreases neighborhood income, but not significant in the others. The proportion
of college graduates (nbagrad) and employed (n_employed) increase neighborhood
income and social capital as expected.

25

See technical appendix.
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Figure 5.13 Neighborhood Bridges SEM Results
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Figure 5.14 Neighborhood Cooperation SEM Results
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Figure 5.15 Neighborhood Cohesion SEM Results
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Table 5.7 Full Model SEM Results
Observations
Log
pseudolikelihood

Model (4) Bridge
7318
-168905.26

incvalue
incvalue

Model (5) Cooperation
6644

N/A

-292191.9
bridge
(SC)
-0.001***
-0.334
(0.010)

incvalue
N/A

Model (6) Cohesion
7418
-255673.44

cooperation
(SC)
-0.001***
-0.406
(0.001)

incvalue
N/A

cohesion
(SC)
-0.001***
-0.396
(0.001)

30168.83***
0.479
(5007.197)

N/A

16761.6***
0.447
(1965.472)

N/A

20367.3***
0.490
(2073.516)

N/A

NSC*

N/A

.946***
0.260
(0.301)

N/A

1.047***
0.346
(0.132)

N/A

0.756***
0.445
(0.072)

edu

728.866***
0.081
(219.585)

0.043***
0.305
(0.004)

2296.413***
0.147
(184.6302)

0.038***
0.160
(0.004)

1347.355***
0.149
(137.300)

0.031***
0.142
(0.004)

-4007.464***
-0.055
(1125.011)
2424.105**
0.037
(1098.478)
-3438.99***
-0.060
(647.889)
-6935.076***
-0.121
(1055.094)

-0.044*
-0.039
(0.023)
-0.111***
-0.108
(0.017)
-0.040***
-0.045
(0.023)
-0.061***
-0.067
(0.022)

-1783.56*
-0.024
(955.651)
-251.115
-0.003
(898.134)
-2468.162***
-0.043
(635.569)
-5934.346***
-0.102
(1087.401)

-0.158***
-0.080
(0.030)
-0.063**
-0.036
(0.025)
-0.100***
-0.065
(0.023)
-0.112***
-0.072
(0.029)

-4338.444***
-0.060
(958.519)
1946.827**
0.030
(920.999)
-3284.481***
-0.057
(624.78)
-2724.101***
-0.047
(1023.623)

-0.001
-0.001
(0.026)
-0.161***
-0.103
(0.023)
-0.060***
-0.043
(0.019)
-0.060***
-0.096
(0.019)

-3694.441***
-0.057
(1074.602)

-0.145***
-0.084
(0.037)

-2274.762**
-0.035
(1029.669)

SC*

old

young

female

black

hispanic

-3326.982***
-0.051
(1229.376)

married

6505.693***
0.112
(1131.993)

0.172***
0.187
(0.021)

8291.949***
0.142
(814.950)

0.192***
0.123
(0.028)

9149.257***
0.157
(739.126)

0.121***
0.086
(0.023)

sepdiv

-2687.728***
-0.035
(837.357)

0.034**
0.029
(0.018)

-1346.017
-0.017
(827.411)

-0.045
-0.022
(0.029)

580.866
0.008
(856.471)

-0.102***
-0.056
(0.024)

0.176

0.096***
0.106
(0.022)

12065.16***
0.211
(739.984)

0.101***
0.066
(0.029)

9525.82***
0.167
(733.521)

0.154***
0.112
(0.024)

323.550***
0.153
(27.967)

N/A

309.860***
0.146
(29.415)

N/A

328.565***
0.156
(27.430)

N/A

employed

prestige

-0.077***
-0.075
(0.023)
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-0.100***
-0.064
(0.032)

tenure

N/A

0.009***
0.230
(0.001)

N/A

0.009***
0.150
(0.001)

N/A

0.152***
0.169
(0.014)

N/A

0.207***
0.136
(0.023)

N/A

0.148***
0.108
(0.018)

-23031.09***
-0.820
(5446.01)

N/A

7502.221 **
(3362.273)

N/A

-25761.55***
-0.916
(3998.691)

N/A

church

Constant

n_income
SC*
N/A
n_income
N/A
NSC*

72275.13***
0.702
(19940.11)

tenure5

n_black

n_femalehouse

N/A

26677.09***
0.418
(4411.391)
-5474.80**
-0.123
(2531.493)

0.550***
0.777
(0.196)
0.643***
0.978
(0.334)
-0.016
-0.054
(0.035)

-4368.198
-0.069
(5321.357)

-0.233
-0.259
(0.145)

N/A
nbagrad

n_bridges
(NSC)
0.061***
.222
(0.017)
-0.001*
-1.490
(0.001)

n_income
N/A

N/A
31145.87***
0.604
(45898.284)
N/A
21764.58***
0.321
(4376.796)
367.1173
0.011
(1810.95)
-4653.029
-0.049
(5058.378)

n_employed

n_cooperation
(NSC)
0.046***
0.140
(0.009)
-0.001***
-1.006
(0.001)
N/A

N/A

n_income
N/A

N/A
20340.47***
0.638
(3362.84)

0.006***
0.110
(0.001)

n_cohesion
(NSC)
0.097***
0.164
(0.017)
-0.001***
-0.667
(0.001)
N/A

1.086***
0.759
(0.195)
1.230***
0.936
(0.249)
-0.198***
-0.320
(0.068)

20761.82***
0.305
(3898.033)
-121.052
-0.004
(1451.124)

1.452***
0.632
(0.237)
1.542***
0.722
(0.330)
-0.229***
-0.231
(0.085)

-0.347 **
-0.191
(0.160)

2392.895
-0.026
(4910.254)

-0.795***
-0.272
(0.181)

N/A

17090.81***
0.449***
26689.39 ***
0.385*
16935.64***
0.876***
0.219
0.592
0.339
0.252
0.216
0.356
(5876.891)
(0.221)
(4354.717)
(0.203)
(3875.068)
(0.255)
Constant
-9369.21
-7128.87
-6924.866
-0.742
N/A
-0.686
N/A
-0.546
N/A
(7157.92)
(4998.248)
(4363.10)
*p <.10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. SC and NSC are for the social capital variable used in each model. . Each table entry in the
table reports the un-standardized coefficient with the significance level and the standardized coefficient. Bridges Clustered
robust standard errors shown in parentheses.
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As in the individual level models, we see an opposite reciprocal relationship
between individual social capital and individual economic success in the neighborhood
models. The effect, however, is larger in magnitude in all three of these models than for
their corresponding individual level models. In the bridges model, bridges increases
success by 30168.83 for each unit change; in cooperation the change is 16761.60 and in
cohesion 20367.30. The standardized effect is also relatively large, with bridges
changing success 0.479, cooperation 0.447, and cohesion 0.490. The negative effect of
income on social capital is also mirrored in these models, with the standardized effect of
success on bridges is -0.334, on cooperation -0.406, and on cohesion -0.396.
On the neighborhood side of models 4, 5 and 6, we find that aggregate social
capital has a significant, positive and relatively large effect on median income. The
opposite is, however, not true. In all of the models, neighborhood income decreased
aggregate social capital, and the magnitude was relatively large, however this relationship
was not significant at the 5% level for Bridges.

Neighborhood bridges increases

neighborhood income by 72275.13(0.702 standardized), neighborhood cooperation by
31145.87 (0.604 standardized), and neighborhood cohesion 20340.47 (0.638
standardized). The standardized coefficient for neighborhood income is -1.490 for
bridges, -1.006 for cooperation and -0.667 for cohesion. These relationships are similar
in direction as the individual level, but the relative magnitudes are much larger. In each
model, neighborhood income has a larger magnitude of effect than neighborhood social
capital, whereas at the individual level, the social capital coefficients have larger
magnitudes than income.
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The links between levels are significant also. In all three models, the covariance
between income and neighborhood income is positive and significant. The reciprocal
path for individual and neighborhood social capital is positive and significant at the 1%
level for all three models. In models the full cooperation and cohesion models,
neighborhood social capital have approximately double the magnitude of the reciprocal
relationship. In the bridges model, the neighborhood social capital’s effect on individual
social capital is larger but closer in magnitude to the reciprocal effect. In models 4 and 5,
neighborhood social capital has a larger magnitude effect than any of the other variables
except for income. In model 6, the neighborhood social capital peer effect is larger than
that of income.
In each of these models, we find very similar dynamics. This suggests that even
by measuring social as separate constructs, they each tap a similar underlying concept.
Therefore, it makes since to run one final model which combines the social capital
concepts into a single latent variable. Model 7, the unitary model, combines all three of
the other social capital variables into a single latent variable. The path diagram and
results of this model are presented in figure 5.16 and table 5.8. For model 7, we used the
predicted factor scores for each of the social capital constructs and scaled the social
capital latent variable to cohesion at both the individual and neighborhood level.
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Figure 5.16 Unitary Model SEM Results
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Table 5.8 Unitary Model SEM Results
Model (7) Unitary
7527

Observations
Individual
Variables

young

female

black

Neighborhood
Variables
SC

B β (SE)

-1819.776
-0.028
(1039.727)
7806.346***
0.134
(773.829)
-43.271
-0.001
(810.671)
10376.29***
0.182
(695.516)
320.830***
0.152
(26.501)

-0.079***
-0.079
(0.021)
0.107***
0.119
(0.015)
-0.040***
-0.035
(0.015)
0.065***
0.075
(0.016)

B β (SE)

B β (SE)

N/A

-0.001***
-0.314
(0.001)

hispanic

29827.91***
0.457
(3027.627)

N/A

married

1133.514***
0.126
(142.317)
-3501.39***
-0.048
(897.832)
1888.018**
0.029
(916.195)
-3106.234***
-0.054
(604.798)
-3856.668***
-0.067
(1053.681)

0.545***
0.394
(0.050)
0.025***
0.180
(0.002)
-0.057***
-0.051
(0.017)
-0.097***
-0.098
(0.015)
-0.047***
-0.055
(0.013)
-0.061***
-0.070
(0.017)

n_income

NSC

N/A

old

B β (SE)

SC

NSC

edu

--263401.91

incvalue

incvalue

SC

Log pseudolikelihood
Individual
incvalue
Variables

sepdiv

employed

prestige

N/A

church

N/A

Neighborhood
Variables

n_income

N/A
0.006***
0.185
(0.001)
0.141***
0.163
(0.012)

NSC

20082.42***
1.222***
0.295
0.734
(3883.969)
(0.257)
n_income
-523.949
-0.166
N/A
n_black
-0.016
-0.216
(1474.185)
(0.063)
NSC
24836.40***
n_femalehous
1167.669
-0.583
0.609
N/A
e
0.012
-0.256
(3200.078)
(4782.499)
(0.165)
tenure
1.134***
19815.09***
0.573***
N/A
0.632
n_employed
0.254
0.300
(0.153)
(3704.059)
(0.202)
*p <.10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 Each table entry in the table reports the un-standardized coefficient with the
significance level and the standardized coefficient. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.
N/A

0.139***
0.192
(0.020)
-0.001*
-0.650
(0.001)

tenure

SC

nbagrad
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In model 7, all of the significant control variables are in the expected direction,
and are similar in magnitude to the other models. The main variables of interest also
mirror the dynamics in the separate models. At the individual level, income reduces
social capital, but social capital increases income with a larger magnitude. At the
neighborhood level, neighborhood social capital increases neighborhood income and
neighborhood income decreases social capital, but this time income has a larger relative
effect than social capital. The links between levels are also similar and significant.
Neighborhood social capital increases individual social capital at approximately twice the
magnitude of the reciprocal effect, and the errors of income and neighborhood income
have a positive and significant covariance.
Model 8 replicates the unitary model, 7, but splits the analysis into income
groups. Table 5.9 reports differences in key variables between different income groups.26
SEM analysis allows for calculating coefficients for separately by groups, so we can
compare differences across them. The groups are defined by income quartiles in 1995,
with poor being the bottom quartile, those earning $15,00or less, and affluent being the
top quartile, or those earning 65,000 or more.27 The rationale for this is that because of
existing network segregation, the dynamics for social capital may be different for
different income groups. This is motivated by the bulk of research into concentrated
poverty.28 Discussion of these results and the unitary model are discussed below.

26

The full table of results is in the technical appendix.

27

Income quartiles for the state of Illinois in 1994 are from Bureau of the Census (1995).

28

See chapter 3 for a brief review.
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Table 5.9 Group Model SEM Results
Observations
Log
pseudolikelihood
Individual
Variables

7527

incvalue

SC

SC

-252078.72
Neighborhood
Variables

n_income

NSC

NSC
Poor
Middle
Affluent

0.366***
(0.072)
0.395***
(0.039)
0.043
(0.080)

N/A

Poor

N/A

Middle

N/A

Affluent

incvalue

0.641***
(0.049)
0.595***
(0.027)
0.567***
(0.041)

N/A
N/A
N/A

n_income
Poor

N/A

Middle

N/A

Affluent

N/A

-0.298***
(0.071)
-0.235***
(0.040)
0.034***
(0.075)

edu

Poor

N/A

Middle

N/A

Affluent

N/A

Poor

N/A

Middle

N/A

Affluent

N/A

-0.860***
(0.145)
-0.528***
(0.083)
-0.585***
(0.141)

SC
Poor
Middle
Affluent

0.099***
(0.022)
0.097***
(0.023)
0.071*
(0.042)

0.132***
(0.028)
0.124***
(0.022)
0.039
(0.035)

0.214***
(0.021)
0.108***
(0.016)
-0.152***
(0.042)

0.011
(0.028)
0.041*
(0.021)
-0.026
(0.042)

employed

0.193***
(0.042)
0.109***
(0.033)
0.055
(0.060)

n_employed
Poor
Middle
Affluent

NSC

Poor
Middle
Affluent

0.443***
(0.024)
0.211***
(0.016)
0.100***
(0.028)

0.430***
(0.067)
0.278***
(0.032)
0.365***
(0.043)

0.150***
(0.027)
0.330***
(0.022)
0.525***
(0.030)

0.668***
(0.065)
0.692***
(0.054)
0.666***
(0.108)

nbagrad
Poor
Middle
Affluent

0.319***
(0.034)
0.400***
(0.028)
0.358***
(0.045)

N/A

Poor

N/A

Middle

N/A

Affluent

tenure

n_tenure5
0.218***
0.608***
Poor
N/A
Poor
N/A
(0.025)
(0.041)
0.187***
0.661***
Middle
N/A
Middle
N/A
(0.022)
(0.032)
0.097**
0.868***
Affluent
N/A
Affluent
N/A
(0.046)
(0.065)
*p <.10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Reports standardized coefficients for selected variables. Clustered robust standard
errors shown in parentheses. Full results are reported in the technical appendix.
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Discussion
Now we move from describing the empirical results of the models to interpreting
them. Because of the number of models presented and the complexity, I will focus on
models 7 and 8. The results of the factor analysis, 2SLS and individual level models
demonstrate the overall validity of the aggregate models. This section of the chapter will
focus on interpreting the results presented above on two fronts. First it will evaluate the
hypotheses developed in chapter four and second present substantive interpretations of
the results.
One of the assumptions of this analysis was that the different types of social
capital may have different dynamics. However, models 4, 5 and 6 show that this
assumption was not entirely valid. Though the models have slightly different coefficient
magnitudes and significance levels, on the whole the direction and magnitudes of the
regression coefficients were remarkably similar. This is the primary justification for the
unitary model which combines all three dimensions of social capital into a single latent
variable.
The first and most central hypothesis, H1, is that social capital positively affects
income. In all of the models this relationship is positive and significant. The magnitude
of the effect is also large. In fact, it is larger than any of the socio-demographic control
variables, even education, which was surprising. The second hypothesis, H2, that the
relationship between social capital and success is endogenous can also be retained. This
was demonstrated in the 2SLS regressions and also in the full SEM models. The
direction of the reciprocal relationship, from income back to social capital, was
unexpected however. The prediction was that this relationship was positive; however in
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all of the models it was actually negative. This is an interesting finding with regards to
the previous literature on two fronts. First it confirms the endogeneity of success and
social capital, which is important for modeling. But second, and more importantly, it
shows the relationship between income and social capital in a clearer light. Most studies
that have looked at income or aggregate economic indicators have found a positive
correlation between them.29 My results show that this correlation exists, but that it has a
more complex relationship. If we were to model the relationship without the endogenous
relationship, we would find them positively correlated. My results show that this
correlation is due to the fact that social capital has a greater magnitude of effect than
income, and therefor they rise together. Without modeling the reciprocal effect, this
relationship would appear different.
At the neighborhood level, we find strong evidence for H3, that aggregate income
positively affects economic success. We also found some evidence for H4 that
neighborhood income and neighborhood economic success had a reciprocal relationship,
but, like the individual level, found that neighborhood income had a negative effect on
neighborhood social capital, instead of the expected relationship was positive. At the
neighborhood level, though, the relative magnitude of neighborhood income is larger
than that of neighborhood social capital.
The interpretation of social capital is relatively straightforward as it fits the
expected result. Increasing social capital increases economic success. Social capital is
has the largest magnitude of all the predictors for income, more than twice that of any of
the other variables alone, a finding we will come back to in the next chapter. The effect
of income on social capital is not as straightforward. All other things being equal, a gain
29

See chapter one for a review.

154

in income actually decreases social capital. What are we to make of this? The first, and
obvious, consequence is that income by itself does not generate social capital. Income by
itself does not lead or mean more cooperative norms or more social connections. It
actually suggests that without other factors, such as increasing education, increasing
income erodes social capital. This erosion is even stronger at the neighborhood level.
Why does this dynamic exist? There may be a couple of answers. The first is that
recent experiments have shown that power and income actually reduce individuals trust
and reciprocity. Economic success can breed a cynical view on other’s actions (Inesi et.
al. 2012). Another interpretation is that economic success is a substitute for social
capital. This means that as economic success increases, the demand for social capital
actually decreases. This could be because of the corrupting effect mentioned above, or it
could simply be because it is easier for individuals to buy what they need rather than
working cooperatively. If we extend this logic, then individual substitution would create
a peer effect that would reduce further cooperation. The results on neighborhood income
show that this social interaction is more detrimental to aggregate social capital than
individual. However, the opposite relationship would not be true from the results. They
show that increased social capital increases income, which suggests that it is a one-way
complement since the opposite is not also true.30 This suggests that this relationship is
endogenously stable, because income counteracts the effect of social capital. The
positive feedback of social capital is dampened, meaning that social capital and income
might be relatively stable over time without some other factor changing.
The results also support the final hypothesis, H5, that aggregate social capital is
directly related to individual social capital. The reciprocal effect, from individual to
30

I borrow the concept of one-way complementary goods from Yalcin et. al. (2012).
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neighborhood, is also significant. However, the magnitude of neighborhood social
capital on individual social capital is approximately double that of the individual on the
neighborhood. This suggests that there is a strong peer effect in social capital; that
individual social capital is determined in part by the social capital of peers in the
neighborhood. The standardized neighborhood social capital coefficient is the single
largest predictor in magnitude for individual social capital, even larger that the negative
effect of personal income. The reciprocal dynamics are different. Individual social
capital actually has the smallest magnitude of the predictors of neighborhood social
capital. The largest magnitude predictors are the proportion of college graduates,
followed by neighborhood income and neighborhood tenure; each of which over three
times in magnitude of effect.
The group model, model 8, asks if the dynamics for social capital are different at
different income levels. The rational for this is that income segregation may create
different social capital dynamics at different income levels. This is the implication of the
neighborhood effects literature which suggests that concentrated poverty has its own
dynamic (e.g. Wilson 1996) as well as more recent work which suggests that the rich
might have different dynamics (Putnam 2012). There are indeed differences, but they are
mostly differences of the affluent from the other two groups. First, for all three groups
social capital has a positive effect on income, but for the affluent, this effect is not
significant. The magnitude of this effect is also small compared to middle income
individuals. For individual social capital, income has a negative effect on the social
capital of the poor and middle income groups, but the effect is not significant for the
affluent. This suggests that for the highest income groups, the social capital and income
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have don’t have a meaningful effect, but that it is an important relationship for the other
two groups. For the poor and middle income, social capital is still the largest predictor of
income. For all three groups, neighborhood social capital is still a significant predictor of
individual social capital and the largest in magnitude.
Other differences in groups exist at the neighborhood level. Neighborhood social
capital has a positive and significant effect on neighborhood income with very similar
magnitudes for all three groups, similar to the unitary model. Also, all three models show
a negative and significant effect of neighborhood income on neighborhood social capital.
However the magnitudes of these show something surprising. For middle and affluent
individuals, the magnitudes of these effects are relatively similar and very close to the
magnitude of neighborhood social capital on neighborhood income. However for poor
individuals the negative effect of neighborhood income on neighborhood social capital is
larger in magnitude than that for the other groups, and also larger in magnitude that the
effect of social capital on income. This suggests that increased neighborhood income has
a more undermining effect on the aggregate social capital of the poor than for other
groups. One way to interpret this is that poor individuals in higher income
neighborhoods are more isolated and therefor have lower social capital in the aggregate.
In fact, neighborhood income is the largest magnitude predictor for aggregate social
capital for the poor, while proportion of college graduates and neighborhood tenure are
larger magnitude predictors for the other income groups.

Conclusion
This chapter has presented the data, methodology and empirical results of the
study. We found evidence to support most of the hypotheses presented in chapter four,
157

but that found that the effect of income on social capital was in the opposite direction
than predicted. This may be due to social capital and income having different
substitution and complementary effects or due to income decreasing trust. The results
also show slightly different dynamics for different income groups, but more was similar
than different. In the next chapter, we will use the results and interpretations presented
here to provide policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER 6 – POLICY
What are we to do with the results found in chapter five? Ideally, empirical
research can serve to inform policy choices. In this chapter, I will use the empirical
results and theoretical analysis to draw some implications for policy and to review
existing programs in light of these results. The hope is that understanding social capital
and income dynamics can help craft more effective policy.
The analysis in the preceding chapters has focused on the concept of economic
success. Success is operationalized as income. In this chapter though, we will focus on
low incomes and poverty. This is a fine grained distinction, but it makes the policy goals
clear. If we were to focus on income in the aggregate, or general income success, what
we would really be focused on is economic growth. However, this economic growth
could come for any segment of the population, such as the affluent increasing income
without income growth for poor and middle income individuals. Implicit in the
theoretical discussion and the empirical analysis is that social capital is one mechanism
by which inequality develops and is reinforced between groups. Therefore, we focus on
policies aimed at increasing lower incomes and alleviating poverty.
There is one assumption that underlies this entire discussion about policy. While
I am arguing that social capital is an important policy variable for understanding
economic opportunity, this assumes in part the existence of those opportunities. Social
capital allows access to those opportunities that exist as well as identifying and exploiting
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unrealized opportunities. For example, using social capital to gain an advantage in the
labor market assumes that there is a functioning labor market and that jobs exist to be
found; access to institutional resources only matters if there are functioning institutions.
However, in economies where there is more competition for limited resources, social
capital may make the difference in who can access and use those resources. In short,
social capital is not a cure-all for economic success, but is one important factor among
others.
Here I focus on urban policy in the U.S. designed to help alleviate poverty and
improve lower incomes. Most U.S. urban policy is designed to reduce concentrated
poverty, based on the idea that concentration of poor people in urban areas creates
additional disadvantages beyond those of a lack of income.31 In the following sections, I
outline two different dimensions of policy, policy targets and policy scale. I then review
the dominant paradigm for urban poverty policy, housing mobility policy, concentrating
on the logic of the policy and how it interacts with social capital. The chapter ends with a
broad outline three alternative strategies for developing social capital.

Two Dimensions of Policy
There are at least two dimensions that need to be considered for policy
recommendations for reducing poverty. Table 6.1 shows the dimensions in a 2x2 matrix,
with examples of policies along each dimension. The first dimension is on the target of
intervention—whether it is better to intervene on social capital or income. Where is
intervention more effective? The second dimension is based on scale, and specifically
the distinction between people-based verses place-based policies. This dimension is
31

This policy parallels research on neighborhood effects discussed in chapter two.
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more concerned with the nature of policies and whether it is better to direct policies to
individuals directly or to neighborhoods.
Table 6.1 People- and Place-Based Policies
Income

Social Capital

People-Based

Income supports, jobs programs

Housing mobility, social capital
substitution

Place-Based

Neighborhood economic
development

Neighborhood housing stability,
Neighborhood cohesion

Table 6.2 shows the relative magnitudes of the policy relevant variables from the
unitary social capital model32. The policy relevant variables are ones that can be
influenced through intervention and are statistically significant. These relative
magnitudes help point to where policy interventions may be most effective and most
efficient. The assumption here is that policy intervention is possible on these variables
and the ultimate goal is a sustainable increase in income.

Table 6.2 Policy Relevant Variables

Income

--

Social
Capital
-0.314

Social Capital

0.458

--

--

--

0.394

--

Education

0.126

0.180

--

Employed

0.182

0.075

--

Housing Tenure

--

0.185

--

% Employed

--

--

0.300

Income

Neighborhood
Social Capital
--

Neighborhood Social
Capital

32

See chapter five for a discussion of the various models and for definitions of the variables. I use the
standardized coefficients to allow comparison between the effects.
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% College

--

--

0.734

Neighborhood Tenure

--

--

0.633

Neighborhood Median
Income

--

--

-0.650

The first question is whether redistribution should directly target income or social
capital. Because of the opposite signs for income and social capital, the answer seems
fairly clear. If, everything else being equal, income decreases social capital but social
capital increases income, this suggests that increasing social capital would have a net
positive benefit. Policies that increase social connectedness would have a multiplier
effect on income, because the positive effect of social capital is greater than the negative
effect of income. Because of the negative reciprocal effect, increasing income alone
without increasing social capital may not be sustainable. If we look at relative
magnitudes of social capital compared to education and employment, we find that social
capital has the largest magnitude effect on income. The implication, then, is that
increasing social capital should be a goal of policy.
Both the theory and the empirical results suggest that income and social capital
are deeply and complexly intertwined. And while social capital may be the more
effective object of intervention, the theory shows that a prerequisite of social is stability
and a minimal level of economic security, which means that basic income supports may
be a necessity for the creation of social capital. What it does suggest is that beyond
minimal levels of economic security, it may be more effective to construct policies to
increase social capital than to provide more income benefits.
The second policy dimension is people-based verses place-based policies. In its
simplest form, people-based policies are those that are targeted toward helping
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individuals regardless of where they live, while place-based policies are aimed at
improving the places in which people live. A finer grained way to think of the distinction
is in whom the policy targets: people-based policies target individuals and households
while place-based policies target neighborhoods. The debate between these dimensions
is one of the longer standing divides in urban development policy.33 For social capital, the
question comes to: Should policy try to increase social capital, and thus economic
outcomes, through policies targeting individuals and families or through policies that
target neighborhoods?
Economic theory offers some guide to answering this question. Partridge and
Rickman (2006; 2007) outline the economic arguments for people or place based
policies. Strong arguments for people based policies assume long-run spatial
equilibrium—that people will move to where opportunity is. With spatial equilibrium,
policy to help poor areas would entice more qualified people to move or commute to the
area to take advantage of the policy than for the intended beneficiaries. Also these
policies assume no, or low, transaction costs for moving. The spatial equilibrium
assumption, however, goes against the logic of social capital and neighborhoods. The
dynamics of localization (Özgür 2010), social distance (Akerlof 1997) and path
dependency (Page 2005) are all rooted in disequlibrium.34 They are the mechanisms by
which differences between neighborhoods develop and are sustained. Social capital also
raises the transaction costs of moving. This cost goes up for two reasons. First is the
opportunity cost of creating social capital. Social capital is created through repeated
interactions that provide a foundation for future interactions (Ostrom 2005). Secondly,
33

See Crane and Manville (2008) for a recent evaluation of the debate.

34

See chapter three.
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social identity theory (Akerlof and Kranton 2010) suggests that joining new groups
imposes identity costs on the mover based on their social distance from the new group.
Partridge and Rickman (2006; 2007) argue that place based policies make more sense
with strong spatial variation and transaction costs, simply because people based policies
may be ineffective or miss the actual problem.
Empirically, social capital is the largest predictor of income while neighborhood
social capital is the largest predictor of social capital. This implies a strong peer effect.
Because neighborhood social capital is mediated by individual social capital, a one
standard deviation increase in neighborhood social capital increases income by
approximately 0.180.35 The effect of neighborhood social capital is moderate when
compared with the larger magnitude change that a similar increase in individual social
capital would make. Yet since individual social capital is dependent on peer networks in
neighborhood social capital, the most direct way of influencing it is by changing
neighborhood social capital. This is where the people- vs. place-based policies come in.
Neighborhood social capital can be changed for an individual either by policies that aim
to create more social capital in the areas in which they live (place-based) or by moving
people into different neighborhoods or by creating access to networks beyond the
neighborhoods (people-based). Contemporary urban policies for alleviating poverty have
focused on the latter: moving people through space. We can see the tensions in people
vs. place policies by looking at the effects of current policy.

Moving People

35

Indirect effects are calculated by multiplying the coefficients of variables in the structural path.
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The most prominent type of contemporary urban policies in the US are peoplebased policies based on moving people spatially. Labeled variously as poverty
deconcentration or dispersal, these policies seek to address problems rooted in
neighborhood structures by moving low income people out of high poverty
neighborhoods and into mixed or middle-income neighborhoods, usually in suburban
areas. These policies are so prominent in urban policy that they have been characterized
as a consensus or as a “mobility paradigm”, though this consensus is facing serious
criticism and challenges both theoretically and for programmatic results (Imbroscio 2008;
2012; Steinberg 2010).
The most prominent and high profile programs within this “mobility paradigm”
are Moving to Opportunity (MTO) and HOPE VI. Both of these programs focus on
moving poor people in public housing in high-poverty urban neighborhoods. MTO,
based on the Gautreaux program in Chicago, provides housing vouchers to move into
more integrated neighborhoods, while HOPE VI focused on redeveloping distressed
public housing. The redevelopment efforts of HOPE VI create mixed-income and
privately-owned units to replace the public housing and result in far fewer low-income
housing units, effectively forcing deconcentration (Goetz 2004). Participation in MTO is
voluntary and participants must move to low-poverty, low-minority areas, whereas in
HOPE VI participation is involuntary (the housing is torn down), and there is no
restriction for the housing vouchers. The premise behind these programs is to address
concentrated poverty as a causal force in sustaining and creating impoverished persons
(Steinberg 2010). Almost two decades of empirical research into the effectiveness
programs have generated ambiguous results. While the programs have resulted in higher
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sense of safety and neighborhood satisfaction for the participants, they have made no
impact in improving employment, income, or self-sufficiency (Goetz and Chapple 2010;
Turney et al. 2006; Kling et al. 2007). Other indicators of economic success and
stability, such as health and education attainment, also show little improvement (Goetz
and Chapple 2010). While it may be that these specific programs have flawed designs,
they serve to illustrate people-based mobility policies as an idea type.
How can these types of policies help improve social capital? The naïve view of
mobility policies is that by moving to a less poor neighborhood, individuals would have
greater access to social capital and therefor to more economic opportunities and
productive norms. The empirical results of this dissertation did find that aggregate
neighborhood social capital was the largest predictor of individual social capital. But
there are both theoretical and empirical considerations here that undercut the idea that
simply moving into higher income neighborhoods would improve individual social
capital. Mobility policies have two flawed assumptions. The first is that it assumes that
higher income neighborhoods have more social capital. While it is true that higher
median income neighborhoods are positively correlated with higher social capital, the
SEM results show that this correlation is in part spurious—higher levels of social capital
are due to the higher levels of other factors, largest among them education and housing
tenure that are associated with both social capital and median income. The results
showed that controlling for these factors increased median-neighborhood income actually
decreases neighborhood social capital.
The second flawed assumption is that individuals will be integrated into
neighborhood social networks simply by relocating there. Both the empirical results and
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theory show that this may not be true. Looking at table 6.2 again, one major source of
individual social capital outside of neighborhood social capital is housing tenure.
Theoretically this makes sense, as trust and cooperation are based in part on repeated
interactions and accumulated knowledge of people’s behaviors and reputations. Social
capital is built on time. By moving people around in space, these programs disrupt these
foundations of social capital, forcing movers to build new networks and establish new
relationships with their neighbors. Existing residents may be slow to accept newcomers
into their social networks because of the uncertainty or may defensively protect their
networks from newcomers. Despite this, social learning theory (Chamly 2004) suggests
that movers may benefit from a higher social capital environment anyway, by imitating
behaviors in the environment. This could work in the opposite direction too, however,
because if residents are excluded from social networks, they may learn the futility of
attempting to cooperate with their neighbors. Social identity theory (Akerlof and
Kranton 2010) suggests that closure and acceptance in new neighborhood contexts may
depend on how proscribed and chosen identities among residents and movers are built as
compatible. The greater social distance between the mover and the residents, the harder
it may be to integrate into the existing neighborhood network. Studies look at the social
capital of movers in MTO and HOPE VI generally show that the social capital of movers
in not increased, but actually reduced by moving (Greenbaum et. al. 2008; Curley 2009).
Movers have difficulty establishing new ties and miss their old networks, while
homeowners are resistant to associating with poorer newcomers. Also, by disrupting
established support networks, moving may actually be detrimental to economic success
(Curley 2009).
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The role of stability in neighborhood social capital points to a potential pernicious
effect of mobility policies: further neighborhood destabilization. Housing tenure is one
of the largest determinants of neighborhood social capital. By moving individuals from
their neighborhoods, mobility policies disrupt existing neighborhood networks by
reducing the overall stability of the residents. Even if mobility policies generated
positive gains for individuals who moved, they generate an externality on the
neighborhood from which people are displaced by reducing tenure and stability and
therefore potentially negatively impacting the social capital of those left behind. By
prioritizing individual gains through mobility, these policies, inadvertently, deprioritize
and delegitimize existing networks of the poor and can further destabilize troubled
neighborhoods. Furthermore, mobility programs like HOPE VI which redevelop the
vacated space can further disrupt communities by encouraging gentrification and pricing
out even those not directly moved by the program (Goetz 2011). These externalities
when combined with the difficulty of movers to integrate into new networks mean that
mobility policies may actually result in a net reduction of social capital. If they are meant
to promote social capital, then they may actually be counterproductive. This means that
we need to consider alternative policies.

Alternatives to Mobility
If individual mobility programs are problematic, then what are alternatives for
building social capital? One starting point is to recognize the importance of the
neighborhoods and communities in which people already live. Evidence shows that poor
people, even in public housing, greatly value their communities and that they see those
communities as a positive force in their lives (Manzo et al 2008; Gibson 2007). By
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recognizing the value of these communities, we can use existing networks as a basis for
designing policies to improve social capital. This suggests that policies to address low
incomes through the vehicle of social capital must first respect existing networks and
communities and as a principle seek to build social capital where people live, rather than
move people to where there is social capital. This suggests a place-based approach, but
that is not necessarily the case. Unfortunately, there is no single program that I am aware
of that can serve as a model for a social capital building program. Instead I focus on
some strategies that can serve to guide policy development. These strategies can be
divided into place-based and people-based, but the guiding principle is that a mixture of
place and people based may be necessary, which is the dominant view among advocates
of place-based policies (Partridge and Rickman 2007). The place-based strategies can be
categorized as neighborhood stabilization and neighborhood linkage policies. The
person-based strategies can be categorized as social capital substitution programs.
The first place-based strategy would be neighborhood stabilization. By this, I
mean programs that seek to address some of the causes of social capital by enhancing
neighborhood stability. Housing tenure is large predictor of aggregate social capital,
which makes sense both intuitively and with regards to theory. Cooperation and trust can
be built through repeated interactions which also reduce uncertainty regarding ones
neighbors. Promoting a stable community provides a basis for the construction of social
capital. Policies of these types would focus on primarily on creating stable housing and
could take many forms. For example, community land trusts or community based
financing could be used to reduce foreclosures and promote stable home-ownership in
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poor communities. These policies require recognizing that network stability is a prerequisite of building social capital.
The second group of strategies I call neighborhood linkage strategies. This group
of strategies would seek to enhance social capital by building purposeful linkages among
people within a neighborhood and linkages between neighborhoods. These strategies
would involve community organization efforts to foster cooperation on projects and to
build community capacity for collective action. At the most basic level, these policies
could take the form of trying to promote community cohesion through creating
community contact, for example through creating safe public space or through
community forums. More active strategies would seek to promote active participation in
community cooperative activities and engagement. An important part of this strategy
would be to build linkages between neighborhoods, by promoting exchange, contact and
cooperation among residents of different neighborhoods.
These place-based policies have both advantages and drawbacks. The advantage
is that they seek to build social capital by addressing its basic components as rooted in the
community by directly promoting participation, cooperation and stability. The trade-off,
however, is that these policies affect income in a very indirect manner and are not
targeted to those who may be the neediest. They also require a longer time-frame—
building social capital through neighborhood based programs will take time and a
sustained commitment. Also, because of the reinforcing nature of peer effects, it may be
that some neighborhoods could be resistant to efforts to build social capital.
The final set of policy strategies are person-based, but focus on education and
employment instead of mobility. They would focus on building substitutes for social
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capital. This means, in effect, building institutions to fill the role of social capital,
particularly in the labor market. Since on the instrumental resources that social capital
provides individuals is information in about the labor market, one way to build policy to
address the lack of this type of social capital would be to design institutions that would
provide the same type of labor market linkages normally provided informally through
social capital. For example, job programs that seek to connect individuals to work
opportunities. These policies would seek to address gaps or deficiencies in social capital
with minimal disruptions to existing networks or support structures. These person-based
policies could avoid some of the destabilizing effects of mobility policies, while still
seeking to build social capital directly at the individual level. But as with all policies,
there are trade-offs. These social capital substitution strategies would have the advantage
of being more directly connected to economic success at the individual level, and
therefore more effective at the individual level in the short-run. However, because of the
weaker links from individual social capital to aggregate social capital, they would not
have the positive spillover benefits of the place-based policies. Also, because of the large
magnitude of neighborhood social capital for individual social capital, neighborhood
conditions could diminish the longer-term effectiveness of these policies.

Conclusion
In this chapter, we have briefly looked at different policies to build social capital.
The dominant policy consensus around poverty deconcentration is counter-productive
because it works against the logic of social capital by destabilizing neighborhoods and by
not integrating movers into new networks. As an alternative, I sketched three broad
strategies to build social capital where people live, both through place-based and people171

based policy strategies. An ideal approach to building social capital to improved
economic success would combine aspects from all three of these broad strategies:
combining neighborhood stabilization, building neighborhood capacities and
supplementing individual social capital. A broad based plan would seek to add economic
development into the mix to generate neighborhood based sources of economic stability.
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION
This study set out to explore the relationship between social capital,
neighborhoods and economics success. The aim of this dissertation has been to show the
social component to economic success and to contextualize it by connecting it to
neighborhoods. The aim of this chapter is to rearticulate and synthesize the main
arguments and findings. Following that, I will state the main contributions of this study,
look at its limitations and provide some avenues for further research.

The Argument and Findings
The argument for the connection between social capital, neighborhoods and
economic success is incremental. For it to be credible, social capital must affect
economic success and neighborhoods must affect social capital. Over the course of this
dissertation, each of the links in this argument were built theoretically and tested
empirically. Generally, the theoretical expectations were confirmed empirically, though
there have been surprises.
If we abandon a normative view of it, social capital is fundamental to human
endeavors (Ostrom 2000). Conceptually, social capital represents the social
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networks in which people are embedded and the “stuff” that flows through those
networks—behavioral norms and instrumental resources. Social capital provides
resources that enable economic success and behavioral norms for cooperative action.
The first research question for this study was: What is the nature of the
relationship between social capital and economic success? At the individual level, social
capital affects economic success primarily by enabling collective action. The basic
prisoner’s dilemma game shows that absent trust, reputation, information or other factors,
cooperation is unlikely if there is an incentive for people to defect (Axelrod 2006). The
norms and resources associated with social capital, such as trust, reputation, time
preference, and information sharing fundamentally change the structure of the game so
that it is no longer a prisoner’s dilemma. In effect, social capital lowers the transaction
costs of cooperation. Trust, reputation, and information lower the risk that individuals
take on in cooperative endeavors. The diffusion of information and access lower the
transaction costs of new economic opportunities and new knowledge.
Empirically, we found that social capital does increase income as expected. This,
by itself, replicates the large number of studies which find a link between social capital
and income both at the individual and aggregate levels (for example see Narayan and
Pritchett 1999; Putnam 1993). However, the magnitude of this effect was a little
surprising—social capital was the single largest predictor of income in the model.
In addition to social capital affecting economic success; there is a reciprocal
causal relationship from economic success to social capital. This endogenous
relationship has been posed, but understudied empirically, in the social capital literature
(Portes and Vickstrom 2011; Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005). Studies that look at the
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determinants of social capital have generally found the relationship was positive (Glaeser
et. al. 2000). The reasons for expecting a positive relationship are straightforward:
Economic success reinforces the norms and behaviors that led to it. However, there is
also an opportunity cost to developing social capital as building and maintaining network
connections takes time and effort, which means that economically successful individuals
face a higher opportunity cost of time. Successful individuals may not feel the need to
build social capital if it offers only small marginal benefits.
The assumption of endogeneity drives the empirical methods of this study.
Empirically, we confirmed this assumption, and found that income and social capital
were indeed endogenous. The direction of this relationship is one of the more surprising
findings of this research. While social capital increases income, income decreases social
capital, everything else held equal. Also, the magnitude of this negative effect was
relatively large. There are both methodological and substantive implications to this
finding. First, it shows that the positive correlation between income and social capital is
due to the larger effect of social capital on income, and also that this correlation is
partially spurious, and is driven by confounding variables which increase both social
capital and income such as education. The methodological implication of this is that
endogeneity needs to be modeled statistically to produce unbiased results. Second, this
finding suggests that in addition to the opportunity cost of social capital, there may be
other dynamics in this relationship. The first is that higher income, and the market
generally, may have a corrupting effect on social capital and undercuts social
relationships. Also, while social capital compliments economic success, success may
substitute for social capital as the resources provided by social capital may be purchased
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through the market. The exact meaning of this finding is an unresolved puzzle from these
findings, and warrants further study. The finding of endogeneity and the negative
recursive relationship have important methodological and substantive implications for
further studies which are examined below.
Social capital can be disaggregated into the qualitatively different types of
bridging and bonding. These types of social capital theoretically operate differently on
economic success, with bridging social capital providing individuals with social leverage
resources to “get ahead” and bonding providing social support resources to “get by”
(Briggs 1998). Empirically, the findings show that bonding and bridging social capital
have relatively similar dynamics with regards to income empirically. The coefficients in
the three social capital models used in this study—bridging, cooperation and cohesion—
all had very similar magnitudes and directions, which means that fine-grained distinctions
among types of social capital are not as important for modeling, but may still have
substantive implications for policy.
The second and third research questions so closely interrelated, at least
conceptually, that it makes more sense to discuss them together rather than separately.
The second question was: What is the relationship between neighborhood social capital
and neighborhood economic success? The third is: What is the relationship between
neighborhoods and individual social capital? Neighborhoods are not just geographic
containers of people, but social determined understandings and networks of social
interactions. Importantly, neighborhoods are institutions with different configurations of
networks, rules and identities. As institutions, neighborhoods structure social interaction

176

by creating repeated interactions, generating expectations of others behavior, creating
shared identities and reducing uncertainty and transaction costs with others.
There are four interacting dynamics that are important for social capital in
neighborhoods: localization, difference, learning and identity. By its nature, social
capital is a type of social interaction, which means that it generates externalities (Manski
2000). Because of localization processes, these externalities can produce stable but
different configurations social resources and norms. Because the benefits of social
capital are localized in the neighborhood, neighborhoods will differentiate. If the
differences between neighborhoods are big enough, which empirically they are, then
individuals may try to protect their network resources through closure and exclusion.
Social learning and social identity are important because they are the dynamics by which
norms and informational resources are shared in neighborhood networks. This means
that people will adopt the behaviors and norms of people with whom they have contact.
Because neighborhoods are differentiated, and those differences a self-sustaining, this
means that individuals have access to different levels of social capital. Because social
capital is linked to economic success, this differentiation between neighborhoods can
generate distributional inequalities.
Empirically interactions between aggregate social capital and neighborhood
income mirrored the results at the individual level and are endogenous. One difference is
that the absolute magnitude of the negative effect of neighborhood income on
neighborhood social capital was larger than the positive magnitude of social capital on
income. For neighborhood income, neighborhood social capital had the largest
magnitude of effect. However, the most important factors for neighborhood social capital
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were the proportion of college graduates and the proportion of households of five years or
more in the neighborhood. The role of tenure reinforces that social capital is partially a
function of stable and repeated interactions and that neighborhood stability is vital.
There is also a significant relationship between aggregate social capital and
individual social capital. Individual social capital has a relatively small positive effect on
the aggregate, but neighborhood social capital is the single largest predictor of individual
social capital. This is consistent with the social interactions view of social capital, where
and individual’s norms and behaviors are partially dependent on those of people to whom
they are connected. This evidence is consistent with the dynamics of localization,
differentiation, learning and identity. What it shows is that social capital is not a quality
of individuals, but of communities and the links between individuals.

Contributions
This research contributes to the literature on social capital and neighborhoods
methodologically and substantively. Methodologically, there are two important
contributions. The first is the use of structural equation modeling analysis to model the
link between neighborhoods, social capital and economic success. Structural equation
modeling allows for a nuanced picture of the relationship between the variables. SEM
has been used to model relationships between variables of social capital (Brehm and
Rahn 1997), or between neighborhood diversity and individual social capital (Fieldhouse
and Cutts 2010), but this is the first study to use it to study the relationship between social
capital and economic outcomes. The nuance of SEM allowed us to draw a more finegrained picture of how neighborhoods, social capital and economic success are
interrelated. The second methodological contribution is the modeling social capital and
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income as endogenous. The endogeneity issue is recognized in the literature (see Durlauf
and Fafchamps 2005), but it has not been implemented empirically to show the reciprocal
relationship between social capital and income. Substantively, this modeling contribution
led to the surprising result that income decreases social capital. Theoretically, this study
has modestly contributed the literature by developing the conceptual links between
neighborhood, social capital and economic success. I connected different literatures on
norms, information asymmetries, local interactions, and identity economics to develop
the conceptual framework for understanding the mechanisms by which social capital
operates in neighborhoods and on economic success.

Recommendations for Future Research
This study also has several limitations. The first limitation is with the relationship
between the conceptual framework and the empirical testing. Though I develop the
conceptual framework in chapters two and three to explain the mechanisms linking
neighborhoods to social capital and social capital to income, I don’t test those
mechanisms directly. Instead, the mechanisms are implied by the results. Future
research could expand this conceptually by directly testing and modeling the mechanisms
quantitatively or qualitatively.
A second limitation is with the finding of the negative impact of income on social
capital. This finding needs more theoretical development to understand and needs to be
replicated to verify its validity. Future research could expand on this finding by
replicating it using other data sets and statistical methods and by developing a theory of
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the negative impact of income on social capital. Replicating the general results of the
model with other data sets is another avenue that future research could take.
Another limitation is modeling. Neighborhoods are only one network in which
people are involved. It may be that other networks have important effects on social
capital that are not captured by neighborhoods. Also, the role of the family is not
represented in this model, which could potentially confound some of the social capital
processes if the families are more important for norm transference than peers (Briggs
2005). Data limitations also forces sub-optimal choices, such as using household income
as a proxy for individual income. And because the data is cross-sectional, we only have a
picture of it at a moment in times, which could be improved with longitudinal data. The
modeling and data aspects all provide avenues for future research.

Conclusion
Social capital enables economic success and is shaped by the neighborhoods we
live in. Since social capital is property of the links between people, this reinforces the
role of community in enabling and sustaining economic lives. Community and
neighborhoods are important because they structure opportunities and provide resources
lacking in other areas. Building and strengthening communities and neighborhoods
means building and strengthening economic opportunities.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Clustered Robust Standard Errors
The non-independence of the hierarchical sampling method in the PHDCN data
set violates the assumption of independence of observations in regression analysis, and
therefor needs to be corrected (Kline 2012). The main issue is that the non-random
sampling method could introduce heteroskedasticity. The main issue with
heteroskedasticity is that it reduces the validity of the standard errors and therefor makes
inference from significance tests suspect. One method to correct for this violation is by
using a hierarchical structural equation model, but in this study we take a different
approach and use robust standard errors clustered by neighborhood cluster. This approach
uses Huber-White standard errors clustered around neighborhood clusters. This approach
indicates that observation may be correlated within neighborhoods, but independent
between neighborhoods.36 This method doesn’t change the coefficient estimates, but
takes into account the non-independence of the observations.
There are two exceptions to this use of clustered robust standard errors in this
analysis. First, the neighborhood level 2sls models don’t use clustered standard errors.
They are unnecessary, since the regression is performed on data aggregated at the

36

This is implemented in Stata with vce(cluster ) option. This method limits some of the post-estimation
commands.
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neighborhood cluster. Instead I use the standard unclustered Huber-White estimator.
The second exception is the generation of fit statistics. In order to evaluate model fit, all
of the models were run without robust errors, so that more evaluations of model fit could
be generated and evaluated. All of the estimates presented in the text, with the exception
of these fit statistics (detailed below), were produced with the clustered robust standard
errors.

SEM Factor Scaling
In order to estimate the SEM models consistently and for identification, we need
to scale the latent variable factor (Bollen 1989). To do this, each latent variable is scaled
to one its observed variables in the measurement portion of each of the SEM models. To
do this, I set the regression coefficient for this path in each model to equal 1. Table TA.1
shows each latent variable and the measured variable it is scaled to. In the neighborhood
portions of the models, the neighborhood social capital variables were scaled to the
neighborhood mean of the same variable it was scaled to at the individual level. In
models 7 and 8, social capital was scaled to the predicted factor score of cohesion.
Table TA.1 Latent Scaling Variables

Latent Variable
bridges
cooperation
cohesion
sc (model 7 and 8)

Models
1,4
2,5
3,6
7,8

Scaling variable
membership
q18
q11b
cohesion

Fit Statistics and Stability Index
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One of the conventional methods of evaluating SEM models is by assessing
overall model fit using various fit statistics (Schrieber et. al 2006). In this section I
present the fit statistics for the SEM models in chapter 5. Because of the clustered nature
of the data, most models were fit using clustered robust standard errors (described below)
which limit the fit statistics which can be used to test the overall model.

We use two fit

statistics to test the model. The first is the coefficient of determination (CD), which
indicates the proportion of the variance in the observations explained by the model. This
is analogous to the common R-squared statistic used in multiple regression. The second
is the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), which is an absolute measure of
fit, defined as the standardized difference between the observed and predicted
correlations (Kenny 2012). The SMSR is an absolute measure of fit, with a value of 0
meaning perfect fit. A heuristic rule for interpretation is that a value of less than .08 is a
good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). In order to make the fit statistics more robust, the
models were also run without robust errors to so that other statistics of fit could also be
evaluated. Here I report the Chi2, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA). Heuristically, a model is considered good fitting if it
has TLI >.94 or a RMSEA < .08 (Schrieber et. al 2006).
Tables TA.2 and TA.3 report the fit statistics for each of the models. Chi-square
was significant for all three. The bridging model is the best fitting with SRMR = 0.018,
TLI = 0.98, and RMSEA = 0.025. The cooperation and cohesion models fit slightly
worse, but still have acceptable fits with cooperation having SRMR = 0.034, TLI = 0.946,
RMSEA = 0.044 and cohesion having SRMR = 0.024, TLI = 0.969 and RMSEA = 0.029.
Table TA.3 reports the fit statistics for the neighborhood models. Again all three have
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significant chi-square statistic. The neighborhood bridging model has SRMR = 0.034,
RMSEA = 0.031, and TLI = 0.935. Each of these is within the acceptable range, but
indicate that the model is slightly less well fitting once we add in the neighborhood data.
The neighborhood bonding models have a similar decrease in fit, neighborhood
cooperation SRMR = 0.046, RMSEA = 0.045, and TLI = 0.954, while neighborhood
cohesion has SRMR = 0.047, RMSEA = 0.055, and TLI = 0.883. Of these, all are within
acceptable bounds, though the TLI score is a little below the fit cut-off. Part of this is due
to TLI’s sensitivity to model complexity. But because the other statistics are acceptable,
and TLI is close, the models are retained.

Table TA.2 Individual Level SEM Fit Statistics
SRMR
CD
Non-Robust Fit Statistics
Chi2 (model v. saturated)
TLI
RMSEA

(1) Bridges
0.018
0.390

(2) Cooperation
0.027
0.287

(3) Cohesion
0.024
-0.242

668.093***
0.983
0.018

1300.777***
0.957
0.031

580.228***
0.969
0.029

Table TA.3 Neighborhood Level SEM Fit Statistics
(1) N Bridges
SRMR
CD
Non-Robust Fit
Statistics
Chi2 (model v.
saturated)
TLI
RMSEA

0.034
-0.081

(2) N
Cooperation
0.046
0.268

(3) N Cohesion

(4)

0.047
0.603

0.031
0.543

4079.404***

6274.235 ***

6569.274***

3032.643

0.935
0.031

0.895
0.045

0.883
0.055

0.950
0.033

Table TA.3 reports the stability index and equation level fit statistics for each of
the models. The stability index is the Bentler and Freeman (1983) eigenvalue stability
index, which tests the stability of the non-recursive SEM models. In this case, all models
were found to be stable. For equation goodness-of-fit, I use the Bentler-Raykov squared
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multiple-correlation coefficient (Bentler and Raykov 2000). This is because R-Squared
equation level fit statistics can be misleading and potentially nonsensical in non-recursive
models, particularly ones with reciprocal causation. This statistic reports the squared
correlation between the dependent variable and its prediction, and is interpreted the same
as R-squared. Looking at the equation level fit in table TA.3 again, we see that the MC^2
statistics are much higher than what we had at the individual level. Neighborhood
income in particular, has a relatively large MC^2 in each of the models. Adding the
neighborhood level increased the MC for cooperation and cohesion at the individual level
by a great amount, but decreased it slightly for success and for bridges social capital.

Table TA.4 Stability Indices and Equation Level Fit
Model

(1)

Stability Index

Dependent Variables1
incvalue
SC*

n_income

N SC*

Bridges

0.263

0.284

0.206

N/A

N/A

Cooperation

0.459

0.267

0.056

N/A

N/A

(3)

Cohesion

0.160

0.147

0.002

N/A

N/A

(4)

N Bridges

0.587

0.223

0.188

0.550

0.001

(5) N
Cooperation

0.543

0.185

0.108

0.538

0.126

N Cohesion

0.410

0.135

0.159

0.669

0.466

0.489

0.230

0.245

0.625

0.299

(2)

(6)

(7)

Unitary

Reports the stability index and Bentler Raykove squared multiple correlation coefficients. SC* and NSC*
refer to the social capital and neighborhood social capital variables in the models.
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First Stage 2sls Regressions
Tables TA.5 and TA.6 report the first-stage regression coefficients for the 2SLS
models reported in tables 5.4 and 5.5 in chapter 5.

Table TA.5 Individual Level 2sls First Stage Regression
Dependent

Model (1)
bridge

Model (2)
Cohesion

Model (3)
Cooperation

Observation

7527

7527

7527

0.1283

0.0845

0.0637

0.014***

0.015***

0.016***

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.003)

-0.049***

-0.128***

-0.046**

(0.007)

(0.018)

(0.019)

-0.031***

0.064***

-0.011***

(0.009)

(0.065)

(0.023)

-0.016*

-0.120***

-0.111***

(0.009)

(0.021)

(0.023)

2

R

edu
young
old
hispanic
black
female
sepdiv
married
employed
church
tenure
Constant

0.006

-0.173***

-0.081***

(0.007)

(0.017)

(0.018)

-0.007

-0.027*

-0.058***

(0.006)

(0.020)

(0.0156)

0.012

-0.073***

-0.035

(0.008)

(0.021)

(0.023)

0.053***

0.046***

0.077***

(0.007)

(0.015)

(0.017)

0.017***

0.0716***

-0.013

(0.017)

(0.016)

(0.017)

0.075***

0.134***

0.180***

(0.006)

(0.014)

(0.015)

0.005***

0.005***

0.008***

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.267***

-0.222***

-0.291***

(0.017)

(0.040)

(0.044)

*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01, clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table TA.6 Neighborhood Level 2sls First Stage Regression
Dependent

Model (4)
n_bridge

Model (5)
n_cohesion

Model (6)
n_cooperation

Observation

8782

8782

8782

0.0866

0.3495

0.2096

0.069***

0.602***

0.309***

(0.008)

(0.018)

(0.018)

0.045***

0.307***

-0.051***

(0.009)

(0.027)

(0.016)

0.026***

-0.125***

-0.086***

(0.004)

(0.010)

(0.006)

-0.076***

-0.497***

-0.102***

(0.009)

(0.026)

(0.017)

0.137***

0.826***

0.418***

(0.007)

(0.019)

(0.012)

-0.110***

-0.613***

-0.224***

(0.008)

(0.022)

(0.014)

2

R

nbagrad
n_employed
n_black
n_femalehouse
n_tenure5
Constant

*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01, clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
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SEM Group Model
Table TA.7 reports the full results from model 8 reported in chapter 5.
Table TA.7 SEM Results for Group Model (8)
Observations

7527

Log pseudolikelihood

-252078.72
Stand
Coef.

Robust
Std. Err.

P>|z|

incvalue <-

Stand
Coef.

Robust
Std. Err.

P>|z|

SC <-

SC

incvalue
Poor

0.366

0.072

0.000

Poor

-0.298

0.071

0.000

Middle

0.395

0.039

0.000

Middle

-0.235

0.040

0.000

Affluent

0.043

0.080

0.591

Affluent

0.034

0.075

0.654

Poor

0.319

0.034

0.000

prestige

NSC
Poor

0.005

0.019

0.809

Middle

0.110

0.019

0.000

Middle

0.400

0.028

0.000

Affluent

0.062

0.032

0.050

Affluent

0.358

0.045

0.000

Poor

0.063

0.024

0.007

Poor

0.016

0.030

0.594

old

old
Middle

-0.074

0.018

0.000

Middle

-0.059

0.022

0.007

Affluent

0.051

0.042

0.224

Affluent

-0.052

0.045

0.253

Poor

-0.024

0.024

0.318

Poor

-0.088

0.028

0.001

Middle

0.022

0.017

0.191

Middle

-0.101

0.020

0.000

Affluent

0.002

0.038

0.963

Affluent

-0.095

0.046

0.039

young

young

edu

edu
Poor

0.099

0.022

0.000

Poor

0.132

0.028

0.000

Middle

0.097

0.023

0.000

Middle

0.124

0.022

0.000

Affluent

0.071

0.042

0.086

Affluent

0.039

0.035

0.270

Poor

0.062

0.027

0.023

Poor

0.018

0.034

0.591

hispanic

Hispanic
Middle

-0.029

0.023

0.196

Middle

-0.046

0.024

0.062

Affluent

-0.049

0.033

0.140

Affluent

-0.085

0.038

0.026

Poor

-0.047

0.027

0.084

Poor

-0.034

0.029

0.238

Middle

-0.013

0.019

0.499

Middle

-0.019

0.021

0.380

Affluent

0.027

0.033

0.412

Affluent

-0.027

0.037

0.465

Poor

-0.074

0.020

0.000

Poor

-0.053

0.022

0.015

Middle

-0.022

0.016

0.159

Middle

-0.058

0.020

0.003

Affluent

-0.043

0.032

0.178

Affluent

0.003

0.037

0.940

Poor

-0.017

0.027

0.534

black

black

female

female

sepdiv

sepdiv
Poor

-0.002

0.024

0.947

Middle

-0.012

0.017

0.488

Middle

-0.038

0.020

0.063

Affluent

0.043

0.038

0.258

Affluent

-0.065

0.041

0.111

married

married
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Poor

0.111

0.023

0.000

Poor

0.057

0.028

0.039

Middle

0.087

0.018

0.000

Middle

0.065

0.020

0.001

Affluent

0.049

0.040

0.220

Affluent

0.079

0.046

0.087

Poor

0.214

0.021

0.000

employed
Poor

0.011

0.028

0.699

Middle

0.108

0.016

0.000

Middle

0.041

0.021

0.056

Affluent

-0.152

0.042

0.000

Affluent

-0.026

0.042

0.540

Poor

0.218

0.025

0.000

employed

_cons

tenure
Poor

0.621

0.124

0.000

Middle

1.022

0.119

0.000

Middle

0.187

0.022

0.000

Affluent

2.386

0.304

0.000

Affluent

0.097

0.046

0.033

--

--

--

--

Poor

0.172

0.024

0.000

--

--

--

--

Middle

0.172

0.019

0.000

--

--

--

--

Affluent

0.121

0.043

0.005

n_income
Poor

-0.860

0.145

0.000

--

church

n_income <-

NSC <-

NSC
Poor

0.641

0.049

0.000

Middle

0.595

0.027

0.000

Middle

-0.528

0.083

0.000

Affluent

0.567

0.041

0.000

Affluent

-0.585

0.141

0.000

--

--

--

--

Poor

0.193

0.042

0.000

--

--

--

--

Middle

0.109

0.033

0.001

--

--

--

--

Affluent

0.055

0.060

0.357

Poor

0.443

0.024

0.000

n_employed
Poor

0.430

0.067

0.000

Middle

0.211

0.016

0.000

Middle

0.278

0.032

0.000

Affluent

0.100

0.028

0.000

Affluent

0.365

0.043

0.000

--

SC

n_employed

nbagrad

nbagrad
Poor

0.150

0.027

0.000

Poor

0.668

0.065

0.000

Middle

0.330

0.022

0.000

Middle

0.692

0.054

0.000

Affluent

0.525

0.030

0.000

Affluent

0.666

0.108

0.000

Poor

-0.011

0.022

0.619

Poor

-0.151

0.033

0.000

Middle

0.008

0.014

0.577

Middle

-0.234

0.027

0.000

Affluent

-0.013

0.022

0.567

Affluent

-0.329

0.042

0.000

Poor

0.057

0.029

0.052

-0.282

0.029

0.000

Middle

-0.018

0.017

0.294

Middle

-0.259

0.022

0.000

Affluent

0.017

0.036

0.635

Affluent

-0.243

0.034

0.000

Poor

-0.660

0.163

0.000

n_tenure5
Poor

0.608

0.041

0.000

Middle

-0.226

0.110

0.039

Middle

0.661

0.032

0.000

Affluent

-0.469

0.192

0.015

Affluent

0.868

0.065

0.000

n_black

n_black

n_femalehouse

_cons

Arrows indicate dependent variable.
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